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ABSTRACT
"THE LAW WILL MAKE YOU SMART": LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS, 




University of N ew  Hampshire, September, 1999
In 1834, one o f the informal leaders of Boston's black community 
rebuked a black defendant in court, declaring "the law  w ill make you smart." 
This dissertation uncovers h ow  African Americans in Massachusetts did  
indeed become 'smart' through an ongoing engagem ent w ith the law  for over 
two hundred years. W hile the law could be oppressive, the accessibility of the 
legal system in M assachusetts enabled black w om en and men, slave and free, 
to learn to use the law  in efforts to exercise som e control over their daily  
lives. In the deteriorating racial atmosphere during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the law  remained one of the few  arenas in which African 
Americans had any hope of experiencing the professed egalitarian ideals of 
the new republic. But the law  also instructed African Americans about the 
value of establishing and maintaining individual legal boundaries betw een  
themselves and others, black and white. Through their engagement w ith  the 
law, African Americans developed a legal consciousness that fostered a sense  
of themselves as autonom ous individuals. After emancipation, that legal 
consciousness com bined w ith a legal rights ideology to help define what it 
meant to be African American. That legal rights ideology eventually became 
an integral part of free black identity when African American leaders, who  
had expressed little identification with the new  nation in the first decades 
after the American Revolution, began to explicitly identify black m en and 
w om en as American in  response to attempts by som e whites to deny African 
Americans an Am erican identity and citizenship. Black leaders anchored 
their argument in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, and 
articulated a black identity defined in part by comm itm ent to achieving full 
citizenship rights. W hen som e black Bostonians balked in that comm itment, 
som e black leaders attem pted to define them as standing outside of the black 
community. What it m eant to be free, black, and American, remained a 
complex and at times contentious issue complicated by the evolution of legal 
consciousness and legal rights ideology.
ix
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Introduction
"The Law Will Make You Smart7: Legal Consciousness. Rights Rhetoric, and 
African American Identity Formation in Massachusetts. 1641-1855
In 1834, Governor Riggins, the black 'governor' of Boston, publicly- 
rebuked one of his subordinates, William Patterson, who had fallen to the 
mercies of the formal legal system. As governor, Riggins occupied an 
informal position of leadership within the black community that had cultural 
roots in N ew  England extending back into at least the middle of the 
eighteenth century. Black governors and kings, traditionally chosen by other 
slaves and free blacks during Negro Election Day festivals, were often men of 
exceptional physical strength and stature, but also demonstrated leadership 
ability befitting their role. In the nineteenth century, however, the 
prominence of black kings and governors was on the wane; Riggins, in fact, 
may have been the last in a line of black rulers in Boston. Riggins did not 
admonish Patterson for any grievous crime. Patterson had sim ply gone out 
and bought some unlicensed liquor for a group of African Americans who 
probably only sought momentary escape from the travails of a sometimes 
difficult existence. Making up only about five percent of the population, and 
living in a growing metropolis during an era of diminishing opportunity for 
and increased antipathy towards free people of color, black Bostonians had 
good reason to desire escape, even if only temporary. But Patterson's mistake 
was not buying unlicensed liquor. H e had gone outside of the governor's 
authority and made his purchase on a Sunday — Riggins reminded him that
1
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"I always gets a gallon o f good spirit on Saturday night" — and thus drew the 
ire of reform-minded city authorities. Riggins washed his hands of Patterson, 
declaring "the law w ill make you smart."1
Riggins spoke as a man firmly ensconced in black culture and 
community. He also spoke as a man well aware of the law's utility and 
power. The law, he knew, could teach through discipline. The legal 
consequences Patterson m ight suffer, likely a fine and several days in jail, 
w ould hopefully teach him to think more carefully about transgressing the 
informal authority the governor possessed within the black community. 
Riggins' declaration also suggests how the law  could make African Americans 
'smart': by running afoul of the law, Patterson probably learned how to avoid  
the law, but he also learned something about how  the law and the court 
worked. From experiences like this, he and other black Bostonians learned 
how  to use the law to their advantage as w ell as when to avoid it. And  
finally, Riggins' public chastisement of Patterson in court suggests his ability 
to work within the system . Whether or not Riggins brought the charge 
against Patterson him self or only testified as a witness is unclear, but his 
rebuke was surely as m uch for the court's benefit as for Patterson's. Riggins 
managed to use the law  to cast himself as a black man who supported the 
law's function of maintaining certain moral codes while reminding his 
subordinate of the price for overstepping his authority. That recasting of self 
in relation to the law likely had implications for Riggins' identity; it held  the 
potential to reinforce an image of himself as a black man who could 
sometimes use white institutions to his advantage.
1 Selections from the Court Reports originally published in the Boston Morning Post, from 1834 
to 1837 (Boston: Otis, Broaders, & Co. 1837), 173-174.
2
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This dissertation tells the story of African Americans7 engagem ent with 
the legal system  in Massachusetts from 1641 to 1855 and the consequences of 
that engagem ent for African American identity. Because the Massachusetts 
legal system  remained accessible to enslaved and free black w om en and men, 
African Americans gained a legal consciousness that shaped black identity 
formation. This process began in  the seventeenth century w ith ordinary 
black folk like Zippora, a slave w om an acquitted of infanticide in 1663, and 
the tw o slave wom en whose testim ony, along with Zippora7s ow n  account, 
contributed to her exoneration. In the South, black testimony w ould  soon be 
virtually meaningless, but in Massachusetts, black testimony carried legal 
w eight throughout the colonial era. All three black wom en gained some 
insight into how  the law worked in  N ew  England. The seeds of legal 
consciousness were planted early on.
The evolution of legal consciousness and its role in African American 
identity formation began soon after Africans came to the shores of  
M assachusetts. Chapter One sets that engagement within the unique context 
of Puritan law and documents the ability of enslaved and free black women 
and m en to use the law in Massachusetts. The law, along w ith other social 
and cultural interactions, played a role in the transition of an African identity 
to an African American identity. Chapter Two relates the story o f free black 
Americans like Chloe and Cesar Spear, w ho bought a house in  1798 with an 
eye towards improving their financial standing. African Americans began to 
acquire property in increasing numbers as they attempted to carve out a life 
for them selves in the young republic. Becoming property owners entailed 
signing a deed, which established legal boundaries and contributed to an 
awareness of how  to use the law. It also entailed becoming subject to a host of 
city regulations in a growing early nineteenth century urban area. The Spears
3
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and other African Americans experienced both the benefits of the pow er of 
the law and its concomitant restrictions. Chapter Two also carries the story 
into the nineteenth century and points to the significance of conflict within  
the black community. With the erosion of the black festivals and their 
judicial function within the black community, free people of color turned to 
the law in increasing numbers to m anage conflict with white and black 
Bostonians. That heightened awareness o f the law's utility, however, also 
affected black identity. A  likely consequence of their court involvem ent was 
the inculcation of how  one's rights as a citizen worked on a practical, 
personal, day-to-day level, and blacks' acceptance of the law's role in ordering 
their lives. Chapter Three traces African Americans' continued use of the 
lower courts despite a new court system  installed by reform-minded city 
officials after the incorporation of Boston in 1822. During the antebellum era, 
a time of increased racial antipathy, African Americans' legal consciousness 
continued to be informed by a variety of encounters with the law, and they 
continued to demonstrate a knowledge o f and belief in the law's utility. But 
the increased hostility, combined with black Bostonians' steady court 
appearances, drew the attention of newspaper reporters, who began to 
regularly lampoon black litigants. The court reports made black litigants into 
public performers and contributed to a racist caricature, paralleling the rise of 
minstrel show s.
The fourth and fifth chapters shift the focus to the impact of black 
leaders' rights rhetoric on black identity. Sparked largely by the abolition of 
the slave trade in 1808 and the rise of the colonization movement nearly a 
decade later, black leaders began explicitly defining free people of color as 
Americans. Forming a key part of the foundation of their definition w as the 
Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. The legal consciousness
4
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of black leaders manifested itself in a belief that the law, based on the 
Constitution, was and should be able to protect and prosper African 
Americans. A  legal rights ideology — the belief that legal rights should reflect 
and aid the aims and needs of African Americans — became an integral part of 
black identity. As Chapter Five demonstrates, an incorporation of fighting for 
rights within black identity led to acrimonious disputes within the black 
community. When one group of black Bostonians, who preferred to avoid  
rather than fight certain kinds of discrimination, decided to try and keep the  
city's black school open, black integrationists attempted to define them as 
traitors to their race and country. The black separatists viewed the law as a 
means of protecting themselves from white interference in their lives, 
whereas integrationist-minded members of the community wielded their 
legal consciousness to identify denied rights, and claim them by negating the  
'rights' of white and black Bostonians to maintain any separate black school.
The definition and usage of the term 'legal consciousness' in these 
pages is best encapsulated by Michael Grossberg's description of legal 
consciousness as a "conscious sense of legal entitlement that encourages 
individuals and groups to use legal beliefs in disputes about their status, 
rights, duties, and problems."2 Unpacking the key terms of Grossberg's 
definition helps elaborate how the term is used here. First, legal 
consciousness is conscious. It does not operate on som e subliminal level, but 
is an awareness informed through experience, whether that experience is 
personal, vicarious, or communicated through others. Legal consciousness is 
an informed, though varied, awareness of the presence of the law's power  
and function.
2 Michael Grossberg, A Judgment for Solomon: The D'Hauteville Case and Legal Experience in 
Antebellum America (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.
5
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Second, legal consciousness involves a sense of legal entitlement.
Legal consciousness entails the sense that individuals or groups should be 
able to use the law, and, I would add, that to som e extent the law  exists for 
their use and their benefit. Individuals or groups who possess a legal 
consciousness m ay simultaneously perceive the law  as beneficial, deficient, or 
oppressive, because the law is not monolithic. David Walker expressed this 
in 1829 w hen he complained that black property owners were rarely able to 
pass on their property to their heirs. W henever a black property owner in 
Boston died, Walker claimed that the real estate "most generally falls into the 
hands of som e w hite person."3 Walker surely understood that the law  
required that creditors be satisfied, but he apparently believed that whites 
som ehow exploited the situation to deprive black families of their 
inheritances. In this case, he believed the law  to be deficient in its perceived  
inability to protect black families.
But his protest indicates how  he believed the law should function.
And the experience of many black property owners in Massachusetts belied 
Walker's protest. African American w id ow s knew  they could petition the 
court for an allowance and a dower, and thus obtain legal protection of a 
portion of the inheritance from creditors. Abel Barbadoes, a black property 
owner who died in 1820 in Boston, left his property to his wife, w ho managed 
to keep it and eventually passed it on to her children. Peter Howard, a black 
barber whose shop was frequented by black and white abolitionists and who  
probably knew Walker, bought property in  1822 on Poplar Street for $1400, 
lived there for 32 years, and then deeded the property to his sons for $1 and
3 David Walker, David Walker's Appeal, in Four Articles; Together xvith a Preamble, to the
Coloured Citizens o f the World, but in particular, and very expressly, to those o f the United
States of America (Boston:1829), 10.
6
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"considerations." Even families in danger o f losing their property were 
sometimes able to devise strategies to keep property by exploiting ties within  
the black community. Thomas and Margaret Revaleon bought property near 
Boston late in life. In 1831, their house w as up for auction due to a tax debt, 
but the Revaleons managed to have it sold to their son-in-law, Peter Howard. 
Howard eventually sold the house back to the Robert Revaleon, with the 
understanding that Robert w ould take care of Margaret, his mother.4 The 
ability of these and other fam ilies  to use probate laws reinforced the 
conception of legal entitlement, that the law  should be usable and beneficial. 
When the law was not usable or beneficial — for there were surely cases that 
substantiated Walker's criticism — African Americans did not necessarily 
perceive the law  as useless, but in need of remedy.
Finally, the conscious sense of legal entitlem ent encourages people to 
use legal beliefs. Legal beliefs are perceptions of how  the law does or should  
work, perceptions based on personal experience, on information passed 
through the neighborhood, or by watching w hat happens to others who  
encounter the law. Legal beliefs may be inaccurate and still be effective, or at 
least perceived by those employing legal beliefs to be effective. Historian 
Hendrick Hartog has pointed out that people m ay sometimes be "objectively 
wrong...about what public institutions w ou ld  actually do" in certain 
situations. Nevertheless, people's "legal assertions and claims are 
important...not for their truth as law, but for their roles in giving m eaning to 
actions." In 1701 a slave named Adam believed he had a legal basis for
4 Carol Bulchalter Stapp, Afro-Americans in Antebellum Boston: An Analysis of Probate
Records (New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), 3-4; Franklin A Dorman, Twenty Families of
Color in Massachusetts, 1742-1998 (Boston: N ew  England Historic Genealogical Society, 1998), 
2-3,144, 365-366; on Peter Howard and his barber shop, see James Oliver Horton and Lois E. 
Horton, Black Bostonians: Family Life and Community Struggle in the Antebellum North (N e w  
York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), 37.
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becoming a free man. As Chapter One documents, his belief informed his 
actions for tw o years, despite repeated legal setbacks during his pursuit of legal 
freedom. In 1837, when black Bostonians John and Sophia Robinson 
kidnapped a young black girl from a white family who they believed intended 
to sell her back into slavery, their actions were informed by their 
understanding of the law  and by a similar previous case. Though the court 
informed them their interpretation of the law  was wrong, their 
understanding of the law  continued to inform their actions.5
On other occasions, legal beliefs can be employed without ever actually 
formally engaging the law. Legal beliefs include perceptions of how  law can 
work in life outside the legal system as w ell as in it. Chapter Two documents 
black Bostonians' zealous use of a justice of the peace court in the early 
nineteenth century. Many of them probably used the threat of litigation to 
intimidate irritating neighbors or would-be assailants. The group of black 
Bostonians w ho set up the African Humane Society in 1818 made sure to 
include a by-law that authorized the directors to act as a court with the power 
to try members suspected of violating any of the Society's rules. African 
Americans understood the value of infusing certain situations w ith the 
authority of the law.
It is these three key concepts working in conjunction that define legal 
consciousness. It is a cognizance of how the law  works, coupled with some 
expectation of the law  as useful and potentially beneficial, and the actual 
employment o f that knowledge and expectation, whether in attempts to gain 
rights, change one's status, or simply to manage neighborhood conflicts.
5 Hendrick Hartog, "Abigail Bailey's Coverture: Law in a Married Woman's Consciousness," in
Law in Everyday Life, ed. Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1993), 69.
8
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To some extent, this differs from how some legal scholars employ the 
term. Austin Sarat, for instance, calls legal consciousness "a consciousness of 
power and domination... and a consciousness of resistance." He examines 
how individuals enm eshed in the m odem  welfare system  attempt to 
navigate through the terrain of legal rules and practices of bureaucracy. Sarat 
concludes that the welfare poor experience and understand the law as 
"grounded in the realities of a society in which race, wealth, and power 
matter, and law is neither more nor less useful because it does not transcend 
or transform the world as they know it."6 African Americans in 
Massachusetts during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were not 
ignorant of the relevance of race, wealth, and power, but did perceive the law  
as a tool that could be used  to make a difference in their world. The law was 
one of the few forms o f power available to them in an increasingly racist and 
hostile environment. Black leaders in antebellum M assachusetts and 
throughout the North demonstrated their belief in the law's utility when  
they resorted to a rights rhetoric based on the Constitution to assert their legal 
standing as citizens, and called Americans to live up to the both the laws and 
spirit of the Constitution.
This divergence in  the legal consciousness of free people of color and 
the people of Sarat's study points to the difficulty of talking about legal 
consdousness. Sarat7s definition of legal consdousness is applicable to the 
particular group of people in the spedfic context of the m odem  welfare 
bureaucracy. In fact, that is a key part of his argument: Sarat condudes that 
"legal consdousness is, like law itself, polyvocal, contingent and variable." 
Even within the welfare poor, legal consdousness varies. Legal scholars
6 Austin Sarat, " '...The Law Is All Over': Power, Resistance and the Legal Consciousness of the 
Welfare Poor," Yale Journal o f  Law and the Humanities 2 (Summer 1990), 344 and 359.
9
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Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey define legal consciousness as "the ways in 
which people make sense of law  and legal institutions." But, like Sarat, they 
argue that "consciousness is neither fixed, stable, unitary, nor consistent. 
Instead, w e see legal consciousness as something local, contextual, pluralistic, 
filled w ith conflict and contradiction."7
But, even considering the variation of legal consciousness, "it has 
shape and pattern." Part of the shape and pattern, according to Ewick and 
Silbey, is people's "tactical engagement" with the law. Tactics involve the use 
of legal beliefs to discern how  to resist the institutional pow er of the law and 
the courts. Resistance does not typically mean criminal activity; it is the 
ability to exploit the weak links in the law  in order to use it, avoid it, or work 
within it to achieve one's goals. For instance, when a black man in colonial 
Massachusetts was arrested for not carrying a lit lantern, he shrewdly pointed 
out that the town ordinance m erely stated that blacks, mulattos, and Indians 
were required to carry a lantern after dark. Nowhere did it m ention that the 
lantern had to be lit. The selectmen's intention had clearly been to require 
any black man or woman who w as out at night to be easily visible. This black 
man, however, went out repeatedly at night and managed to escape 
prosecution because of a w eak link in the law. In the antebellum era, black 
leaders used a rights rhetoric to challenge segregation — they em ployed legal 
beliefs about rights and the Constitution to challenge what they considered to 
be an unjust law. In both cases, African Americans used the law  against itself 
to achieve their goals.8
7 Sarat, 375; Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, "Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An 
Account of Legal Consciousness," New England Law Review 26 (Spring, 1992), 734 and 742.
8 Ewick and Silbey, "Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance," 742; Edward H. Savage, A
Chronological History of the Boston Watch and Police, from 1631 to 1865; Together with the 
Recollections of a Boston Police Officer, or Boston by Daylight and Gaslight (Boston: 1865), 33;
10
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Like these examples, much of the legal scholarship dealing w ith the 
late twentieth century casts individuals' use of tactics within an adversarial 
relationship w ith  law . People wield their legal consciousness in a sort of 
sparring match w ith  the law to achieve certain goals or to protect themselves 
from the law. Though that kind of relationship characterizes some of the 
stories in this dissertation, the argument here is that African Americans' 
engagement w ith  the law  was not always adversarial. Because African 
Americans did n ot perceive the law as w holly  hostile or useless, their 
conscious sense o f legal entitlement encouraged them to use the law  in their 
everyday lives. For them, the law was not always an institution to be resisted. 
A t times, it w as an effective ally. And frequently, African Americans found 
the law useful for regulating their relationships and conflicts with one 
another.
The calls of historians of pre-Civil War black America to push into the 
relatively unbroken territory of conflict w ithin African America fueled much 
of this dissertation. Over a decade ago, N ell Irvin Painter succinctly issued a 
summons to turn over this new ground by getting historians to
transcend the w eight of stereotype and to bravely investigate black life 
fully, even w hen  the evidence show s angry, violent, disorderly black 
people. After all, anger, violence, and disorder are thoroughly 
human em otions and actions. By sanitizing blacks who lived in  the 
past, historians make them less com plete human beings.9
A Report o f the Record Cotnissioners of the City o f Boston, containing the Selectmen's Minutes 
from 1769 to April, 1775 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1893), November 9 1769.
9 Nell Irvin Painter, "Comment" in The State o f Afro-American History: Past, Present, and
Future (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1986), 88. Painter's "Comment" was in response to 
an essay in The State o f Afro-American History b y  Armistead L. Robinson, "The Difference 
Freedom Made: The Emancipation of Afro-Americans," 51-74.
11
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There is no shame in acknowledging the reality of the ugly sides of the lives 
of an oppressed people, even when that ugliness grew of their own volition. 
That individual Africans and African Americans often chose to indulge in 
petty, selfish, even vicious behavior is no surprise, but perhaps due to a fear 
of supplying political ideologues with weapons for hurling charges of black 
inferiority, or a fear o f enabling those same ideologues to absolve themselves 
of individual, corporate, and institutional responsibility, historians have 
devoted scant attention to black misbehavior except w hen cast as a form of 
resistance.
Slighting any aspect of African Americans' history, however, means 
missing opportunities to explore causes, ’meaning, and consequences of 
events in black peoples' lives. It means missing the choices they made.
Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham pointed to this w hen she commented that the 
powerful rubrics of race and gender not only obscure important distinctions 
in antebellum gender constructions, but also m ask significant differences 
along class and gender lines within  black communities. Higginbotham also 
argued that the term 'race' has superimposed "a 'natural' unity over a 
plethora of historical, socioeconomic, and ideological differences" among 
African Americans. Furthermore, race, "as the sign of cultural identity has 
been neither a coherent or static concept among African Americans."10 For 
nineteenth-century African Americans, and twentieth-century historians, the 
term 'race' typically signified the kind of cultural, social, and experiential 
common ground upon which slaves and free black w om en and men had 
trod. The term also tended to homogenize African Americans and the terrain 
they traversed. That comm on ground was frequently uneven, and African
10 Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham, "African-American Women's History and the Metalanguage
of Race," Signs 17 (Winter 1992), 270.
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Americans often walked different and sometimes diverging paths. This 
dissertation tracks some of those paths and how  they helped outline black 
identity in the north.
Other scholars, including Gary Nash, James Oliver Horton and Lois E. 
Horton, Shane White, and Clarence Walker, along with Painter and 
Higginbotham, have all called for more scholarship that unpacks the 
meaning of fractures in black communities.11 Few have answered the call. 
This dissertation uses those fractures as an entry point, and legal actions as an 
analytical tool, to uncover important elements of individual and corporate 
identity formation. Africans became African American not only in 
opposition to w hite people, but also through countless interactions with one 
another. Many of those interactions took place in the legal realm.
This dissertation examines how  black women and m en became African 
Americans by examining a trajectory of identity formation in one locale, 
namely Boston, from the seventeenth century to the eve of the Civil War. 
How and w hy northern slaves and their descendants eventually formed an 
identity defined by national boundaries has been insufficiently explored.
Many African Americans w ere attracted to the potential of the Revolution. 
There was a disjunction, how ever, between the promise o f the Revolution 
and the life experiences of black people: black folks knew that many whites 
viewed them in a less than favorable light, and it is doubtful that all black 
women and m en assumed that white prejudices would easily dissipate in
11 James Oliver Horton, Free People of Color: Inside the African American Community
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993); Gary Nash, Forging Freedom: The 
Formation of Philadelphia's Black Community, 1720-1840 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1988); Clarence Walker, Deromanticizing Black History: Critical Essays and 
Reappraisals (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991); Shane White, Somewhat More 
Independent; The End of Slavery in New York City, 1770-1810 (Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1991).
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revolutionary fervor. The vestiges of an African worldview that taught 
Africans about life's uncertainties, combined w ith their own experience of 
white (and black) duplicity, would have rem inded them that things are often 
not what they seem . The assumption, then, that slaves and ex-slaves accepted 
the Revolutionary rhetoric at face value and subsequently identified  
themselves w ith a n ew  country that had been the site of their exploitation for 
over a century needs to be interrogated on tw o counts: first, by examining 
what processes m ay have been at work to facilitate black people's accepting 
membership in this new  country; and second, by questioning if the process 
was complete at the establishment of the United States of America.
On the first count, this dissertation explores how engagement with a 
central social institution, the law, contributed to African Americans 
exchanging an identity forged in slavery for an identity forged in freedom. 
William Piersen has demonstrated how  N ew  England slaves' incorporation 
into white families exposed them to 'Yankee' habits of mind and work, 
which helped shaped eighteenth-century Africans into African Americans.12 
I argue that interacting with the law in a variety of forums for over a hundred 
years before the Revolution was also an integral part of shaping an identity 
that facilitated enslaved and free blacks accepting a conception of themselves 
as African and American.
On the second count, this dissertation argues that after emancipation in 
Massachusetts during the 1780s, African Americans' engagement w ith the law  
accelerated from that point and throughout the Early Republic era.
Heightened interaction w ith the law am ong black peoples of all ranks thus 
continued to shape black identity in the new  nation. African American
12 William D. Piersen, Black Yankees: The Development of an Afro-American Subculture in
eighteenth Century New England (Amherst: University o f Massachusetts Press, 1988).
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identity was not a fa it accompli after emancipation, but an ongoing process of 
negotiation and contestation between black and w hite peoples, between black 
peoples and social institutions, and among African Americans themselves as 
they frequently w ielded the law and notions about the law against one 
another as well as white citizens.
A host of cross-cultural influences shaped African American identity. 
Ira Berlin, Mechal Sobel, and William Piersen and others have revealed a 
good deal of the eighteenth-century process of transformation through labor, 
culture, and social exchanges; Albert Raboteau, Jon Butler, Betty Wood and 
Sylvia Frey have done likewise in the area of religion.13 This study 
complements that historiography by tracing black interaction with a 
pervasive and central institution of colonial and American society, the law, 
and how that interaction shaped African American identity.
The law remained one arena in which African Americans in 
Massachusetts stood som e chance of contesting w ith whites on a relatively 
level playing field and an arena that remained accessible. This made 
emotional and mental investm ent in the legal system  all the more attractive. 
The law came to play an important role as African Americans turned to the 
legal system for redress w hen other avenues were growing more restricted. 
Economic advancement was difficult, political advancement nearly 
impossible, but legal success was realistic. Black Bostonians knew this from
13 Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Tzoo Centuries of Slavery in North America
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1998); Mechal Sobel, The World They Made 
Together: Black and White Values in Eighteenth-Century Virginia (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1987); Piersen, Black Yankees; Syliva R. Frey and Betty Wood, Come 
Shouting to Zion: African American Protestantism in the American South and British 
Caribbean to 1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Jon Butler, Awash 
in a Sea of Faith: Christianizing the American People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1990); Albert Raboteau, Slave Religion: The "Invisible Institution" in the Antebellum South 
(N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1978).
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personal experiences of having their testimony matter in court, signing deeds, 
having wills validated, using justice of the peace courts, and succeeding in  
appeals to higher courts. In short, the law made a real difference in their lives 
for nearly two hundred years.14
This argument contributes a historical perspective to an ongoing debate 
in another discipline. Within the law and society field, critical legal studies 
scholars have raised intriguing questions challenging the notion that rights 
and a rights discourse are effective tools for weakening white hegemony. 
These scholars argue that rights talk merely stifles challenge. In response, 
critical race theorists, while acknowledging the potential that a rights 
discourse can be muted, have argued that legal consciousness and rights do 
matter in a variety of ways and can indeed be w ielded  to mount effective 
challenges. After examining the historical evidence of African Americans' 
ability to frequently "harness the power of the law," this dissertation comes 
dow n on the side of the critical race theorists.15
This dissertation speaks to two related areas in  the law and sotiety field. 
The first involves the degree to which litigants' court experience reinforces or 
sustains hegemony. Douglas Hay and E. P. Thompson have argued for an 
understanding of law as an ideology wielded to maintain hegemony. But
14 Gary Nash and Shane White both document the worsening conditions for northern African 
Americans during the Early Republic era. See Gary Nash, Forging Freedom; and Shane 
White, Somewhat More Independent; and " 'It Was a Proud Day': African Americans,
Festivals, and Parades in the North, 1741 - 1834," Journal of American History 81 (June 1984) 
13-50.
15 For two seminal artides outlining critical race theory, see Patricia J. Williams, "Alchemical 
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties 
Law Review 22 (Spring 1987) 401-433; and Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law," Harvard Law 
Revieiu 101 (May 1988) 1331-1382. The phrase "harness the pow er of the law" is taken from 
Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working-class 
Americans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 180.
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Thompson, and to a lesser extent Hay, note that the law  was often contested 
ground between the ruled and the rulers. Thompson sees the law as an arena 
of conflict, in  which the ruling class usually has the upper hand, but in order 
to maintain an advantage they have to ascribe to the law  a certain amount of 
real justice and impartiality. This in turn limits the pow er of ruling classes 
and to som e extent protects the common man. Imbuing the law with some 
real justice can even provide a means to attack hegem ony - though it also can 
stifle rebellion. Instrumentally, the law is used by the ruling class and thereby 
serves existing class relations; ideologically, the law transcends class relations 
and possesses at least the potential to have a real impact on social relations. 
The dom inant groups continually strive to minimize that potential, while 
subordinate groups persistently work at maximizing that potential.16
Radical challenges can be m uted through transmission of the norms of 
social control articulated by the courts. Marc Galanter has argued that 
litigants 'carry' back the values and norms of the legal culture to their 
communities as they use it to gain leverage over their neighborhood 
antagonists or merely through relating what happened to them in court.
Sally Engle Merry and others have complicated this picture of hegemonic 
dominance by arguing that by making the court accessible for ordinary folk to 
litigate grievances, the law cannot hide all the cracks in  the armor: litigants 
learn how  to manipulate the system  to their own advantage, they learn 
where the law  breaks down, and they learn the limits of the courts' reach. But 
they do absorb and become subject in varying degrees to the social control 
mechanisms of the court. Merry sees "a continuing struggle" between
16 Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law" in Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime 
and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 3-64; E. P. 
Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (New York, Pantheon Books, 1975).
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subordinate groups seeking to "harness the pow er of the law" and the pow er  
of the law  to reinforce hegemony. My argument aligns with Merry's. African 
Americans were clearly a subordinate group, but were able to 'harness the 
power of the law '.17 D oing so meant gaining som e control over their lives 
while sim ultaneously sacrificing a kind of cultural autonomy that existed to 
varying degrees under slavery. It also meant that black identity w ould be 
informed by the law , w hich would influence the language and m ethod of 
challenges to society's oppression of black America.
Rights rhetoric became a primary language for challenging oppression. 
Hendrick Hartog points out that the developm ent of rights consciousness 
potentially limits the effectiveness or range of challenges to accepted 
conventions. The critical legal studies m ovem ent believes that the term 
'rights' effectively lim its the challenges of subordinate groups, frequently 
because in the Am erican context of liberal individualism  rights stresses 
individual rights at the expense of group rights and needs. Some in the CLS 
school argue that a 'rights' discourse should be discarded and the discourse 
should instead be governed by needs. By conceptualizing their challenges in  
the acceptable language of 'rights', the potential of fundamental change that 
might threaten existing relations of power has been safely channeled into a 
discourse about constitutional rights.18
The evolution of legal consciousness and the incorporation of a legal 
rights ideology that stressed individual rights into black identity may have
17 Marc Galanter, "The Radiating Effects of the Courts" in Empirical Theories about Courts, ed. 
Keith O. Boyum and Lynn Mather (New York: Longman, 1983), 117-142; Sally Engle Merry, 
Getting Justice and Getting Even, 180.
18 See Hendrick Hartog, "The Constitution of Aspiration and 'The Rights That Belong to Us 
AH'" Journal of American History 74 (December 1987), 1013-1034; Leon Fink, "Labor, Liberty, 
and the Law: Trade Unionism  and the Problem of the American Constitutional Order," Journal 
of American History 74 (December 1987), 904-925.
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indeed eventually limited black challenges by undermining the possibility of 
constructing legal challenges based on group rights and needs. But legal 
consciousness and legal rights ideology also em powered black citizens. This 
type of trade-off in the experience of African Americans in Massachusetts 
suggests further ambiguity within black identity and experience. But the 
historical evidence indicates that having, claiming, and using rights had 
tangible and intangible m eaning in the lives of black Americans; the 
confidence that the constable could be called and the court used to punish or 
remove neighborhood antagonists cannot be easily dism issed as hegemonic 
control.19 Through the law , many free blacks learned that at times, some of 
the articulated goals of a democratic and egalitarian republic could actually be 
realized. That confidence also meant absorbing concepts and ideals that 
helped shaped black identity, at times producing conflict with the black 
community. African Americans did not then, and do not now, always agree 
on how  the law could 'make you smart.'
19 I am borrowing here from Patricia J. Williams' critique of the CLS school. See Williams, 
"Alchemical Notes."
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Chapter One
Becoming African American: Building Boundaries of Self, 1641-1783
The story of slavery's legal end in Massachusetts frequently begins in 
1781 w ith the rather well-known tale of Quock Walker's law suit against 
Nathaniel Jennison, who claimed to be Walker's owner and who resorted to 
violence in an attempt to drag Walker back into bondage. The few historians 
w ho have bothered to pay attention to what prompted Walker's decision to 
use the court instead of resorting to other alternatives — he could have 
submitted, retaliated, or run off — have surmised that Walker was likely 
instructed by whites motivated either by sympathy for Walker or by their own  
private feuds with Jennison.20 Little consideration has been given to the 
possibility that Walker needed no prompting or instruction on available legal 
options. It is entirely likely that Walker not only knew he had legal recourse 
against a white man, but that he knew  exactly what court to go to, when the 
court met, and how  to go about getting justice. While he m ay have had 
assistance from whites at the outset, as he did later in what turned out to be a 
drawn-out court battle, there is no reason to suppose that Walker was 
ignorant of the legal processes; in fact, his actions are remarkably consistent
20 See John D. Cushing, "The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts: 
More Notes on the 'Quock Walker Case/" American Journal of Legal History 5 (1961), 118-144. 
There has been some debate on whether this case was solely responsible for abolition in 
Massachusetts; see Arthur Zilversmit, "Quok Walker, Mumbet, and the Abolition of Slavery in 
Massachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly 25 (1968), 614-624; and Elaine MacEacheren, 
"Emancipation of Slavery in Massachusetts: A  Reexamination 1770-1790," Journal of Negro 
History 55 (October 1970), 289-306. Moreover, while the Walker case did in some respects 
represent a culmination of several legal decisions resulting in abolition, sporadic cases of 
enslavement continued for a few years after the resolution of this case. See William E. Nelson, 
Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 
1760-1830 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 102.
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with the Body o f Liberties of 1641 that instructed servants to seek refuge from 
"the Tiranny and crueltie of their masters" by going to a freeman neighbor 
and ensuring that "due notice thereof be speedily given" to a magistrate as 
well as the master. These instructions w ere repeated in the general laws of 
the colony in 1672 and reiterated in a w idely  circulated catechism in  1726. 
Walker was only one of many slaves during the course of the century who  
exercised the ability to appeal to neighbors and, more importantly, the law.21 
While other historians have documented that black New Englanders had 
been actively engaged in the courts for over one hundred years by the time 
Walker pressed his case, none have considered how  this ongoing engagement 
with the law shaped identity as Africans, and later African Americans, moved 
from slavery to freedom.
During the seventeenth century, a tension existed between Puritan 
faith that dem anded legal recognition of persons created in the im age of God, 
and Puritan practice of protecting property and using bound labor. First and 
second generation Africans in New England found opportunity to exploit that 
tension. Other historians have documented the latitude and apparent 
impartiality of Massachusetts courts w hen dealing with free and enslaved  
blacks, but no consideration has been given  to w hat this meant to Africans as
21 Collections o f the Massachusetts Historical Society, v.8, 3rd series (Boston: Charles C. Little 
and James Brown, 1843), 230. This volume reprinted the 1641 Body of Liberties in their entirety 
on pages 218-237. The Body of Liberties were recategorized, expanded, and in som e cases 
ammended in The General Laws and Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony (Cambridge, 1672), 
reprinted in The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts (Boston: 1887). The law referred to here is on 
p. 105 of this reprint. This law was again recommended as the appropriate course o f action for 
slaves in Samuel W illard's A Compleat Body of D ivin ity in Two Hundred and Fifty Expository 
Lectures on the Assembly's Shorter Catechism... (Boston: 1726), 616-17, sermon #179 (the 
pagination in Willard's volume was repeated; this reference is the second set o f pages so 
numbered). The Body of Liberties and Willard were no doubt relying on an interpretation of 
Deuteronomy 23:15-16, which stipulated that Israelites "shall not hand over to his master a 
slave who has escaped fro his master to you. He shall live with you in your midst, in the place 
which he shall choose in one of your towns where it pleases him; you shall not mistreat him."
21
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
they transitioned into N ew  England society and culture. Due in part to the 
unique combination of the law's ambiguity regarding the legal status of 
slaves, and black N ew  Englanders' familiarity with the day-to-day business of 
their owners, including whites' court activities, som e slaves and free blacks 
managed to construct legal boundaries between themselves and their 
owners.22 Mundane legal acts such as committing one's name to a property 
deed, as Sebastian Kaine did in 1656, fixed a claim to land that whites could 
not legally violate.23 While anthropologist James Clifford has pointed out 
that identity is not merely a matter of maintaining boundaries but is also "a 
nexus of relations and transactions actively engaging a subject,”24 for first and 
second generation Africans, establishing boundaries was a critical stage during 
these early years of slavery. The law helped slaves and free blacks perform 
two vital functions of identity formation: maintaining boundaries, and 
actively engaging in a "nexus of relations and transactions" with white and 
black New Englanders. That the law was an integral part of negotiating 
identity also meant that a central institution of N ew  England society played a 
role in the construction of an African American identity, as slaves had 
notions of self influenced by English definitions of the legal person.
22 On the apparent impartiality of the law, see Robert C. Twombly and Robert H. Moore,
"Black Puritan: The Negro in Seventh-Century Massachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly 
24 (April 1967), 224- 242; and Lorenzo Greene, The Negro in Colonial Nezo England 1620-1776 
(N ew  York: Columbia University Press, 1942); also see Cornelia Dayton, Women Before the 
Bar: Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 1639-1789 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1995). On family slavery, see William D. Piersen, Black Yankees:The 
Development of an Afro-American Subculture in Eighteenth-Century New England (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 25-36.
23 Sebastian Kaine appears in the Thwing Database at the Massachusetts Historical Society. 
This database, an ongoing project at the MHS, contains references and notes on over 4000 African 
Americans in Boston who appear in a variety of records, primarily before 1800. While some 
references are very brief, m any contain a significant amount o f information.
24 James Clifford, The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature 
and Art, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 344.
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This chapter aims to uncover the experience of Africans and their 
descendants as they engaged the legal system in colonial Massachusetts, and  
how  that experience contributed to the gradual formation of an African 
American identity. Because the few  sources are rarely in the words or from 
the perspective of black N ew  Englanders, however, this chapter interprets 
their actions and serves in some respects to lay the groundwork for 
succeeding chapters by establishing that black interaction with the law and 
Africans' knowledge of the workings of the legal system was far from atypical. 
Their experience with the law proved to be an integral part of the ongoing 
process of negotiating an African American identity well into the nineteenth 
century.
Determining Africans' place in New England society was not simply a 
matter of whites imposing laws that defined black men and women as 
property for life. The legal relationships of power between colonists and 
enslaved Africans were murky for much of the seventeenth century, in large 
part because, unlike the rest of the New World, there was no slave law from  
the mother country to transfer to the colonies. Historian Alan Watson has 
noted that in the British colonies the law in general was made by colonial 
courts and legislatures and not simply taken straight from England. This w as  
especially true regarding slave law; because England had no slave law, 
colonial courts did not even have a standard from the home country to use as 
a referent. By contrast, in the Spanish colonies the power of making law  
resided in Spain. But in British North America, as the institution of slavery 
evolved, slave law "came into being bit by bit, either by statute or by judicial 
precedent, sometimes based on what people did."25 Though African slaves
23
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came to Massachusetts during the first generation of settlers, the law dealt 
with them by name only sporadically. In 1652, the General Court stipulated 
"that all Scotsmen, Negeres and Indians" had to attend militia training along 
w ith the English, but m odified that order four years later w ith a racial 
exclusion: Indians and blacks, whether free or slave, w ere barred from 
training or carrying arms. In 1680, the General Court prevented any vessels 
from sailing from the colony w ith  any "Passengers, or any Servant or Negro" 
unless the Governor had granted perm ission.26
Nevertheless, in the seventeenth century and the first half of the 
eighteenth century, when racial ideologies and concepts defining 'race' in 
British North America were still nebulous and fluid, the law, as much as any 
other mechanism, gradually came to play an important role in defining for 
the white and black peoples of N ew  England how Africans w ould fit into 
society.27 But because Africans w ere an unplanned part o f  the errand into the 
wilderness, and because they w ere few  in number, seventeenth-century law  
in Massachusetts was largely silent regarding the black presence. When the 
General Court compiled the Body of Liberties in 1641 and stated that "There 
shall never be any bond slaverie, villinage or Captivitie amongst us," they 
added a significant qualifier to the absolute term "never" by permitting 
slavery in cases of "lawfull Captives taken in just warres, and such strangers
25 Alan. Watson, Slave Law in the Americas (Athens: University o f Georgia Press, 1989), 64; 
Jonathan A. Bush, "The British Constitution and the Creation of American Slavery," in 
Slavery and the Law, ed. Paul Finkelman (Madison: Madison H ouse, 1997), 382.
26 George H. Moore, Notes on the History o f Slavery in Massachusetts, (N ew  York: 1866), 243; 
The General Laws and Liberties, 281.
27 Concerning the ongoing construction of race in seventeenth-century British America, see 
Winthrop Jordan, White over Black, American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (N ew  
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1968), 3-98; T.H. Breen and Stephen Innes, "Myne Owne Ground": 
Race and Freedom on Virginia's Eastern Shore, 1640-1676 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1980); Ira Berlin, Many Thousands Gone: The First Two Centuries o f Slavery in North America 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1998).
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as willingly selle themselves or are sold to us."28 The apparent contradiction  
is understandable when the context w ithin  which the Court articulated this 
conditional 'antislavery' law is taken into account. Three types of slavery  
existed in early Puritan New England: Indians captured in what the colony 
defined as 'just wars', such as the Pequot War in 1637 or other wars 
considered to be in self-defense or in defense of allies that had been 
authorized by the General Court;29 African slaves; and white servants who  
had been convicted of a crime and sentenced to slavery. But white servants 
either had time limits placed on their slavery, or had their sentences 
terminated by the court. In 1638 W illiam Androws attacked his master and 
was "delivered up a slave to whom  the court shall appoint"; less than a year 
later he was released "upon his good carriage" and the promise to pay  
restitution to his victim. In 1640 Thomas Savory was whipped for theft, and 
sentenced to work as a slave until he paid double the value of what he stole.30 
The targets of this early 'antislavery' law  were freemen like Androws and  
Savory.31
Puritan lawmakers relied heavily, though not exdusively, on Old  
Testament precedent to construct a slave law  that permitted slavery, but
28 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 231. Repeated in The General Laws and 
Liberties , 10.
29 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 217. Repeated in The General Laws and 
Liberties , 73. I conclude this as the Puritan's v iew  of 'just war' because this statute stated that 
"no man shall be compelled" to serve in "offensive" wars, while they could be com pelled to 
serve in defensive wars. Presumably, defensive wars were always considered just, whereas 
offensive wars, in the English experience were frequendy unjust. Therefore, captives taken in 
offensive wars were not seen as people who had in som e manner forfieted their liberty, as had 
those who attacked the colony or 'willingly' sold themselves.
30 Judicial Cases concerning American Slavery and the Negro, ed. Helen Tunnicliff Catterall 
(Washington: The Carnegie Institution of Washington: 1936), vol. 4, 469.
31 George H. Moore made this argument over one hundred years ago; see Moore, Notes on the 
History of Slavery in Massachusetts, 15-19.
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ensured that slavery of fellow  countrymen for debt, criminal offenses, or any 
other reason would remain beyond the pale. Old Testament law permitted 
Israelites to "acquire male and female slaves from the pagan nations" around 
Israel, and stipulated that "if a countryman of yours becomes so poor with  
regard to you that he sells himself to you, you shall not subject him to a 
slave's service. He shall be with you as a hired man" and be released to go 
back to his own property in the year of jubilee. Other passages similarly 
instructed Israelites to free kinsmen in the seventh year of their service.32 
The "Liberties of Servants" section within the 1641 Body of Liberties echoed a 
similar principle by forbidding masters to send away faithful servants empty- 
handed after seven years service. But the laws forbidding bond slavery, with  
the significant exceptions noted above, were in a succeeding section on the 
"Liberties of Forreiners and Strangers."33 Africans were neither kinsmen nor 
countrymen.
Though the lawmakers did not mention Africans, they were 
undoubtedly aware of the foothold black slavery had acquired in neighboring 
colonies as well as their own. The phrase mentioning "strangers" who were 
"sold to us" was likely written with African slaves in mind. Thus, this first 
'antislavery' law was actually N ew  England's first law  codifying slavery — the 
final phrase made this clear, noting that "this exempts none from servitude, 
w ho shall be judged thereto by Authority." This in effect gave the General 
Court or any governing body the authority to make the final determination 
on whether Africans or others fit within the permitted exceptions to the 
'antislavery' law. This law  actually codified a racially-based slavery—black
32 See Leviticus 26:44 and Deuteronomy 15:12. Quote taken from the N ew  American Standard 
B ib le.
33 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 230-231.
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wom en and m en were the only people who as a group fit the description of 
"strangers" being "sold to us" and were not captives of just wars.
Recently, one researcher has stated that black m en and wom en  
"according to law, were not considered special targets for slavery because of 
their race. White, black, and red captives of wars were all considered to be fair 
game." Evidence for this argument is Robert Keayne's 1652 purchase of a 
Scotsman w ho w as one of 270 captured at the battle of Dunbar and sold in 
Boston as slaves, and the return of a group of Africans to Africa w ho had been 
judged as not captured in the course of a war, but captured and shipped to 
Boston aboard the Rainbowe solely for the purpose of being sold as slaves.34 
But m ost Africans came to N ew  England through the Carribean, so Puritan 
authorities could ignore the original cause of enslavement. The Africans on 
board the Rainbowe were an exception. And white 'slaves' such as Keayne's 
Scotsman could expect freedom after a period of time, as general practice 
dictated. As Alan Watson points out, in societies like N ew  England, slave 
law formed largely by common practice. The 1641 Body of Liberties made it 
difficult to place whites into bond-slavery, and the comm on practice, as 
demonstrated by court decisions that placed time limits on  or freed convicts 
sentenced to enslavement, established a pattern that virtually ruled out white 
slavery. Meanwhile, the Body of Liberties left a loophole for the bond slavery 
of Africans. Combined with the 1656 law  banning black and Indian men from 
the militia, Puritan law even within the first two generations, w as slowly but 
surely constructing a racially-based slave law.
While the Old Testament provided a framework for lawmaking, 
Puritans did not bind themselves too closely by divine pronouncements. God
34 Melinde Lutz Sanborn, "Angola and Elizabeth: An African Family in the Massachusetts Bay 
Colony," New England Quarterly 72 (March, 1999), 122.
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had instructed the Israelites to not only provide refuge for escaped slaves, but 
to go further by allow ing the escaped slave to "live with you in your midst, in 
the place which he shall choose in one of your towns where it pleases him."35 
The Puritans, how ever, modified this freedom by injecting the legal process 
that Quock Walker utilized. Slaves could flee to a neighbor who w as 
obligated to provide refuge, but either the neighbor or the slave w as obligated 
to contact the judicial establishment in order to settle the matter. N o doubt 
many judges returned runaway slaves to their masters. Instead of permitting 
runaway slaves to live where they pleased according to Old Testament law, 
Puritan lawmakers built a mechanism into the law  that enabled masters to 
procure their slaves" return.
And yet this statute can be read as both safeguarding slaveowners' 
property, and as acknowledging slaves' humanity and personhood. Though 
some southern slave law  also internalized this ambivalent tension, the 
dominant interpretation in the south leaned heavily towards seeing slaves as 
property. When slaves were recognized as persons, it was frequently for the 
purpose of continued maintenance of the peculiar institution. Southern 
colonies tacitly acknowledged slaves' humanity in a backhanded legal fashion 
by noting that slaves were not on the same level as inanimate property or 
animals, since neither of those kinds of property could be charged w ith  a 
crime.36 But Massachusetts law recognized the personhood of slaves in a 
positive manner by declaring that slaves "shall have the liberties and  
Christian usage w hich the Law of God established in Israel doth morally
35 Deuteronomy 23:15-16, N ew  American Standard Bible.
36 See William W. Fisher HI, "Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery," in Slavery and 
the Law, 44-45; Carl D egler, Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil 
and the United States (N ew  York: MacMillan, 1971).
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require." Lorenzo Greene points out that this Puritan perspective conferred a 
"dual status" upon slaves as property and persons.37 Under Puritan law, 
slaves were not merely property with no legal status as persons. And though  
this law did not elaborate on  w hat "liberties" slaves might expect, it 
presumably referred to O ld Testament passages such as the one above and 
Deuteronomy 24:17-18, in  which God had adm onished the Israelites to 
remember that they had once been slaves in Egypt, and so not to "pervert 
justice due an alien." Other passages made clear that slaves were in m any 
respects the equal of their owners: expectations for worship and eligibility for 
membership within G od's covenant with Israel through circumcision were 
the same for master and slave.38 Puritan law carried an implicit view  of 
personhood since it w as written within the context of an understanding of 
the Old Testament's v iew  of slaves as persons.
Defining slaves as persons was made explicit in other laws. An 
expectation of justice before the law  was apparently one of the liberties 
intended by the early slave law. The Body of Liberties declared that
every man, whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not free 
shall have libertie to come to any publique Court, Councel, or 
Towne meeting, and either by speech or writeing to move any 
lawfull, seasonable, and materiall question, or to present any 
necessary motion, complaint, petition, Bill or information.39
Whether or not Puritan lawmakers envisioned African slaves as being part of
the "not free" is unknown; it is possible that the intent may have been sim ply
to ensure that white servants had free access to the courts and other legal
37 Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, 167.
38 See Deuteronomy 12:12-18 and Genesis 17:9-15.
39 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 218. Repeated in The General Laws and 
Liberties , 90.
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forums. But in light of the Old Testament context within which Puritans 
attempted to build their city on the hill, it is likely that this law was written 
with both black slaves and white servants in mind. The book of Job made 
clear that in both a legal and moral sense, slaves possessed full personhood:
"If I have despised the claim of my male or female slaves when  
they filed a complaint against me,
What then could I do w hen God arises, and when He calls me 
to account, what w ill I answer him?
Did not He who made me in the womb make him, and the 
same one fashion us in  the womb?"40
Biblical precedent combined with a lack of fear of slave rebellion or 
disorder, due to slaves' relatively small numbers, to foster a Puritan slave law  
that permitted this type of legal space to exist. By contrast, South Carolinians, 
convinced that Africans, being "of barbarous, wild, savage natures," were 
"wholly unqualified to be governed by the laws, customs, and practices of this 
Province" subsequently limited slaves' ability to use the law for prosecution 
or defense 41 South Carolina's 1696 Slave Code, and much of southern slave 
law, interpreted the law as som ething to be im posed upon slaves by whites in 
order to protect the increasingly large pool of slave labor and maintain order 
in societies with growing black populations. William Fisher describes how  
southern slave law was frequently driven by conflicting images of Africans: 
the lazy, comical slave, and the murderous savage. In Massachusetts, similar 
imagery existed but it was mitigated both by biblical injunctions that the
40 Job 31:13-15.
41 Fisher, "Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery," 49. Quote taken from South 
Carolina's 1696 Slave Code.
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Puritans tried to follow, and by the lack of a perceived large-scale threat due to 
the small proportion of slaves in the population.42
Puritan law, then, opened the door for a more thorough black 
engagem ent with the legal system than w ould  be possible in  m any other 
colonies. Whether coming to court as plaintiffs or defendants, whether 
appearing before town selectmen or committing their nam es to legal 
docum ents such as wills or property deeds, black men and w om en came to 
understand that certain processes w ere due them despite their low  status in 
Massachusetts society.
This understanding meant black litigants participated fully in legal 
procedures long before the Revolution. In a recent essay, T. H. Breen argues 
that "at a critical moment in the developm ent of Western liberal thought, the 
slaves of Massachusetts brought the testim ony of their ow n lives before a 
public increasingly unwilling to defend" slavery. Breen questions if abolition 
in M assachusetts resulted "as a gift of w hite leaders," those "thoughtful, 
moral, reflective members of a professional elite" whose "growing 
abhorrence for slavery" shaped public opinion. He seeks to inject black 
participation in pushing public opinion towards abolition, and not just 
through the four well-documented freedom petitions m ade by Massachusetts 
slaves in the 1770s. Instead, by focusing primarily on two black m en  
convicted as criminals, Breen examines how  the crimes these tw o m en  
committed "provoked doubt—a defensive reaction—among w hites already 
uneasy about slavery." This chapter demonstrates that the public 'testimony' 
of black lives had been regularly brought before whites through
42 Samuel Sewall's diary, for instance, provides evidence of this imagery, as w ill be seen  
below.
31
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
confrontations w ith  the law  long before the Revolutionary era.43 Though the 
intention here is not to focus on changes in  w hite opinion, the evidence both 
complements and challenges Breen's argument. It complements his 
argument by documenting the long public record of tension resulting from  
slaves' expressions of contention against w hite oppression. W hile w hites had 
been w ell aware of this tension, virtually no momentum pushed w hite  
public opinion towards abolition until just before the Revolution. This 
chapter challenges Breen's argument, which points to the 1760s as the  
beginning of whites' consideration that slavery itself might the problem. The 
evidence presented here suggests that som e whites recognized this long  
before the Revolutionary era.
African slaves came to Massachusetts early, possibly even before the 
establishment of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1629, and certainly before 
mid-century. Lorenzo Greene and others have fixed the 1630s as the arrival 
time of the first Africans, though some anecdotal evidence suggests that at 
least one white man brought his slaves into the colony before 1630.44 D ue to 
the Puritan culture, the needs of N ew  England slave-owning families for 
domestic and farm labor, and the ambiguous legal status of Africans, slaves 
were commonly incorporated into the family. They lived in the house, 
shared the same food, and some sat at the sam e table—or at least in the same
43 T.H. Breen, "Making History: The Force of Public Opinion and the Last Years of Slavery in 
Revolutionary M assachusetts" in Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal Identity in 
Early America, ed. Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, and Fredrika J. Teute (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 71, 74.
44 Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, 16-18; Tw om bly and Moore, "Black Puritan: The 
Negro in Seventh-Century Massachusetts," 225; John Daniels, In Freedom's Birthplace: A Study 
of the Boston Negroes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914; reprint, Am o Press and the 
N ew  York Times, 1969), 1.
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room. The familial connection, not simply a means of assuring subm ission  
and securing control, w as often genuine.45
Nonetheless, w hen  it came to assessing taxes in the seventeenth 
century, Massachusetts slaves were considered property, and not family, along 
with horses, sheep, and swine, and would be sealed into this category until 
emancipation after the American Revolution. As in  the south, slaves could  
be legally sold at will by their masters, and could also be sold to settle civil 
suits or criminal charges brought against themselves or their masters. In 1672 
Silvanus Warro admitted to forging a key to his master's box and taking 
money. While sentencing Warro to 20 strokes of the whip and repayment of 
the stolen money along with the court and prison fees, the court ordered him  
to pay "for the maintenance of bastard child he fathered in Roxbury." If he 
failed to pay the child support, Warro was to be sold. Warro apparently did  
fail to do so, but his master decided to put the child out as a servant until it 
was thirty years old. In 1681, Chefalia, a slave to Thomas Walker, was jailed 
on suspicion of burning dow n the houses of two white homeowners in 
Roxbury. Though not yet convicted of a crime, the court decided that Walker 
had to send Chefalia out of the country—in other words, sell him. The 
judgment also stated that if this were not done in one month, the court 
would do it for him, and give Walker whatever w as left after deducting court 
and prison expenses. In 1677, Nicholas threatened his master with a loaded  
gun and wounded him w ith a knife; after being "severely whipt with twenty  
nine Stripes" and paying a fine, he remained in jail until he could be sold out 
of the country. By contrast, the case following Nicholas' involved a white
45 Piersen, Black Yankees, 25-36; Joanne Pope Melish, Disowning Slavery: Gradual 
Emancipation and "Race" in New England, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 
7-41.
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servant who ran away and attacked a constable in the process. H e was fined 
heavily. On the same day, the court fined one white man for w ounding  
another white man "with a quart pot fetching much blood." There are still 
more cases in which Africans received fines or corporal punishments, as did 
whites, but with the additional consequence of being sold out of the country. 
The point is not to highlight potential inconsistencies in the court's 
sentencing practices. Rather, it is notable that black slaves, unlike white 
servants, could be sold into permanent bondage, even out of the colony.46
In other instances, an accusation of criminal wrongdoing w as not 
necessary for slaves to be taken or so ld  off. Michael Powell's young slave was 
confiscated in 1670 through a writ of attachment after it was claimed that 
Powell had not returned items and m oney he was supposed to have held in 
custody. Others slaves were passed to  surviving kin through a deceased 
slaveowner's will. Slaves whose owners died without heirs, or died with 
substantial unsettled debt, faced the likelihood of being sold by the town along 
with other real and personal properly. This practiced continued w ell into the 
eighteenth century; in 1757 slaves Hercules and Sharper were sentenced to be 
whipped and to repay triple the value of goods they had stolen—a debt 
amounting to less than one pound. Tw o months later, with Hercules and 
Sharper still owing Elizabeth Dabney, w idow  of the man who had accused 
them of the theft, the court granted Dabney's request that she "be allow'd to 
dispose of the sd negros' Life to any o f  his majesty's subjects to satisfy the
46 Warro and Cheffaleer are in the Thwing Database. Many of the African Americans listed in 
the Thwing Database appear solely due to being listed in a probated will. Nicholas and the 
other cases are in Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Collections, v.30 
(Boston: The Colonial Society, 1933) 884-890.
34
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
sum." In these circumstances, the law and whites clearly viewed slaves as 
property, and the demands of property superseded those of personhood.47
While southern states like South Carolina were developing slave law  
that in m ost respects denied Africans' legal personhood—slaves could not 
litigate civil suits as plaintiffs or defendants, and in criminal cases could only  
be defendants—in Massachusetts, the law did at times impart a degree of 
personhood and created space for slaves to situate themselves as beings w ho  
could operate w ithin the legal system.48 Because, as Samuel Willard w ould  
preach in 1726, even "the Soul of a Slave is...of as much worth, as the Soul of 
his Master, having the same noble Faculties and Powers, and being alike 
Immortal; and being alike Precious to Christ," and because the law was meant 
to embody God's perspective in earthly society, every person, even black 
slaves, had to be accorded certain liberties under the law.49 Slaves could 
testify in court regardless of the color of the litigants, were able to sue their 
masters or other whites, make contracts, and could expect to have a trial by 
jury in criminal cases.
Overlaying these tensions within Puritan law  was African slaves' ow n  
experiences previous to being imported to N ew  England. Though many N ew  
England slaveowners preferred young slaves brought directly from Africa, 
their choices were often limited to slaves that the more demanding southern  
and Caribbean markets cast aside. Seventeenth century purchases from the 
West Indies were common. Mixed in with these less desirable slaves were
47 Hercules and Sharper are in the Thwing Database. Account of Powell's slave in Greene, The 
Negro in Colonial New England, 172.
48 On South Carolina, see Watson, Slave Law in the Americas, 71-73.
49 Samuel Willard, A Compleat Body of Divinity in Two Hundred and Fifty Expository 
Lectures on the Assembly's Shorter Catechism, 616.
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
creolized Africans w ho had encountered English law through time spent in  
ports on the African coast or in the Caribbean. Ira Berlin notes that in the 
seventeenth-century Caribbean, some slaves attempted to use the courts to 
gain freedom. Southern slaveowners at times avoided slaves who possessed  
broader experience because they feared that such slaves would at best contest 
for personal freedom, and at worst agitate other slaves to do likewise. 
Encountering Puritan legal procedure was therefore not a completely novel 
experience for som e slaves w ho had som e familiarity with English law  in 
other settings, and even  Africans unfamiliar w ith  the legal process may have 
received som e instruction from more cosm opolitan slaves.50
Occasionally, slaves employed legal knowledge, whether gained 
through watching w hite masters, personal past experience, the experience of 
other slaves, or combinations of these sources, to exploit what space the law  
provided to redefine them selves as a free legal being. One remarkable case 
that began with a contract in 1694 and did not reach a conclusion until 1703 
has been noted only in terms of what it meant for the white participants, and  
only passing reference has been given to its significance for Adam, the slave 
who initiated legal proceedings against a man w ho was not only a member of 
the colonial elite, but also a judge. Throughout this see-saw legal battle, 
Adam demonstrated not only perserverance, but a shrewd understanding of 
how  to use the law and of the law's advantages. In the end, he managed to
50 Piersen, Black Yankees, 3-6; Greene, The Negro in Colonial New England, 34-38. On 
creolized Africans, see Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 17-28 and 47-63; and John Thorton, Africa 
and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, second edition, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). Similarly, a good deal of scholarship on the African 
diaspora documents the long history of opportunties m any Africans had to interact with 
European legal and social institutions; a good overview essay is J. E. Harris, "The African 
Diaspora in the Old and N ew  Worlds," in UNESCO's General History of Africa: Africa from 
the Sixteenth to Eighteenth Century, ed. B. A. Ogot (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), v o l . 5,113-136.
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use the law to shape his circumstances, but was him self shaped in turn by the 
law.
According to a nineteenth-century historian, John Saffin came to 
Massachusetts around 1645, and after a brief hiatus in Virginia, established 
himself as a successful merchant in Boston. Part, perhaps most, of his success 
stemmed from "the clandestine importation of negroes from Guinea."
Saffin's life was marked by tragedy; he outlived all eight of his sons and two 
wives, and in one sorrowful span of two weeks in 1678, he watched helplessly 
as the smallpox robbed him of two teen-aged sons as w ell as the "enjoyment 
of her my Sweet Martha," his wife of twenty years. N ine years later, while 
burying one son, news of the death of his only remaining son arrived from 
London. Two months after that, his second wife died. Even by the 
sometimes austere standards of the seventeenth century, what Saffin 
described as his "allmost insuportable grief" was surely justified.51 Perhaps 
personal tragedies made Saffin a difficult man to deal with—his third 
marriage was not a happy one and resulted in a separation sometime before 
his death in 1710. Perhaps he had a tenacious personality regardless; 
whatever the case, he used every means at his disposal trying to keep one of 
his slaves in  perpetual bondage.
Saffin knew  the courts well. He appears repeatedly in court records 
over a period of thirty years before his slave pursued legal freedom. Saffin 
came to court frequently as a plaintiff and occasionally as a defendant in civil 
cases, in addition to appearing as a witness, court official, attorney, and 
finally, judge. H is relationship with the law was at times a bit murky; in 1671
51 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 (Boston, 1895), 
vol. 1, 86, 362.
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he was accused by another freeman of tampering with a jury and a judge, and 
two years later he was briefly entangled with a wanted man — though it is not 
clear of Saffin w as knowingly involved.52 In 1696, the General Assem bly  
assessed him w ith  a small fine for being connected with the denial of a trial by 
jury to one John W ilkins.53
Saffin w as also a slaveowner, and one of his slaves, Adam, wanted to 
be a free man. Little is known about Adam before he appeared in the legal 
records when he took Judge Saffin to court in pursuit of liberty. He had  
resided in Bristol County, south of Boston, since at least the early 1680s, and 
before coming under Saffin's hand had served a minister and later the 
minister's w idow .54 Adam displayed som e legal savvy early on, m anaging to 
secure a contract, signed by Saffin and three witnesses, that promised  
eventual manumission. In 1694, John Saffin, claiming that he w as m otivated  
by "meer kindness and for the Encouragement of my negro man Adam," had  
agreed to "Enfranchise clear and make free" Adam after seven years of service 
to Thomas Shepherd, one of Saffin's tenants in Bristol. Saffin did attach 
conditions to the seven year term, requiring that Adam served "chearfully 
quietly and Industriously...and doe behave and abear himself as an H onest 
true and faithful Servant."55
52 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Collections (Boston, 1933), vol. 29, 
190-91, 348-49.
53 Suffolk Court Records, vol. 40, 361, 372, 393.
54 Suffolk Court Files, vol. 59, File # 5941
55 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , v o l.l , 88. Most 
of the legal documents concerning the Adam v. John Saffin case—court records, depositions, and 
the 1694 contract between Saffin and Adam—are reprinted in this volume. I have checked 
these reprints against the original documents and microfilm copies of the originals located at 
the Massachusetts State Archives, listed as the 'Suffolk County Supreme Judicial Court,
Suffolk Court Files and Suffolk Court Records' (hereafter referred to by either 'Suffolk Court 
Files' or 'Suffolk Court Records'). The reprints in the Publications of the Colonial Society
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In March of 1701, seven years to the m onth after the contract between  
Adam and his master had been entered into the record, Adam was told to 
leave Boston, meet Saffin in  Bristol, where he w ou ld  be bound over to serve 
another man. In response, Adam launched a cam paign of defiance and 
established a pattern of behavior that would frustrate and infuriate John 
Saffin for the next two years. John Saffin later argued that Adam had always 
been a "Desperate Dangerous Villaine, and of Turbulent humour," possessing  
a "proud, insolent and domineering spirit7'—though for some reason he had 
seen fit to let Adam w ork alone in Boston. Here a corrective to the 'family 
slavery' depiction arises; Adam, regardless of the truth of Saffin's character 
assassination, spent a good  amount of time in Boston alone. According to 
Saffin, Adam "had nothing to do but to work in  the Garden, make Fires and 
the like, was kindly used, did eat of the same as the English servants." This 
semi-autonomy made it easier for Adam to defy Saffin's orders. Instead of 
going to Bristol, Adam "took his Cloaths out of the house by stealth, and w ent 
about the Town at his pleasure." Adam made his defiance a public matter.56
John Saffin eventually came back to Boston to get Adam. To his 
chagrin, Adam came to him  first "in a sawcy and surly manner" and told 
Saffin—Saffin the prom inent judge, Saffin the successful merchant—that he 
had to go speak to Judge Samuel Sewall in his Boston residence. There,
Saffin, making the acerbic comment that he "obey'd this Negromantick 
Summons," was confronted with the contract he had made with Adam seven
volume are accurate, and because of greater of accesibility and legibility, will be referenced 
here. The Publications of the Colonial Society volume is not, however, an exhaustive source for 
the records of this case. The depositions in Adam's favor (referenced below), for instance, were 
not included, as Abner C. Goodell, the nineteenth century compiler of these records, was 
primarily concerned with John Saffin's perspective on his dispute with Samuel Sewall.
56 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , vol. 1 , 104-05.
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years previous.57 Adam had done more than flaunt his rebellion about 
Boston; he had m ade preparations for the next volley in his battle with Saffin. 
It is reasonable to assume that it was Adam  who took the contract to Sewall, 
and rather than run off or wait for Saffin to come to Boston, he likely gave 
Sewall his version of events when he passed along the legal proof of his 
emancipation. There is no evidence of any previous relationship between  
Adam and Samuel Sewall, but som ehow  Adam knew of Sewall's sympathies- 
-there were other judges in Boston to w hom  he could have turned. It cannot 
have been coincidence that he took his case to the judge who felt strongly that 
the legal and theological justifications of slavery were exceedingly thin.
Sewall had published his famous antislavery tract "The Selling of Joseph" less 
than a year previous,58 and Adam, no doubt aware of Sewall's antislavery 
proclivities, counted on his support. Sewall confirmed that trust when, 
understanding that Adam's entire case rested on one legal document, he 
initially refused to even permit Saffin to handle the m anum ission contract.
At this m eeting between Sewall and Saffin, a meeting brought about by 
Adam's hand, the legal battle was joined. The central issue in  this see-saw  
affair was whether Adam fulfilled the terms of the contract by serving out his 
term "chearfully quietly and Industriously." Adam argued that he had 
fulfilled the terms adequately; Saffin disagreed strenuously. Sewall, declaring 
that "Liberty w as a thing of great value, even next to life," enjoined Saffin "to 
stand to it" and honor the contract. Judge Addington, who w as also present at 
this initial meeting, chose a tack probably not to Adam's liking by arguing that 
"there was much to be allowed to the behaviour of Negroes, w ho are so
57 Ibid., 105.
58 The Dairy of Samuel Sewall, Harvey Wish, ed., (N ew  York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1967). 
Sewall's tract is reprinted in this edition of his diary following the entry for June 19 1700.
40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ignorant, rude and brutish, and therefore to be considered as Negroes." This 
judge, seeking to interpret the contract in a fashion that w ould grant Adam  
his freedom, attempted to broaden the stipulation of faithful obedience to 
allow for what he considered the limitations of black character. Saffin would  
have none of it; "small faults," he said, "I should have winkt at them, but he 
having behaved him self so diametrically contrary" to the terms of the 
contract ruled out any possibility of freedom.59
Having failed to resolve the dispute through an informal meeting, the 
dispute escalated to the next level. The next day, Saffin called in another 
justice, Penn Townsend. Townsend and Sewall, while not in agreement w ith  
Saffin, did consent to hold Adam until the matter could be decided in a 
formal hearing before the Superior Court. To ensure Adam's appearance, a 
surety was tendered. Sureties were akin to promissory notes of a certain sum  
of money that would be sacrificed if a defendant did not appear at the 
appointed date, and were often put up by relatives or friends if the defendant 
did not have the required amount. In Adam's case, however, the surety was 
not money or property: a free black man named Dick offered himself (and was 
accepted) as Adam's surety. Adam may have recruited Dick himself, or 
perhaps Dick volunteered to help a friend. This sim ple act demonstrates 
their awareness of what was legally possible, which they likely learned from 
seeing whites do the same. The town of Boston had accepted the practice of 
individuals offering themselves as sureties for newly arrived immigrants or 
relatives for quite som e time; Adam and Dick probably knew individuals 
who had done so.60 Presumably, if Adam ran away, Dick w ould have been
59 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , vol. 1 , 105-06.
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obliged to offer his time and labor as payment. Dick apparently believed  
Adam trustworthy enough to take the risk.61
More importantly, Adam's fate now  lay in the hands of the court. 
Adam may have believed this m ove w as to his advantage; after all, Sewall, 
Townsend, and Addington had all expressed a desire to see him freed. When 
the Superior Court heard the dispute in May, however, they moved  
jurisdiction of the case to next m eeting of the Superior Court in Bristol nine 
weeks later, since both Adam and John Saffin had lived there. In the interim, 
Saffin stewed. The "Rascally Negro," who "went about the Town swaggering 
at his pleasure in  defiance of m e his Master" vexed Saffin, and likely made 
him all the more determined to ensure Adam's permanent bondage by 
sealing his legal defeat and selling him south.62
Before the Court met again, Saffin pulled off a coup of sorts -- he 
managed to have himself prom oted to the Superior Court. N o doubt to 
Adam's dismay, this meant that Saffin would be one of the judges sitting on a 
case in which he w as the plaintiff. A jury found Adam guilty of not honoring 
the terms of the contract, based largely on depositions offered by Saffin that 
characterized Adam as "Turbulent outragious and unruly." The depositions 
also accused Adam of striking the daughter of John Saffin's tenant, Thomas 
Shepard, as w ell as threatening Shepard's wife and Shepard him self with an 
ax, a pitchfork, and a knife. But in the face of this testimony, the judges 
(excepting Saffin) were hesitant to enter a judgment. Perhaps the judges took 
note of the apparent incongruousness of these white m en w ho claimed that
60 See A Report of the Record Comissioners of the City of Boston, containing Miscellaneous 
Papers (Boston: Rockwell and Churchhill, 1886), 63-82. These pages contain a list of people 
who offered themselves as sureties between 1679-1700.
61 Publications of the Colonial Society o f Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , vol. 1 , 106.
62 Ibid.
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Adam was "a vile Refractory fellow" but were not hesitant to let him work 
for other whites. Additionally, the nineteenth century historian w ho  
commented on this case reported that Sewall's notes on the case questioned 
the propriety of Saffin adjudicating w hat was essentially his ow n  dispute. 
Sewall also accused Saffin of tampering w ith the jury foreman — not the first 
time Saffin had been so accused — and complained that Saffin had "Connived 
at his Tenant Smith's being on the Jury, in the case between him self and 
Adam."63
Saffin w as at least partially mistaken: Adam had not spent the whole of 
the interim betw een court hearings sw aggering about Boston. Adam  
demonstrated his legal savvy and took advantage of the space the legal system  
afforded black slaves by obtaining testim ony in his own behalf. He apparently 
traveled to Bristol before the trial in order to secure favorable testimony from 
white folks—not that of other slaves or free blacks, whose testim ony would  
have been permissible but probably not given the same w eight by the justices. 
The deponents, who, according to the justice of the peace w ho took their 
statements, w ere not summoned by the court but appeared voluntarily in late 
June of 1701, no doubt prompted by Adam. They had nothing but good to say 
about Adam. Mary Thurber, who knew  Adam for at least eighteen years, 
testified that w hen Adam had been a servant to the minister John Miles and 
his widow, he had been reliable enough for her to hire him on occasion for a 
day's work. Furthermore, since she lived  next to Saffin and his tenant 
Shepard and had many a day walked past Adam at work, she stated 
unequivocally that she had never seen him  anything but "Diligent and  
Faithfull." John Martin and his father both stated that Adam "so far as ever I
63 77ze Diary of Samuel Sewall, 1674-1729, ed. M. Halsey Thomas (N ew  York: Farrar, Straus, 
and Giroux, 1973), vol 1,453. Entry dated September 11,1701.
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heard was counted a FaithfuU and a good Servant" and had even "heard Mr. 
Thomas Shepherd say that sd Adam was more Faithfull of his Business than 
himself." Martin, Thurber, and four others testified that not only w as Adam  
a "true Faithful and Diligent Servant," but that he had "suffered m uch for 
want both back & belly, that is to say for Victuals & cloathing" at the hands of 
his masters.64
With conflicting testimony and questions concerning the propriety of 
Saffin's judicial behavior in mind, the justices were no doubt uncomfortable 
telling Adam, w ho had approached them immediately after the trial to ask 
about his fate, that he had no hope of liberty. The justices secured a promise 
from Saffin that he would not sell Adam to another province, and then held 
the case over for another year, but stipulated that in the meantime Adam  
must remain in the service of his master. This w as not sufficient for Saffin, 
however, who made it clear that since the court was not forthcoming with a 
final decision, he considered his promise not to sell Adam no longer binding.
With the other justices looking on, Saffin ordered Adam back to 
Boston, presumably to collect his belongings, and then proceed immediately  
to Castle Island to work under a Captain Clark. Adam complied, but not 
without ratcheting up the tension another notch in this skirmish of w ills 
between himself and Saffin. Instead of marching forthwith to Castle Island, 
he spent nearly tw o weeks in Boston. When he finally did arrive in the 
middle of September of 1701, work under Captain Clark apparently went 
smoothly for the first few  weeks. But trouble did not take long to catch, up to 
Adam.
64 Suffolk Court Files, vol. 59, File #5941.
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The witnesses' depositions seem  to be incontrovertible and Adam does 
not appear to have contested their accounts. On October 7th, he "was 
removing some Earth, but did it not to Captain Clark's mind." d a r k  told him  
to do it  differently. One witness merely stated that Adam refused; another 
said Adam "shewed himself very Surley and gave Saucy Answers" in his 
refusal.65 It is entirely possible that any refusal, no matter how  civil, would be 
seen in  this light by white men, m any of whom, even at this early stage of 
racial formation in British North America, had developed specific ideas about 
the character of black people. Samuel Sewall, for instance, blithely used an 
apparently common idiom of the day when he mentioned not wanting to 
treat Increase Mather "as a Negro," and how  Cotton Mather had scolded him 
"as if I had used his father worse than a Neger."66 Winthrop Jordan points 
out that in N ew  England, as early as the 1640s "there were scattered signs that 
Negroes were regarded as different from English people not merely in their 
status as slaves."67 Using 'Negro,' and not 'slave' for a com m on descriptive 
standard of contemptible treatment indicates that by the end of the 
seventeenth century, those scattered signs had become a part of m ost whites' 
everyday perception of black people. Any response by Adam  that was less 
than immediate and total compliance to the commands of Captain Clark, 
regardless of whether or not an order was reasonable, w ould  have been seen 
by som e whites as "surley" and "saucy."
65 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , vol. 1 , 112-113.
66 The Diary of Samuel Sewall, 1674-1729, ed. M. Halsey Thomas, 454-455. Entry dated 
October 9 and 20,1701. Likewise, Twombly and Moore noted other ways in which Africans were 
used in standard language to express what was undesirable. See Twombly and Moore, "Black 
Puritans" 226.
67 Winthrop Jordan, White over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1968), 71.
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The witnesses do agree on what happened after Adam's refusal.
Captain Clark called Adam a rascal and possibly other names. Adam refused  
to allow him self to be defined by the terms that Clark and Saffin had used, 
and replied that "he w as no Rogue, no Rascal, no Thief." Clark then struck 
Adam's tobacco pipe out of his mouth with a stick, shouting "you Rogue you  
shall do as I bid you," and shoved Adam, w ho shoved Clark in return. Adam  
warned Clark that if he was struck, he w ould respond in kind, but Clark, 
likely motivated by a need to keep face in front of the other laborers, landed a 
blow or two with his stick on Adam's shoulders. Adam, "in great Fury & 
rage...wrested the Stick out of [Clark's] hand and broke it" and then m ade 
good on his warning by launching a strike at Clark with his shovel. Clark 
deflected the blow  w ith  one arm, and then the other workers were on Adam. 
Adam's fury w as hardly spent; he was "so furious and outragious and putt 
forth so great Strength that it was as much as Six or Seven of us could do to 
hold and restrain him," and one of those m en m ade the mistake of putting  
his hand within range of Adam's teeth, who "like to have bit it off." 
Fortunately for that man, his hand was retrieved from Adam's m outh before 
much damage was done, and Adam was carted off to the dungeon.68
Saffin quickly m oved to have Adam sold abroad. Likely smarting from  
Sewall's charges and wanting to be careful not to appear deceitful, he sent a 
boat to get Adam with instructions to take him to Judge Addington, "not 
doubting but this Wretch negro in regard of his late bloody attempt, should by  
Authority be forthwith sent aboard." To his surprise, Addington did not  
concur and instead had Adam jailed until the Quarter Sessions court dealt 
with the Castle Island incident.69 That court jailed Adam for three more
68 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , vol. 1 , 112-113.
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months but did not resolve the question of Adam's status as free or slave. 
Ironically, this w ould gall Saffin further. Since Adam was still legally a slave, 
Saffin w as responsible to pay the jailer for Adam's keep. Furthermore, when  
Adam w as released but still awaiting the next hearing of the Superior Court, 
Saffin remained liable for his upkeep. Massachusetts towns regularly 
demanded that slaves not become the responsibility of the town, and required 
sureties from slaveowners w ho manumitted slaves in case the freedmen 
were unable to take care of them selves. The result, complained Saffin, was 
that he had been made "a meer Vassall to his slave in being at continuall cost 
and charges about him to supply him with all manner of Necessarys, as 
Cloaths, Bedding food and Phisick."70 Furthermore, when Adam was 
afflicted by sm allpox that year, Saffin w as responsible to attend to him. For 
Saffin, this w as the antithesis of how  the law was meant to function—it was 
he, John Saffin the judge, merchant, and property owner, and not Adam  the 
slave, criminal, and property, w ho had become the one "greatly Injured & 
oppressed...in a manner...there hath not been the like done in N ew  
England."71
M eanwhile, back on less turbulent shores, events were working in  
Adam's favor. A  new governor excluded Saffin from his appointments to the 
Superior Court, possibly because of the serious charges earlier leveled by 
Sewall. W hen this court m et in November of 1702, Saffin's claims against 
Adam were dismissed. Adam, having undoubtedly learned a good deal about 
the court's procedures, immediately presented a petition for his freedom  
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lawyers to represent Adam and m oved the case to the Inferior Court of 
Common Pleas. There, Adam pressed his advantage, not only suing for his 
freedom, but argued that "he being a freeman and ready to prove his liberty" 
and that Saffin "doth unjustly vex him" by claiming he was still a slave. To 
repair the damage done, Adam had the audacity to ask the court to have 
Saffin pay him one hundred pounds. It is easy to imagine how  infuriated 
John Saffin must have been when Bristol's sheriff appeared at his home to 
deliver a summons requiring Saffin "answer to Adam Negroe of Boston."72
For reasons not clear, this court voided  the summons and refused to 
allow Adam's appeal. His lawyers, prompted by the fact that "Adam dayly 
pursues [us] for the Tryall of his sd liberty" and that he was "being dayly 
threatened by the sd  Mr. Saffin, to be sent out of this province into forreigne, 
parts to remaine a slave during his life" w ent back to the Superior Court to 
seek redress in May of 1703. The court responded with a somewhat legally 
ambiguous statement, defining Adam as neither slave nor free, but declaring 
that he "be in peace untill by due process of Law he be found a slave."73
Saffin, quick to go back on the offensive, circumvented the courts and 
now  petitioned the legislature. He not only outlined the previous two plus 
years of trying to secure his property, but tried a new strategy. Saffin, once 
again revealing how  deeply Adam had gotten under his skin, told the 
legislature that "the said vile Negro is at this Day set at large to goe at his 
pleasure." He then raised the specter of black rebelliousness, a fear that 
already had a deadly history before 1700. Adam, claimed Saffin, had not only 
told a jailer that "he w ould make no more to Twist or wring off the Neck of
72 The summons and the sheriff's brief account that he delivered the summons to Saffin's home 
can be found in Suffolk Court Files, vol. 55, File #5542.
73 Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-94 , vol. 1 , 95.
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your petitioner then he w ould of a Snake" , but had also threatened "all them  
that have cross't his turbulent Humour, to the great scandall and evill 
example of all Negros both in Town and country w hose eyes are upon  this 
wretched Negro." Designating Adam as still a slave would have permitted  
Saffin to sell him and ensure that no one w ou ld  be "exposed to any 
Detriment by the sd Negros villainous practices." The Assembly ordered the 
Court of General Sessions, upon which sat justices of the peace, to hear the 
case in August and for Adam to be jailed in the meantime.74
Samuel Sewall registered his indignation at Saffin's machinations w ith  
a poem:
Superanuated Squier, wigg'd and pow der'd with pretence,
Much beguiles the just Assembly by his lying Impudence.
None being by, his bold Attorneys push it  on with might and 
m ain
by which means poor simple Adam sinks to slavery again.75 
Sewall aptly described the forces against which Adam struggled in his quest 
for freedom—Judge Saffin, his attorneys, and n ow  the 'beguiled' legislature. 
But the prize was worth the fight, and Adam stated his case in court w ith his 
attorney. Nonetheless, a jury found Adam guilty of not performing the 
conditions of the original contract. Denying defeat, Adam promptly appealed 
the verdict.
In November of 1703, the Court of General Sessions heard John Saffin 
employ the same arguments he had used throughout, and appeal once again 
to a fear of black insurrection. His attorney testified that Adam threatened to
74 Ibid., 96-7.
75 The Diary of Samuel Sezuall, 1674-1729, ed. M. Halsey Thomas, 487. Entry dated June 8, 
1703. Sewall also stated that Adam  was "again imprisoned" for the trial ordered by the 
General Assembly, therefore I have surmised that Adam  w as also imprisoned by order of the 
Assembly.
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"ring [Saffin's] neck if he had opportunity," and persistently displayed "cros 
carriage" and "needless malignance" and did not heed Saffin or his attorney.76 
Adam's lawyer asserted that Adam  had indeed performed the conditions of 
the contract, and more importantly, that even if Adam  had not done so, there 
w as no penalty stipulated in the contract. Here Adam's attorney employed a 
new  tactic: he argued that nothing in the contract, on which the entire dispute 
had hinged for well over two years, stated that Adam should "forfeit the 
freedom or liberty thereby intended." He focused on the phrase in the 
contract that stated "Allways provided that...Adam...go on chearfully quietly 
and Industriously," and argued that the word "provided" was "a 
consideration and not a Condition." In contrast, "Enffranchisment is positive 
& not conditional! and liberty being a privilege the greatest that can be given 
to any man save his life, it ought not to be forfeited upon trivial and 
frivolous matters as is pretended by the Defendant." Adam's lawyer made 
Saffin's obsession with Adam's behavior irrelevant. He also cast Adam's 
status into doubt; the implication of his argument w as that Adam entered 
into this contract on the same level as any white man, despite referring to 
Adam  as a slave in other petitions—in this appeal, he carefully omitted any 
reference to Adam as anything but the "sd appellant."
The attorney's argument w on the day and Adam 's freedom. Either 
sw ayed by his novel interpretation of the contract or looking for any grounds 
to grant the petition for freedom, the jury, with Adam and Saffin present, 
found in Adam's favor. The court declared "That the sd  Adam & his heirs be
76 John Saffin's attorney Daniel W illard's deposition in Suffolk Court Files, vol. 59, File # 
5941.
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at peace & quiet & free with all their Chattels from the sd John Saffin Esqr. & 
his heirs for Ever."77
Adam slides quietly out of the records after this final decision, despite a 
final futile attempt by Saffin to get the legislature to order the court to rehear 
the case. Adam settled in Boston, the site of his legal triumph and defiant 
stand against John Saffin. In what was perhaps a final thrust aimed at his 
former master, Adam took Saffin's last name for his own, thereby finalizing 
his self-identification as a free man. Though free from John Saffin, he did not 
remain entirely free from the law; in 1711 he was ordered by Boston's 
selectmen to give three days labor for cleaning and repairing the highways. 
This complied w ith  an ordinance that had been instituted for free black men, 
w ho were not permitted to serve in the militia but could not be allow ed to get 
by without some kind of service to the community. A few years after that, 
Adam Saffin came to the selectmen along with four other free black m en and 
proposed that they be bound to support Leblond, a poor black w om an living 
in Boston. The selectm en denied their request.78
Adam Saffin's story, given only a passing reference by other historians, 
deserves to be told. Adam's actions indicate that on some level he defined  
himself as a legal being—not a legal being with rights as white colonials and 
Americans would at the end of the eighteenth century, but at the very least as 
one w ho could enter into a contract and call upon the law to enforce it. For 
an African man in early New England to perceive himself this w ay is not 
surprising since the law in Massachusetts stated that even slaves ought to be
77 Publications of The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Transactions 1892-1894 , vol. 1, 100.
78 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Boston Records 
from 1700 to 1728 (Boston: Rockwell and Curchhill, 1883); A Report of the Record 
Commissioners containing the Records of the Boston Selectmen from 1701 to 1715 (Boston: 
Rockwell and Churchill, 1884), March 13, 1713.
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accorded some rudimentary legal privileges. What has been given little 
consideration in the accounts of Adam Saffin's legal battle is the degree to 
which he understood how  the process worked and h is  reliance on the law.
Adam, who stood near the bottom of the social hierarchy, managed to 
harness any fear of the law's power. Seemingly small acts such as spending  
two weeks in Boston after being ordered by Saffin in court to go immediately 
from Boston to Castle Island are significant because they demonstrate that a 
black man, a slave, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, accurately 
understood the weak links in the law. He surely understood that the court 
could potentially levy serious punishments for some o f his misdeeds, but 
Adam shrewdly perceived that the dynamics of the court, with Sewall and 
others being Saffin's rivals—or at least disapproving of Saffin personally- 
limited the effectiveness or likelihood of enforcement. He knew how  to 
employ the power of the law for his own benefit, and he knew how far he 
could push on the weak links without bringing legal consequences dow n on 
his own head. There w as always an element of risk lurking in the unknown; 
he could not know what the court's final decision w ou ld  be, and he gambled  
that men who disapproved of slavery but did not necessarily hold high  
opinions of black men in general would care enough to prevail in his favor. 
Adam played his cards well.
But there is a question of w hy Adam went to Castle Island at all, and 
w hy he complied with other orders to appear in court, instead of sim ply  
absconding. Adam's readiness to use the law instead o f flight or continued 
rebellion was likely spurred by his rootedness in the Boston and Bristol 
communities. John Saffin testified that Adam seem ed to have enough  
connections in Boston to allow him to loiter without w ant of room and 
board; so, too, Dick's willingness to offer himself as a surety testifies to
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Adam's network of friends and possibly relatives in the area. Lawrence 
Towner noted some years ago that servants with that kind of community 
grounding were more likely to use legal means of challenging owners, while 
servants less grounded in their communities were more likely to resort to 
unruly behavior or running away. In this sense, Adam fits the description of 
a creolized African: he had established relationships in this non-African 
society and exhibited a high degree of familiarity with how this society 
functioned.79
Perhaps he also believed if he openly defied the orders of the entire 
court and not just John Saffin, chances were good that eventually the law  
w ould catch up to him — that despite the sympathies of Sewall and some of 
the other judges, they w ould be bound to try and catch and hold him. Instead 
of flight, Adam pushed the boundaries of obedience to the lim it without 
actually putting himself in a position of losing all recourse to the court in his 
effort to gain freedom. His actions indicate that he believed his best bet w as to 
rely on his contract, on his ability to convince influential white men that his 
interpretation of it was the correct one, and to trust that Sewall and the other 
justices—men he apparently knew  on som e level—would work within the 
legal process to win his freedom. And perhaps most importantly, Adam  
perceived that if he succeeded in gaining freedom through the court, it w ould  
be final—whereas running away m eant that freedom would always be 
precarious, liable to be snatched away at any moment. Here the law offered
79 Lawrence W. Towner, " 'A Fondness for Freedom': Servant Protest in Puritan Society,"
William and Mary Quarterly 19 (April 1962), 201-219, 213; Berlin, Many Thousands Gone, 17- 
63; Thorton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World. There is little doubt 
that some of the slaves in Massachusetts fit the description of being creoles. One example is 
the w ill o f John Stoughton, which lists "one man Negro named John & one Negro boy named 
Peter." Stoughton (or his family) traded a good bit in Barbados; so it is likely that is where 
they acquired these slaves. See Publications of the Colonial Society, vol. 29, 46-47.
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security, and Adam  knew it and pursued it; in a way, he pursued it again for 
Leblond a decade later, but failed. W hen he came to the Selectmen in 1713 
seeking legal validation of his and the other free black mens' support of 
Leblond, it is doubtful that influential m en like Samuel Sewall gave any 
attention to a seem ingly mundane matter. Relying entirely on his ow n  
standing and that of four other black m en proved insufficient. Having  
experienced the benefits of the law, Adam  also experienced its limitations.
The legal battle Adam Saffin w aged for tw o and half years points to 
other tensions for Africans in N ew  England. When he went to court, Adam  
attempted to im pose his interpretation of events and of the nature of the 
conflict--that the heart of the dispute w as John Saffin's desire to violate a legal 
contract and deny a freeman his liberty. Through his own testimony and the 
testimony of his w hite allies, Adam presented the court with a picture of 
himself not as a man fighting against a social institution of exploitive labor, 
but as a laboring servant who had faithfully fulfilled the terms of a contract. 
Against that, John Saffin presented an interpretation of a black man w ho  
epitomized the negative character traits that white society was already 
beginning to ascribe as inherent to black slaves. A legal conflict, though  
typically interpreted by courts as a single issue dispute, involves multiple 
struggles over interpreting the conflict.80 The various courts that adjudicated 
this case did not deny John Saffin's interpretation of black men; nor did the 
courts move in any w ay to threaten slavery. Again, the winning argument 
made by Adam's attorney is instructive: he appealed not to the injustice of 
slavery, but to the legal wording of the labor contract. Given the distaste the
80 See Sally Engle Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working- 
class Americans (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 87; and Barbara Yngvesson and 
Lynn Mather, "Courts, Moots, and the Disputing Process" in Empirical Theories about Courts, 
ed. Keith Boyum and Lynn Mather (New York: Longman, 1983), 52.
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jurists appear to have held for John Saffin, it is probable that they welcom ed  
an argument that gave them a legal hook upon which to hang a judgment 
against him that in no way threatened slavery. In order to secure his 
freedom, Adam and his attorney, far from challenging slavery, used a 
construction of the conflict "which orders facts according to normative 
claims" that successfully persuaded the court to decide in their favor.81 
Resorting to those normative claims validated the court's authority to 
reinforce and perpetuate those norms in their ow n lives.
Thinking of identity as a continual process that, for African slaves, 
involved establishing and maintaining boundaries as well as negotiating 
relationships and transactions, points to how  Adam's court battles likely 
affected his self-conception in a variety of ways. Clearly, Adam attempted to 
define himself as a freeman before the court concurred. But establishing this 
simple yet vital boundary of freedom that achieved permanence between  
himself and John Saffin—or, for that matter, between himself and every white 
man or woman—came only by negotiating through the legal process. 
Achieving his goal only through the decree of the court likely worked to both 
reinforce and mitigate Adam's sense of self as an individual who controlled 
his own fate. Success, accomplished largely because of his own tenacity and 
understanding of the legal system, reinforced this image of self. But Adam  
had also experienced defeats in his battles for freedom. Failure—even though  
not permanent—combined with a victory achieved not on the word of Adam  
or his witnesses, but due to a clever argument by his attorney, reinforced an 
image of self bounded by and dependent on Puritan systems of authority. The 
point is not that submission to governing authorities was a novel experience
81 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even, 92.
55
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
for Africans in N ew  England, but that the governing authorities had 
distinctly Puritan and English forms, symbols, and process.
Legal anthropologist Sally Engle Merry has pointed out that conflicts 
often "have meaning for how  the person thinks about himself or herself and 
his or her social world, her ability to cope and to defend herself, and her 
ability to create an acceptable image of herself and her life."82 Adam's 
resiliency during this conflict signified that he indeed had the ability to cope 
and carve out a place for himself in this society. His actions during this 
conflict, such as loitering about Boston long after being ordered to Bristol by 
John Saffin or insisting that his work on Castle Island was good enough, 
signified that Adam's acceptable image of him self was that of a freeman w ho  
controlled his ow n fate. H e felt, however, that the best method of making 
this self-image a meaningful reality lay not sim ply through the public 
statement of his own actions, but through the public statement of one of the 
central institutions of w hite sodety--the law.
Adam Saffin provides perhaps the m ost v ivid  example of how  
transitioning to N ew  England society and the space provided within Puritan 
law could come together to influence Africans' evolving identity. Other black 
men and women, both slave and free, also experienced the power of the law  
to affect their daily lives to varying degrees . A few , like Adam, experienced 
the law's ability to protect them from slavery by gaining permanent legal 
freedom. Some, convicted of serious or minor crimes, felt the heavy hand of 
the law; others, cleared of crimes, experienced the law's ability to protect them  
from grievous consequences.83 Whether encountering the law's ability to
82 Ibid., 98.
83 Several cases of this nature appear in Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 
Collections, vol. 29-30 (Boston: The Colonial Society, 1933). These volum es are a reprint of
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protect, punish, or sim ply regulate daily life, Africans in M assachusetts had a 
long record of persistent engagement w ith  the law well before Qouck Walker 
and other African Americans played their part in dismantling slavery after 
the American Revolution. It is to that record this chapter n ow  turns.
N ot long after the arrival of the first black slaves, an African wom an  
encountered the opportunity for both fear and protection under the law. 
Zippora, slave to John Manning in Suffolk County, stood accused of 
fornicating w ith another slave, Jeffea, and murdering her newborn son by 
cutting off its head in September of 1662. There was some conflicting 
evidence, how ever, as Zippora, in a petition pleading for the court7s "pious 
consideration," confessed to the sin o f fomification with Jeffea but later 
insisted that the child had been bom  dead and she had buried it. Apparently, 
a decapitated child had been exhumed, but Zippora argued that her child had 
been "not so w hitish7' and "not so bigg" as the one that had been found. She 
testified that three white women, one her owner's wife with her during and 
after the delivery, and that a Mrs. Parker told her to bury the child. Zippora, 
who said she had not even known she was with child and probably in a daze 
from shock, pain, and grief, obeyed and dug a hole about a foot and half deep 
in a muddy plain and there placed her son "with its head on."
Further depositions hinted at a conspiracy to blame Zippora for the 
crime. Betty, a black woman, testified that a week or more before the incident 
she had spoken w ith Mrs. Sands, one of the three white w om en present 
during Zippora's labor, and informed Sands that Zippora was pregnant. On a
Suffolk County Court Records. Also, the Thwing Database has many examples o f cases like 
these from the Supreme Judicial Court and the Court of Assistants; i s o  see Twom bly and 
Moore, "Black Puritan: The Negro in Seventh-Century Massachusetts,"; and Towner, " 'A  
Fondness for Freedom/ "
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Thursday, the day after Zippora's tragic delivery, Betty ran into Sands, w ho  
said she had talked w ith Zippora's mistress, and that Zippora was not 
pregnant. Another black woman, Mary, testified that "hearing her 
countrywoman zipporah was still a bed," she w ent pay her a visit. This was 
the same day that Sands had told Betty there had been no pregnancy, much 
less a stillborn baby. When Mary arrived, Mrs. Manning, Zippora's mistress, 
confronted her, saying that "she was bold to come & see her countrywoman" 
and that Zippora w as well and on her feet. Perhaps the most damming 
evidence came from a white servant wom an of Mrs. Parker's, who testified  
that she had been in  the house the night of the birth, and that Mrs. Parker had 
"bid her take up [illegible] for her negro w as delivered of a dead child." She 
heard the three white wom en tell Zipporah to bury it "since it was dead  
borne," and that Zipporah obeyed. This servant woman also expressed 
puzzlement concerning why the women seem ed so clandestine, saying "she 
never heard such a thing kept secret" and that she had overheard Mrs. 
Manning speak of sending Zipporah to Barbados. The testimony of these 
three women, one w hite and two black, painted a picture of Sands, Parker, 
and Manning trying to hide something.84
In the light of this testimony, the grand jury did not allow the 
indictment to proceed to a trial. It is possible that the white wom en killed the 
infant and told Zippora her son was stillborn; it is also possible that the child 
had a light complexion, indicating that the father was not Jeffea, but perhaps 
one of their husbands, a fact they wished to hide. Zippora's claim that her 
dead son had been "not so whitish" as the decapitated child suggests that her
84 Suffolk Court Files vol. 5, File #605
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child had indeed been light-skinned—just not as white as the other murdered 
infant.
Regardless, the legal process worked for Zippora. It is likely she is the 
same free black woman named Zippora who obtained a deed to a plot of land 
and a house in 1670, becoming perhaps the first property-owning black 
woman in Massachusetts.85 The law's ability to protect directly impacted 
Zippora by providing security from false prosecution and, seven years later, 
through the security of a property deed.
For a few other black men and women, the law  in seventeenth-century 
Massachusetts worked to help establish boundaries, though in a less dramatic 
manner than the case of Adam Saffin and Zippora. Zippora's case drew other 
black women and men into the legal sphere—not only did Betty and Mary 
gain some familiarity with the legal process; so, too, did their husbands, 
Angola and Frank, though indirectly. This may have very well been part of 
the genesis of the black community in Suffolk County. At a time w hen there 
were few slaves in Massachusetts, it is notable that at least two other black 
women were involved with Zippora. Angola later witnessed the law's 
power to reinforce his claim on his personal property when he successfully 
prosecuted three Indian men for breaking into his house in 1672, for which 
each received twenty stripes. Frank was likely the same Frank who was 
acquitted by the grand jury—lead by the same foreman as the grand jury in 
Zippora's case—in 1668 after being charged with helping a white man awaiting 
trial for murder escape from jail.86
85 Twombly and Moore, "Black Puritan: The Negro in Seventh-Century Massachusetts," 236.
86 Angola's case is in Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Collections, vol. 29, 
119; Frank's case is in Records of the Court of Assistants of the Colony of the Massachusetts Bay 
1630-1692 (Boston: Suffolk County, 1928), vol. 3,194. Hugh Mason was the foreman o f the grand 
jury for both cases involving Zippora and Frank.
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Angola, a slave of Robert Keayne, achieved freedom at som e point after 
Keayne's death. In 1653 Keayne had stipulated in his will that Angola, along 
with two other slaves, were to receive "some young Heifers to rayse a stock" 
two years after his own death. Angola's time had been sold to another free 
black man—which appears to have m eant that Angola him self had been sold— 
and he either earned or was g iven  his freedom in 1656. The man w ho bought 
Angola's time, Sebastian Kaine, pu t his mark on a legal docum ent that 
committed his house in Dorchester and over four acres along with its wheat 
crop if he did not pay the balance of Anna Keayne's selling price of sixteen 
pounds. Angola, like Sebastian Kaine, became a property owner. Part of his 
property came in an unusual manner, w hen Governor Richard Bellingham  
gave him a 50ft. square plot for saving the Governor from drowning. Angola 
had been paddling down a river w hen he came across Bellingham in a 
sinking boat.87 For both of these men, and Zippora and a few  other black 
property owners, the law established permanent ownership of a valued  
commodity in seventeenth century N ew  England. Whites could make no 
claims on their property. The legal pow er of the deed granted a measure of 
distance between black property owners and white N ew  Englanders through 
the security promised in the legal documents on which they put their marks. 
In the first few decades of freedom, these Africans—who were likely among 
the first brought to Massachusetts shores—navigated their w ay comfortably 
through legal territory to lay dow n important boundaries securing personal 
freedom.
87 See Angola and Sebastian Kaine in the Thwing Database and in Twombly and Moore, "Black 
Puritan: The Negro in Seventh-Century Massachusetts," 235-36. Kaine also went by 'Bus Bus', 
and his name is spelled variously as Bostian Ken, Busse, and Bastian Kenn.
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After Angola's death, Elizabeth also experienced the law 's ability to 
protect property w hen the county court validated her inheritance of the 
house and land, and that her property w ould  pass on to her children upon  
her death.88 Though neither Angola or Elizabeth would be alive to witness it, 
the law also conferred mixed blessings for their family: in 1681, their infant 
granddaughter, w hose mother had died and whose father had been banished 
from the colony, w as committed by the court into the selectmen's hands, who 
"may put out the said Child being a Negro" as a servant until she w as thirty 
years old. Though the courTs order m ay seem harsh, it ensured that the 
infant Mary Sapato would have som e provision. It m ay be that there were no 
other relatives or friends who could have cared for Mary w ithout binding her 
to servitude for thirty years, but the court's reasoning— "the said Child being a 
Negro"—indicates that one key factor in  their order was equating blackness 
with legal servitude.89 For the Angola family, as for Zippora w ho lived under 
the threat of being sent to Barbados, and other black w om en and men, their 
status as African and black was never entirely removed from their 
relationship w ith a legal system that could define them as property. It proved 
to be a relationship beneficial and constricting, empowering and oppressive.
Seventeenth-century Africans d id  not have to be personally involved  
with the law to be acquainted with legal process or power. They frequently 
witnessed or were aware of the legal imbroglios that enveloped their masters. 
In 1672, one slave contributed to a strident legal dispute am ong whites simply 
by complaining that a white neighbor w as causing trouble by taking a pin out 
of a water pum p, thereby preventing this African slave from accomplishing
88 Publications o f the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Collections, vol. 30, 598.
89 Mary Sapato appears in the Thwing Database.
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an assigned task of fetching a pail of water.90 In 1675, a white man w as 
charged for killing  a dog and threatening the dog of a young slave—and 
though the charge was not proved, the defendant found himself fined for 
"behaving him selfe very rudely & unmannerly."91 It is probable that the 
young slave came to court to testify, and subsequently witnessed not only the 
court's expectations of respect and decorum, but the mechanics of how  a court 
case proceeded.
The m ost powerful witness of the law's power to punish came through 
public executions. In the summer of 1681, Maria, slave of Roxbury resident 
Joshua Lamb, "being instigated by ye devill," took live coals from a fire and, 
laying it on the floor near a door, burnt down the house of a Doctor Thomas 
Swann. Maria then crept back into her master's house through a hole at the 
back door and set it ablaze with another coal. Maria not only confessed to the 
details of the crime, but accused the slaves of tw o other white men of aiding 
her arson spree, Chefalia and Coffee. The Grand Jury did not return a bill of 
indictment against these two, but deeming them to be dangerous slaves based 
on the suspicion of their involvement, the Court of Assistants ordered both 
men to be sold out of the country. The 'space' of personhood that N ew  
England law supposedly afforded slaves closed very quickly for Chefalia and 
Coffee, even though there had been no verdict against them. Maria, w ho  
admitted her guilt, was sentenced to be burned to death.92 This sentence was 
apparently carried out. According to a nineteenth-century historian, Increase 
Mather's original diary had an entry for September 22, 1681, briefly noting the
90 Publications of the Colonial Society, vol. 29, 196.
91 Publications of the Colonial Society, vol. 30, 601.
92 Records of the Court of Assistants of the Colony of the Massachusetts Bay, 1630-1692 (Boston: 
Suffolk County, 1901), vol. 1, 197-99.
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burning to death of "a negro woman w ho burnt 2 houses at Roxbury July 1 2 -  
in one of wch a child w as burnt to death." Mather also noted that this w as the 
first execution by fire in N ew  England.93
Just days after Maria burned dow n the Roxbury homes, another slave, 
Jack, was caught and accused of arson in North Hampton. Whether or not 
Jack, if he was indeed guilty, had known of and been inspired by Maria's act is 
unknown. Tried on the same day and in the same court, Jack initially 
confessed, then recanted, but to no avail. He w as sentenced to be "hangd by 
the neck till he be dead & then taken downe & burnt to Ashes in the fier wth  
Maria negro." Five years previous, a Boston slave named Basto who insisted  
upon his innocence w as accused, convicted, and executed for raping the three 
year old daughter of his owner.
Being public affairs, executions carried weighty symbolic meaning. 
When a young slave named Bristol was executed in 1763, a number of slave 
and free black men and wom en were present; it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that there w ere some black faces in the audience at public executions 
in the seventeenth century.94 Executions were the ultimate example o f the 
ability of the law to remove all boundaries provided by personal liberties, 
while simultaneously making a public statement that the law protected the 
lives of the rest of the community by eliminating alleged murderers.
93 The Case of Maria in the Court of Assistants in 1681 (Boston: n.d.) 10.
94 From Sylvanus Conant, The Blood of Abel, and the Blood of Jesus considered and improved, in 
a Sermon Delivered at Taunton, December the First 1763. Upon the Day of the Execution of 
Bristol, A Negro Boy of about Sixteen Years Old, for the Murder of Miss Elizabeth M cKinstry  
(Boston: 1764) 34. On the symbolic importance of executions to maintain the image of the 
majesty and power of the law, see Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law" 
in Albions' Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (N ew  York: Pantheon  
Books, 1975), 3-64.
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Furthermore, sentences in Puritan N ew  England were not merely punitive; 
they functioned to maintain political and social order.95
Maintaining the place of slaves and free black w om en and men in that 
social order receives little consideration. Historians note that N ew  England 
and m ost of the northern colonies did not possess an intense fear of slave 
insurrections that occasionally convulsed the southern states, primarily due 
to the low  density of slaves in m ost of New England. W hile it is true that 
there was little reason to fear the kind of broad slave rebellion that seemed 
plausible in other areas, this does not mean that white N ew  Englanders did 
not fear slave rebelliousness. In som e respects, white slave owners had good  
reason to fear slaves rising up against them—perhaps not in an organized, 
wide-scale rebellion, but on an individual level. The 'fam ily slavery' that 
existed in much of N ew  England gave slaves opportunity to bond with their 
owners and families, but it also fostered an environment in which personal 
friction and resentment could grow intense. Some of the crimes that slaves 
in Massachusetts committed, such as Maria's arson, if she was indeed guilty as 
she confessed, seem to have had a decidedly personal edge—w hen she planted 
the coals in her master's house during the night, she placed them in the bed 
chamber, probably hoping to trap both her master and Doctor Swann in the 
resulting infernos.
Piecing together the experience of Africans with the legal system fills in 
som e of the spaces in the picture of 'family slavery' that scholars such as 
William Piersen and Joanne Pope M elish have constructed. Piersen 
convincingly argues that N ew  Englander slaveowners typically set out to
95 See Howard Schweber, "Ordering Principles: The Adjudication of Criminal Cases in Puritan 
Massachusetts, 1629-1650," Law and Society Review 32 (No. 2, 1998) 376-408; Cornelia Dayton, 
Women before the Bar: Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 1639-1789 (Chapel Hill: 
University o f North Carolina Press, 1995).
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incorporate slaves into familial and subordinate relationships. Slaves were 
often bought as children or infants, making the inculcation of their place 
within the family easier. Naturally, genuinely close relationships often  
resulted; Cotton Mather w ent so far as to assert that slaves were not only "of 
our own household," but were "more clearly related to us than m any others 
are." Piersen states that w hen white and enslaved black children grew up  
together, "close relationships usually developed."96 Melish points out that 
the familial relationships characterizing N ew  England slavery were 
frequently genuine as far as the existence of emotional ties. Many owners not 
only considered slaves as a part of the family, but experienced acute grief 
when a slave died.97
But many slave-owning families lived in a state of tension w ith their 
African charges, and not all contemporaries held Cotton Mather's rather 
benign impression of the relationships between slaves and their owners. In 
1700 Samuel Sewall observed that slaves' "continual aspiring after then- 
forbidden Liberty, renders them Unwilling Servants." He also questioned, 
perhaps with Mather in mind, the notion that slaves could actually become 
part of a white family. Taking into account the "disparity in their Conditions, 
Colour & Hair," Sewall doubted that Africans could ever "embody w ith us, 
and grow up into orderly Families."98 Sewall knew firsthand of slaves' 
'continual aspiring' for the freedoms that their white slave-owning families 
daily lived out in front of them, as well as the persistent unwillingness of 
some Africans to remain in bondage. Sewall's growing discomfort, prompted
96 Piersen, Black Yankees, 26.
97 Melish, Disowning Slavery, 23-34.
98 The Dairy of Samuel Sewall, ed. Harvey Wish (N ew  York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1967). 
Contained in "The Selling of Joseph," reprinted after the entry dated June 19 1700.
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by issues before the Assem bly concerning the slave trade and a petition to free 
tw o 'unjustly' enslaved Africans, lead him to write this early antislavery tract, 
which may have been aimed at his fellow jurist and staunch supporter of 
slavery, John Saffin." Sewall's early antislavery activism, while in part due 
to his own theological convictions, was also due to the agitation of slaves 
themselves— Adam and others who, through their more vociferous public 
misbehavior, were a part of the cadre of 'unwilling servants' that helped 
convince a vanguard of men like Sewall that slavery was at best a 
troublesome institution.
Piersen and M elish and other scholars w ho have studied N ew  England 
slavery have described the 'distance' within the familial slave-master 
relationships. Slaveowners may have considered their chattel as part of the 
family, yet they did not forget that Africans were still chattel. And though 
'family slavery' may have mitigated some of the harsh reality of what was in 
the end an exploitive relationship, it also frequently reinforced relational 
distance through sim ple mechanisms such as seating arrangements.100 For 
some slaves that duality of being 'in' the family but persistently reminded 
they were not 'of' the family must have been a persistent irritation. For a 
few, that irritation spilled over into outright antagonism that found release 
in criminal acts. The argument here does not so much undermine 'family 
slavery' as suggest that the connotations of the term can obscure the 
animosity and outright hostility that caused som e slaves to find themselves 
answering to the law.
99 Lorenzo Greene described Saffin as Sewall's "bitter enemy." See Greene, The Negro in 
Colonial New England, 297; also see Arthur Zilversmit, The First Emancipation: The Abolition 
of Slavery in the North, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 58.
100 Piersen, Black Yankees, 31.
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Though the cases docum ented here may seem  few  in light of a time 
span of several decades, on ly  the stories of men and w om en who were caught 
and brought to the superior courts are readily available in  the records. Other 
slaves certainly committed crimes against their masters that went undetected, 
or were dealt with personally or at the justice of the peace level, without ever 
reaching the higher courts. One Boston justice of the peace examined Cesar, a 
Boston slave, for a series of thefts he committed over a period of seven  
months. Running away during the early winter of 1717, Cesar told the justice 
about his exploits in great detail—so much detail, in fact, that the impression 
is of a slave, knowing the gam e is up, boasting of how  easily he frustrated 
those w ho thought they held  pow er over him. Cesar regaled the justice with 
stories of he "oft times" broke into his master's house for food and clothing; 
of breaking into another Boston home where he "took about half a cheese 
[and] a Silver cup in w hich he drew beer upon"; of enlisting an Indian named 
Toby to help him steal butter and two-gallon stone jug filled with rum"; and 
acquiring geese, pork, and veal—all the while remaining in Boston. That 
Cesar chose to target his master's home repeatedly again speaks to the kind of 
personal antagonism that could run high in a close environment. The record 
of this examination, a single sheet of paper among the justice's private papers, 
happened to survive; certainly there are far more that have disappeared. In 
1734, Answer, the slave of a Boston blacksmith, was indicted but acquitted for 
burning down his owner's bam  and house. In 1747, tw o slaves from the 
Boston area, both named Cato, were indicted for "entering with force & arms" 
and stealing bills of credit w orth cel250 old tenor from one of their masters. 
One confessed, the other plead not guilty but was found guilty, no doubt in 
large part due to the confession of his partner, and both were sentenced to 20
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stripes and to repay triple the value of the bills. Cesar epitom izes the kind of 
'unwilling servant' Sewall had in  m ind.101
The m ost extreme expression of being an 'u n w ill in g  servant7 came 
from slaves who murdered their masters. In the m iddle of the eighteenth 
century, there were three docum ented instances of Boston area slaves 
assassinating their masters by poison. The most complex murder directly 
involved three slaves, Mark, Phillis, and Phoebe, and indirectly involved 
others w ho heard of or assisted their scheme. According to Phillis' testimony, 
Mark first planted the idea of doing away with their owner, Captain John 
Codman, during the winter of 1755. Mark had apparently given this a good 
deal of thought; Phillis said Mark had read through the Bible and discerned 
that "it w as no Sin to kill him  if they did not lay violent Hands on him So as 
to shed Blood, by sticking or stabbing or cutting his Throat." The plan came to 
fruition that summer. When the wom en finally agreed, Mark procured some 
poison—apparently arsenic—from Robbin, an acquaintance and slave of an 
apothecary in Boston. Phillis testified that Robbin served as their guide for 
how  to administer the poison and how  much to use. A side from working for 
an apothecary, Robbin apparently had experience in the matter, having 
previously assisted another group of slaves in murdering their master.
Phillis said this crime had gone undetected.
In his testimony, Mark insisted he knew nothing o f a plan to murder 
Codman. Phoebe, he claimed, had asked him for som ething lethal so she 
could kill three of her husband's pigs, possibly under the guise of submitting 
to a town ordinance prohibiting slaves, free blacks, and Indians from keeping
101 Cesar's case is found in the papers o f  James Otis, Sr., 1642-1747, Box 1. Located at the 
M assachusetts Historical Society. Basto appears in Records of the Court of Assistants of the 
Colony of the Massachusetts Bay, 1630-1692, vol. 1, 74; Answer and Cato appear in the Thwing 
Database.
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hogs.102 Phoebe and Phillis, who should have epitomized the m odel of 
'family slavery/ having been bought as a little girl and served Codman 
virtually her entire life, made absolutely sure that their owner w ould die: 
they put a black powder called Potter's lead in Codman's soup (who had 
complained it was a bit gritty), and put another kind of poison, this one a 
white powder and thus less visible, in "his barly Drink, and into his Infusion, 
and into his Chocalate, and into his Watergruel." Admitting that "I felt ugly" 
after lacing nearly everything in sight w ith poison, Phillis claimed she had a 
change of heart, and poured out the barly and tried to clean the mug. But her 
accomplice Phoebe had already poisoned his other food and drink.
The court did not buy Mark's alibi. Supplementing Phillis' testimony 
was that of Phoebe's husband, Quacoe. Quacoe told the justice of the peace 
who performed the initial examinations that another black man, Kerr, had 
come to him during the previous winter and told him of conversations with 
Mark about getting poison. Mark had also asked Kerr if Phoebe had gotten 
any poison. A concerned Quacoe warned his w ife not to have anything to do 
with Mark, for "she would be Brought into Trouble by him." What happened 
to Phoebe is not clear; Phoebe does not appear in the indictment or in the 
judgment. Phillis and Mark were both sentenced to be executed near a public 
highway on the afternoon of September 6, Phillis by burning and Mark by 
hanging. Both were "drawn" to the place of execution, described by a 
nineteenth century historian as pulling the condemned on a sled behind a 
horse, presumably to extend the public spectacle of execution. The spectacle 
continued after death; Mark's body was hung in chains from a gibbet (an
102 Boston selectmen had passed an ordinance preventing the keeping of hogs within the dty in 
1746 that specifically targeted black and Indian city dwellers. See A Report of the Record 
Comissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Boston Records from 1742 to 1757 (Boston: 
Rockwell and Churchill, 1885), May 23, 1746.
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upright post w ith  a  crosspiece) along the highway, and remained there for 
several years afterward—long enough for the spot to become such a familiar 
landmark that Paul Revere referred to it w hen he recounted his famous ride 
as the place "where Mark was hung in chains."103
Unlike A dam  Saffin, Mark, Phillis, and Phoebe did not conceive of 
themselves as free legal beings. While they may have understood that they 
could enjoy the privilege of being tried in a court, their intention, if they did 
indeed murder Captain Codman, was not to gain freedom: Phillis claimed 
that Mark, com m enting on Robbin's complicity in the murder of another 
slaveowner, had said "Mr. Salmon's Negros poison'd him, and were never 
found out, but had got good masters, & so might we." The objective, then, 
was to improve the situation by improving the master.104
The m otive o f another slave, also nam ed Phillis, for murdering her 
master is not know n. But she may have been the example for Mark and 
Phillis, preceding them  by five years. This Phillis had even more direct access 
to the means for murder; her owner, John Greenleaf, was an apothecary. 
When the Superior Court met in February of 1750, they sentenced Phillis to 
be executed in M ay of 1750, nearly a year after Greenleaf died. In April the 
Boston selectmen w ere instructed by the Court of General Sessions to 
"consider of som e suitable place for erecting a Gallows," so apparently Phillis 
was hung.
103 Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 5, 107. David Hackett Fischer 
notes that in order to get to Boston from Charlestown, one had to go past "a rusted iron cage that 
held the rotting bones o f  Mark." See Fischer, Paul Revere's Ride (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 10.
104 Account of Mark, Phillis, and Phebe is in Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical 
Society (Boston: M assachusetts Historical Society, 1884), vol. 20, 122-157.
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The selectmen chose a small knoll on a stretch o f land commonly 
referred to as Boston N eck .105 The Neck had been used before for hangings 
and, like the gibbeting of Mark, became a geographical reference point well 
known to Boston residents. In December of 1749, for instance, the selectmen 
identified a piece of property as being "on Boston Neck, where the Gallows 
now stands."106 The gallow s, "the first structure that greeted a traveler" 
heading north into Boston, w ould have been im possible to miss on this 
desolate stretch of land that was nearly devoid of buildings or trees.107 The 
Neck was frequented by slave and free black travelers; one of the ordinances 
renewed annually by the selectmen set up Sabbath-day watches on the Neck, 
when the regular militia watches were not operating, for the expressed 
purpose of to prevent disorders caused by "loose vain Persons Servants 
Negroes &c Unnecessarily Travelling or Walking to & from Boston & 
Roxbury w ith Neglect of Attending on the Publick W orship of God in either 
place and bringing from the Neighbouring Towns C om  Apples & other fruits 
of the Earth to the great disturbance of the Publick peace & Scandal of Our 
Christian Profession."108 Here the power of the law  converged in two 
important ways: the daily reminder of terror of the execution of justice 
represented by the gallow s, and the daily reminder of the ability of law  to
105 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Selectmen's 
Minutes from 1742-1753 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1887), April 17 1750/51.
106 Ibid, December 1749.
107 Fischer, Paul Revere's Ride, 10; Walter Muir Whitehill, Boston: A Topographical History 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 74-75. 
Whitehill notes that it was not until 1801 that the selectmen tried to develop the virtually 
empty Boston N eck area. Even then, there was little success until much later; the selectmen 
informed the town meeting in 1811 that there was little demand.
108 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Selectmen's 
Minutes from 1742-1753 , September 1743 and annually thereafter.
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exercise pow er over their daily lives. Some black folks were probably glad to 
have the m ilitia and watchmen acting as a form of crowd control; others 
likely resented it. But in this and other subtle ways, slaves and free black men 
and wom en encountered the ability o f the law to shape the form of their daily 
lives.
They frequently encountered law s directed with black and Indian 
peoples in m ind. As early as 1723, the selectmen drew up "Articles for the 
Better Regulating of Indians Negros and Molattos" that penalized free blacks 
and Indians w ith a fine and a severe w hipping if they allowed a slave into 
their "House yard garden or outhouse" without permission of the 
slaveowner. Furthermore, the selectmen stipulated that to ensure 
enforcement, "any two free holders m ay Enter the House of any such free 
Indian Negro or Molatto." Other ordinances prevented these three groups 
from ow ning firearms, selling "strong drink Cakes or any other Provision" 
on highways or on the Common, and several more aimed at circumscribing 
nighttime activities among free and slave blacks and Indians.109 Attempting 
to come up w ith  "some Method for the better and more Effectual Watching 
the Town of Boston," a committee appointed by the town m eeting in 1736 
made several recommendations. The only recommendation targeting a 
specific group of people, though, called for the watchmen to "take up all 
Negro and Molatto Servants, that shall be unseasonably Absent from their 
Masters Families" after ten o'clock at night. The town returned to this issue 
periodically, seeking in 1750 to find if "any more effectual Method than is
109 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Boston Records 
from 1700 to 1728 (Boston: Rockwell and Curchhill, 1883), April, 1723.
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already prescrib'd by Law can be taken, to prevent the Disorders that are 
frequently committed by Negroes in the night."110
Some ordinances, though ostensibly aimed at whites, effectually 
impacted blacks. In 1761, the selectmen warned that sellers of "Rum & other 
Spiritous Liquors to Negro & Moletta Servants, not bringing Certificates from 
their Masters" w ould be penalized. Though directed at the white merchants 
and masters, this abridged some of the informal freedoms of black servants 
and slaves—some of whom  surely had used their masters' taste for liquor as a 
pretext to get some for themselves. Other ordinances persistently reminded 
free black men and wom en that their freedom was mitigated by racial 
ideologies that expected African Americans to be a drain on society. Sdpio, a 
free black Philadelphian who m oved to Boston in 1761, knowing that he 
would be the object of such expectations, came to the selectmen offering £100 
as a surety against becoming a charge to the town.111
Though it is not possible to determine the rigor of enforcement, the 
persistence efforts in the town meetings and by the selectmen to regulate the 
lives of black men and women indicates that this was an ongoing tension, a 
tension that must have been felt by black Bostonians. Furthermore, this 
illustrates the ambivalence that African Americans likely held regarding the 
law: it could be a powerful instrument for protection or freedom, and a 
powerful instrument for oppression.
110 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the C ity of Boston, containing the Boston Records 
from 1729 to 1742 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1885), April 1736; A Report of the Record 
Commissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Boston Records from 1742 to 1757 (Boston: 
Rockwell and Churchill, 1885), March 1750/51.
111 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the C ity of Boston, containing the Selectmen's 
Minutes from 1754-1763 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1887), August 1761.
73
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Occasionally, savvy African Americans, follow ing in the footsteps of 
people like Adam Saffin, managed to protect them selves from the oppressive  
side of the law by using the law against itself. In 1769, when the selectmen  
once again attempted to put some teeth into the ordinance aimed at 
preventing free and enslaved blacks from being out late at night, they 
required the watchmen to patrol in pairs in  order to ensure the arrest of "all 
negroes found out after dark without a lantern." Presumably, the selectmen  
had decided that any black man or wom an w ithout a light was skulking about 
for no good reason. Soon thereafter, the watch picked up an elderly black 
man "prowling about in total darkness." They held him overnight, brought 
him before a judge the next morning, only to hear him  plead not guilty and 
hold up an old lantern as evidence of his innocence. The lantern, however, 
had no candle or oil. The ordinance was quickly rewritten to specify that any 
black man or woman had to have a lantern w ith a candle. The same man 
was caught by the watch again, pled not guilty again, and once more held up 
an old lantern — with a fresh candle that had obviously never been lit. The 
judge, probably irritated by the old man's flirtatious run-ins with the law , 
discharged him this time with a reprimand. The law was rewritten a second  
time, and this time specified that any slaves out after nine o'clock had to be 
"carrying Lanthoms with light Candles and can give a good and satisfactory 
Account of their Business."112 Though w hites m ay have repeated this story as 
an example of what was in their view  a literal-minded black simpleton 
managing to dodge legal consequences, it is more plausible that this man,
112 Edward H. Savage, A  Chronological History of the Boston Watch and Police, from 1631 to 
1865; Together with the Recollections of a Boston Police Officer, or Boston by Daylight and 
Gaslight (Boston: 1865), 33; A  Report of the Record Comissioners of the City of Boston, 
containing the Selectmen's Minutes from 1769 to April, 1775 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 
1893), November 9 1769.
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acting as sort of a human trickster, intentionally did as little as possible to 
comply w ith a law that he considered a nuisance. H e apparently knew he w as 
on safe ground in pleading not guilty, and knew  w hen to stop. For a time, he 
succeeded in using a literal interpretation of the law  to evade submitting to 
an oppressive ordinance.
While the town was busy seeking w ays to confine the daily lives of 
black Bostonians, there were other instances o f African Americans using the 
law  for their own ends. While not quite as dramatic as Adam Saffin's story, 
James, a slave to Samuel Burnell, pursued his freedom after his master of 40 
years died in 1736. James insisted that his master had always intended to free 
him upon his own death. Burnell's w idow  and children claimed that James 
w as part of the estate. James petitioned the legislature for his freedom, w hich  
suspected that the final w ill had been "by som e ill Arts conveyed away, and  
probably destroyed, so that there cannot be a legal Probate thereof, yet there 
being sufficiently Evidence that ...the Testator had ordered the freedom of the 
Petitioner." The legislature, giving a black man the benefit of the doubt 
against a white woman and her children, granted James' freedom in October 
of 1737, so long as he could provide a security to the town, and in December 
his freedom was finalized when two white m en stepped forward to give a 
bond of £200.113 In 1740, John Woodby, a free black man, complained to the 
selectmen that "he was taken up in the street" by one of the watchmen as he  
was going home from work at night, subsequently imprisoned and fined 13 
shillings, "all without any legal process - w hich he humbly Apprehends is 
against Law and Justice." The watchman w as probably acting according to the 
ordinances restricting night activity by black Bostonians, but perhaps was too 
eager and accosted Woodby too early in the evening. Woodby apprehended
113 James appears in the Thwing Database.
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correctly; the selectmen told the watchman to be more cautious and to "act 
prudently in all such matters in the future.114
As the eighteenth century wore on, and the number of freed African 
Americans in Boston increased, their lives were shaped by laws that were 
intended to regulate life, regardless of color, in what was becoming an urban 
environment. The selectmen passed a series of rather mundane law s in 1757; 
some fined "persons who dug holes or broke the ground on streets or lanes; 
left dirt, rubbish, dung, carrion," levied fines against "playing or kicking of 
Foot-ball within any of the Streets or Lanes", required homeowners to rake 
up the dirt from their doors into the streets so farmers could pick it up, 
mandated that no one over 12 years old could undress and wash themselves 
in the streets until one hour after sunset, and so on.115 As Boston grew, so 
too did the pervasiveness of legal authority governing daily life. Black 
Bostonians' awareness of the power of the law grew as well, since they too 
butted up against the increasing number of regulatory ordinances. By 
encountering not only laws aimed at governing urban life in general, but also 
governing black people specifically, and experiencing the liberating power of 
the law, the seeds of a legal consciousness grew among African Americans, 
including those w ho never entered a courtroom.
But many did enter the courtroom, and their familiarity of doing so 
meant that Quock Walker's prosecution against his former owner w as no 
aberration. On April 30 of 1781, according to Walker, Nathaniel Jennison beat 
him with his "fist and a large stick," and then imprisoned Walker for two
114 A Report of the Record Comissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Boston Records 
from 1729 to 1742 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1885), June 1740.
115 A Report of the Record Comissioners of the City of Boston, containing the Boston Records 
from 1742 to 1757 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1885).
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hours. The next day, Walker resorted to the law, charging Jennison with  
trespass. Jennison did not dispute the facts of the case—probably because in  
addition to Walker, there were at least two white witnesses. Instead, Jennison 
expanded the dispute by arguing that because he had married the w idow  
Caldwell, whose previous husband had owned Walker, he was now  Walker's 
owner. Walker countered that his former owner, Caldwell, had long m ade 
oral promises that upon his death Walker would be a free man. Caldwell's 
brother testified that "my brother said always he should be free at 25,"
Jennison insisted upon his rights as the owner of the since deceased w idow  
Caldwell's property. In an earlier time and place, the case might well have 
gone against Walker; but in this revolutionary era, his appeal fell on  
receptive ears.
Overlooked in this well-known case is Quock Walker's legal strategy.
He did not go to court for the explicit purpose of obtaining legal freedom. He 
went to get a measure of protection and to extract some vengance upon  
Jennison. It is notable that Walker did not file criminal charges of assault 
upon Jennison: he filed a civil charge of trespass, based on Jennison's 
kidnapping him and holding him prisoner for two hours. This enabled 
Walker to do more than have the court punish Jennison for assault w ith a 
fine and, perhaps, a brief imprisonment. Walker sued Jennison for £50 in  
damages—which a jury awarded. Walker was no novice; he knew how  to 
work the legal system to his greatest advantage.
Walker's decision to charge Jennison with trespass instead of assault 
also speaks to his sense of self—Jennison had done more than beat him, 
Jennison had crossed a boundary that violated his rights as a freeman.
Assault was not unheard of; but to imprison him likely pushed the offense to 
another level in Walker's mind. Had he charged Jennison with assault, it
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w ould have left the larger question of his legal status unresolved; slaves 
could successfully prosecute their owners or other whites w ith  assault 
without changing their status as slaves. By charging Jennison with trespass, 
Walker forced Jennison to defend him self by arguing that Walker was his 
slave, and therefore no trespass had occured. This pushed the case from the 
Court of Com mon Pleas to the Supreme Judicial Court. In effect, Walker — 
perhaps inadvertently and perhaps not — gave the court the opportunity to 
expand the dispute to address the issue that was closest to his heart.
His tactic paid off. The presiding judge noted that slavery had been but 
a custom— "a usage"—that had "been heretofore countenanced by the 
Province Laws formerly, but now here is it expressly enacted or established." 
Since, however, "a different idea has taken place with the people of America, 
more favorable to the natural rights of mankind, and to that natural innate 
desire of Liberty, with which H eaven (without regard to color, complexion, or 
shape of noses features) has inspired all the human race." The state 
constitution, argued the judge, declared "that all men are b om  free and equal- 
-and that every subject is entitled to liberty, and to have it guarded by the 
laws, as w ell as life and property—and in short is totally repugnant to the idea 
of being bom  slaves." Therefore, "there can be no such thing as perpetual 
servitude of a rational creature."116
Like Adam  Saffin, Quock Walker's identity became intim ately tied to 
the law. Like Adam Saffin, Quock Walker defined himself as free man, and 
asserted his self-definition by leaving Jennison, believing that the promises of 
his dead master had freed him. But it took a legal act to formally establish his
116 Quotes and reconstruction of events taken from The Case of Nathaniel Jennison for 
Attempting to Hold a Negro as a Slave in Massachusetts in 1781. From the Minutes of Chief 
Justice Cushing, with references to contemporaneous records.(Boston: John W ilson & Son, 1874).
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status. When. Judge Cushing dedared that "every subject is entitled to 
liberty," it shaped Walker's identity in two ways: first as a free man, and  
second as a subject. Defining Walker as a subject gave him certain daim s 
upon the polity; namely, the right to have his status as a free man "guarded 
by the laws." Defining Walker as a subject tied him to the commonwealth  
and to its laws, it created a bond between the man who had formally m oved  
from slavery to freedom not by his own daim  (saying that his dead masters 
had made certain promises) or actions (running away), but by the act of the 
court. This dearly does not deny Walker agency. He initiated the entire 
proceeding by first asserting his freedom w hen he left Jennison, and escalated  
the conflict by charging Jennison with trespass. But the final definition of his 
status came only with the court's dedsion, a dedsion  that laid important 
boundaries between him self and others, espedally  men like Jennison.117
Quock Walker, far from being a pioneer in the pursuit of legally 
recognized liberty, w as one of a long line of black men and women w ho  
depended upon the law  to manage conflicts. But because Walker's case and 
others like his came at time when, as T. H. Breen points out, white public 
opinion had turned against slavery in Massachusetts, the legal conflict could  
be phrased in a manner that challenged slavery. Eventually, in the spring of 
1788, Massachusetts offidally abolished slavery. But even that act was 
tempered, as was much of African Americans' experience with the law. On 
the same day of the abolition act7s passage, another act passed that em powered  
justices of the peace to expel any black man or wom an that the justice deem ed  
as not being a Massachusetts resident. With state-wide legal freedom came
117 Ibid. On the importance of the law creating or reinforcing boundaries, see Patricia 
Williams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights," Harvard 
Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 22 (Spring 1987), 401-433.
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legislation aimed at limiting the growth of the black population.118 
Nevertheless, the persistent engagement of black men and wom en with the 
law over the course of a century, as plaintiffs as well as defendants, proved to 
be integral both in providing individuals like Walker a wealth of experience 
to draw upon, and in keeping the legal personhood of black wom en and men 
viable. Just as significantly, this century-long engagement shaped Africans as 
they entered the Early Republic as African Americans.
118 Massachusetts Legislative Documents 1817-1822, House No. 46, "Free Negroes and 
Mulattoes," 14-15. This House document notes that the emancipation was 'official' in 
Massachusetts when a law was passed on March 26,1788. The trigger event was when a man 
decoyed 3 black men onto a ship in Boston harbor, and tried to sell them in the West Indies 
island o f St. Bartholomew) The Govenor o f Massachusetts and the French Consulate wrote 
letters to the Governor of St. Bartholomew, who stopped the sale. The men returned to Boston 
on July 29, which "was made a day of great rejoicing." The document also comments about the 
law permitting justices to expel blacks, stating that "the constitutionality of which has been 
called into question, and which it is well known was passed on the same day as the abolition 
act o f march 1788." Also see Moore, Notes on the History of Slavery in Massachusetts, 228.
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Chapter Two
Delivering Tustice and Shaping Identity: The Law and the Formation of Black
Identity in Boston. 1783-1820
In June of 1787, Jack and Silvia Austin sold a plot of land near the 
center of Boston to Boston Smith. That same day, Smith turned around and 
sold that plot to Cromwell Barnes, who, four months later, m ortgaged half of 
it to John Brown, Esquire. Brown, however, apparently did not hold up his 
end of the deal, and in 1791 the property returned to Cromwell Barnes. Five 
years later, Barnes sold the land to Abel and Chloe Barbadoes, w ho  
immediately sold half of it to Prince Freeman. A year and a half later, in the 
spring of 1798, the Barbadoes mortgaged the remaining half to M ungo  
Mackay, Jr. Part of the significance of the dealings swirling around this tract 
of urban real estate is that all of the players but one—John Brown, Esquire— 
were free people of color.119
Jumping ahead fourteen years to what may seem a very different story, 
a young black woman named Rebecca Freeman testified before a justice of the 
peace in 1812 against a black m an accused and subsequently convicted of theft. 
Over the next several years, Freeman w ould go on to appear num erous times 
as a plaintiff, defendant, and w itness in this justice of the peace court.
Freeman, like many other black Bostonians—especially w om en—discovered  
that her word meant something in  this court. She doubtlessly communicated
119 From the Thwing Database at the Massachusetts Historical Society. Each deed and 
transaction is listed in the databse under the individual's name.
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her court encounters by  telling friends and neighbors of her victories and 
setbacks. She definitely transmitted her legal experience by bringing other 
black men and w om en to court either as her witnesses or by leveling charges, 
both serious and trivial, against them. In July of 1819, Freeman charged 
another black woman, Lucy DeCosta, with 'profane swearing' and brought 
two other black w om en, Am y Jackson and Harriet Hubbard, as her witnesses. 
Found guilty, DeCosta had to pay a fine of just over three dollars. Amy  
Jackson apparently learned the legal lesson well. One month later, Jackson, 
w ith Hubbard as her w itness, managed to have a white woman thrown in  jail 
after charging her w ith 'profane swearing.' Black litigants like Freeman and 
Jackson acquired a certain amount of legal savvy through their court 
experiences, and learned to expect a decent chance of success against black and 
white antagonists.120
Two threads draw together these two seemingly disparate stories. The 
obvious one is that nearly all of the major players were African Americans. 
The second is their participation in Boston's legal system. Both groups knew  
how  the law could w ork to their advantage. The wheelers and dealers of real 
estate experienced the law's ability to establish power over a piece of property. 
Litigants experienced the lower court's ability to deliver justice quickly. 
Building on more than a century of experience, black Bostonians during the 
Early Republic era now  engaged the law as citizens, heightening an awareness 
of themselves operating as legal beings in a free society. That heightened
120 From the record book o f  justice of the peace Stephen Gorham, Criminal Actions from July 19 
1812 to November 24 1813, George Reed v. James Williams, A ugust 3 1812; and Criminal Actions 
from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820, Freeman v. DeCosta, July 3,1819, and Jackson v Betsey 
Francis, August 5,1819. This book and eight others, documenting cases from April of 1806 to 
November of 1820 (except for one missing book covering October of 1816 through January of 1818) 
are part of the Adlow Collection in the Rare Books Room of the Boston Public Library. There is 
no pagination of these record books; all references will be according to date.
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awareness continued to nuture a legal consciousness in the m idst of a salient 
period in  the formation of an African American identity.
In making this argument, this chapter employs a conceptualization 
similar to that used by legal scholars David Engel and Frank Munger. They 
described "the variety of ways in w hich rights can become active in 'day-to- 
day' life, even w hen individuals do  not choose to assert them....Rights may 
may interw oven with individual lives and with particular social or cultural 
settings even w hen no formal claim is lodged." The authors also argue that 
law, culture, identity, and experience act in concert to shape one another. 
Everyday life experience interacts w ith the law to shape identity; in turn one's 
identity influences how individuals use, avoid, and perceive the law. And 
since identity is in many respects an ongoing negotiation between the Self 
and the social and cultural environment, use of avoidance of the law  "can 
redefine cultural categories and self-perceptions over time." This study  
argues that relatively simple and unremarkable legal actions, joined with the 
unique life experience of a people m oving from slavery to freedom in a 
period of rapid social and cultural change, shaped their identity at a key 
historical m om ent.121
For free and enslaved blacks in the seventeenth century and most of 
the eighteenth century, the law provided an arena for participating in a 
network of relationships with neighbors, selectmen, court officials, jury 
members, or witnesses, any of w hom  might be allies or enemies. Black 
participants took on a variety of roles in those legal relationships as plaintiffs, 
defendants, property owners, or petitioners, thereby establishing a black 
presence in the legal arena and confirming the power and utility of the law
121 David M. Engel and Frank W. Munger, "Rights, Remembrance, and the Reconciliation of 
Difference," Law and Society Review 30 (N o. 1, 1996), 14-16.
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for defining blacks as legal beings during northern slavery. The ability to play 
these roles was severely restricted for southern blacks, but black N ew  
Englanders could take center stage in attempting to maintain some measure 
of control over their daily lives or in pusuit of greater freedom.
And take the stage they did. After the court rulings of the early 1780s 
freed virtually every slave in Massachusetts, African Americans took on legal 
roles in increased numbers. Gradual judicial reforms after the Revolutionary 
War, in part a response to Shay's Rebellion and other expressions of 
dissatisfaction with legal formalities, made the law  even more accessible to 
ordinary citizens, including African Americans.122 Playing those roles helped  
erect and maintain legally defined boundaries around the individual while 
simultaneously tying the individual to other legal actors — property deeds, for 
instance, dearly marked out a physical and legal boundary over which others 
could not trespass without consequence, and sim ultaneously defined the 
property owner by naming the neighboring property owners. Cato Ransom's 
land in Salem was delineated as lying "westerly on land of Joshua 
Dodge...northerly on land of Benjamin Crowning" and so on.123 A black 
plaintiff who charged som eone with 'threatening' invoked the power of the 
law and justice system to provide protection and create a legal distance 
between the plaintiff and his or her antagonist. Even though the law could 
not guarantee that an antagonist would respect that distance, it did enable the 
plaintiff to identify a behavioral boundary, and gave the individual recourse 
if that boundary was violated. Like Quock Walker, Adam Saffin, and many
122 See William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change 
on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 67-88.
123 From the deed of Cato Ransom's sale of this lot to Nathan Wood in 1795. Contained in the 
Robert Morris box, located at the Boston Athenaeum.
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others, free people of color found the law  a valuable tool, but by engaging the 
law, they became subject to and dependent upon its power to define, in part, 
their social and legal identity.
M ost of these m en and wom en left few  traces of how  they tried to 
maintain control over their ow n circumstances during the Early Republic era. 
Their legal trail is usually short and barely discernible. They left no known 
written observations of how they perceived their encounters w ith  the law; 
they did not go  on record to articulate in clear and unambiguous terms that 
their legal experience encouraged a consciousness of individual rights; they 
did not publicly proclaim a faith in the power of the law to maintain 
personal boundaries. Nonetheless, their actions hold meaning. Historian 
Rhys Isaac notes that "the searching out of the meanings that such actions 
contained and conveyed for the participants lies at the heart of the enterprise 
of ethnographic history. Actions m ust be view ed as statements."124 Grafting 
ethnographic m ethodology with the work of legal scholars studying race, 
rights, and the courts yields understanding of what those statements meant.
Despite the increase in manumissions in Massachusetts before and 
during the Revolution, and despite the legal dem ise of slavery in 1783, the 
law remained oppressive for free people of color in many respects. Only black 
residents, for instance, risked imprisonment or deportation if unable to prove 
citizenship.125 There is also evidence that not all slaves were freed after 1783;
124 Rhys Isaac, The Transformation of Virginia 1740-1790 (N ew  York: W.W. Norton & Co.,
1982), 324.
125 Massachusetts Legislative Documents 1817-1822, House No. 46, "Free Negroes and 
Mulattoes," 14-15; George H. Moore, Notes on the History of Slavery in Massachusetts, (New  
York: D. Appleton, 1866), 228; John Daniels, In Freedom's Birthplace: A Study of the Boston 
Negroes (Boston: Houghton & Mifflin, 1914; reprint, A m o Press and The N ew  York Times, 1969), 
26-28. The M assachusetts legislature passed a law in 1788 aimed at controlling "rouges, 
vagabonds, com m on beggars, and other idle, disorderly, and lewd persons," and stipulated that
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court cases in 1784 and 1786 involved slaves, and the portrait gracing the 
frontispiece for a 1786 volum e of Phillis Wheatley's poetry was engraved by 
"the slave of Rev. John Moorhead."126 Nevertheless, black wom en and men  
staked their claim to the right to participate in  the life of the polity. A  few  did 
so through more visib le and traditional m ethods such as the famous freedom  
petitions drawn up by Massachusetts slaves in  the 1770s.
Many other free blacks engaged in unobtrusive exercises aimed not at 
forcing legal change, but intended to gain som e control over their ow n lives. 
Through simple and practical interactions w ith  the legal system, free black 
women and men began to demonstrate certain expectations of how  the law  
applied to them and how  they could apply the law. When Sdpio and Tobias 
Locker, two former slaves, ignored orders by the selectmen in 1762 and again 
in 1766 to perform w ork for the dty under an old ordinance labeled "Act for 
Regulating of Free Negros," they showed an awareness of where the law  
broke down—they d o  not appear to have suffered any consequences for their 
noncompliance. H aving only recently been em andpated, Sdpio and Tobias 
were unwilling to subm it their time to labor for others. Meanwhile, they  
signed deeds to the land that they bought and sold in Boston. John Thurber, 
freed in November o f 1761, bought land less than two weeks later, and a year 
later was also d ted  by the selectmen for noncompliance with an order to work  
on the highways. Both he and the Lockers committed their names as sellers
any black man or wom an had to have proof of United States citizenship from their state of 
origin.
126 See Nelson, Americanization of the Common Laiu, 102; Scipio Moorhead, John M oorhead's 
slave, refered to in the Thw ing database. It is possible that Scipio had done the work while a 
slave, previous to the legal eradication of slavery, and w as a free man in 1786 when he 
received credit for his work. It seem s unlikely, however, that Scipio would have still been  
refered to as a slave and unlikely that he would have been comissioned to do the work several 
years before publication o f  the volume.
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to deeds dedaring "KNOW all Men" that they "have good right to sell and 
convey" a plot of land, and as buyers to documents stating that they were 
protected from the "daims and demands of any persons." This language 
denied the ability of others to make daims on the property of those who had 
once been property. N o  doubt this sense of power, this sense of control, was 
not lost on John Thurber or the Lockers. Their refusal to comply with the 
selectmen's orders may have very well been fed by this sense that there were 
some things that they had a right to control—such as their property and their 
labor.127
The Lockers were not the first black property owners in Boston;
Angola, slave of Robert Keayne in the seventeenth century, received a 50 
square foot plot of land from in 1673 from Governor Richard Bellingham as a 
reward for saving the Governor's life. Angola w as probably a free man when  
he acquired this property, as Keayne, who had died several years previous, left 
a will stipulating Angola's manumission. Angola was preceded as a black 
property owner by his acquaintance, Bus Bus, a free black who owned a house 
and a small plot in 1656. Even enslaved Africans could ow n property in 
Massachusetts, though at som e point it apparently became accepted legal 
practice that they could buy or sell property only with the consent of their 
masters.128
127 John Thurber's and the Locker's deeds and selectmen's orders in the Thwing Database. The 
Database, however, does not contain the deeds in their entirety. The legal language of the 
deed is taken from the 1795 deed of Cato Ransom, a black man who lived in Salem, 
Massachusetts. Scipio , who initially kept the last name of his master Capt. John 
Fayerweather, was freed less than a year before the 1762 order, and Tobias five years before 
Scipio.
128 In 1816, the Supreme Judicial Court noted that Caesar Elisha, a seventeenth-century slave, 
"could acquire no property, nor dispose of any without the consent of his master." From judicial 
Cases concerning American Slavery and the Negro, ed. Helen Tunnicliff Catterall 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1936), vol 4, 493.
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The first significant numbers of black Boston property owners do not 
appear in the records until the Lockers' time, coinciding w ith  an increase in 
manumissions by Massachusetts slaveowners. From 1761 through the end of 
the Revolution, seven black Bostonians signed eight deeds; between 1783 and 
1800, twenty-one free blacks signed twenty-two deeds. This may seem a small 
number for building claims of a burgeoning legal consciousness among 
African Americans. But there were less than 1000 African Americans— 
including children—in Boston before the Revolution and only a hundred 
more by 1800. As people of some means, all of the property owners, several of 
w hom  had trades, occupied influential positions in the black community. As 
they interacted with other black Bostonians, whether through passing along 
their ow n experiences on how to secure property or deal w ith  similar types of 
contractual relationships, their evolving sense of self contributed to the 
forging of a free black identity. A  few  eventually provided leadership in the 
black community. Scipio Dalton, w ho bought property in 1799, became vice- 
president of Boston's African Hum ane Society in 1818. Abel and Chloe 
Barbadoes' son James emerged as one of the Boston's nineteenth century 
abolitoinists who also pushed to expand civil rights, and their daughter 
Clarissa married another prominent Bostonian civil rights activist.129
The 21 property owners include a handful of wives, for whom  
participating in this simple legal act held a deeper significance. Married black 
wom en in an age of emancipation were caught in a legal purgatory that has
129 Scipio Dalton and the by-laws of the African Humane Society are in a small booklet 
labeled The By-Laws, rules and regulations, o f the African Humane Society (Boston: 1820). 
Contained in the Robert Morris Box at the Boston Athenaeum. To the best of m y knowledge, no 
other record exists of this previously unknown organization. The Barbadoes family is well 
documented in Franklin A Dorman, Twenty Families of Color in Massachusetts, 1742-1998 
(Boston: N ew  England Historic Genealogical Society, 1998). Population statistics taken from 
George A. Levesque, Black Boston: African American Life and Culture in Urban America, 1750- 
1860 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), 79, 86.
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been little appreciated. For enslaved wom en, emancipation m eant m oving  
from a status of being legal property to being legally as free, but as a married 
woman, their legal personhood was denied. Married women had no right to 
ow n property.130 Nonetheless, some black w om en demonstrated an 
awareness of both the limits and the utility o f the law, and gained som e 
amount of control over their own lives by obtaining property. In 1798 Chloe 
Spear, African-born in 1750 and sold as a child in Boston, initiated the 
purchase of an unfinished house on White Bread A lley in Boston. K nowing  
that she could not legally buy the house and lot in her own name, Chloe had 
to first get her husband Cesar to agree to the purchase, "cause he de head." 
"Cesar, house to sell; I w ish w e buy it," Chloe declared. Cesar, taken aback, 
responded with "I no got de money, how I buy a house?" His thriftier wife, 
however had m anaged to save enough to m eet the $700 purchase price. After 
the Spears obtained the deed, Chloe mapped out a plan to secure their 
investment and enhance their independence. Since the house was 
unfinished, the Spears w ould live in the poorest part of the house, and rent 
out the rest. Her intent was to use the rent m oney for improvements, 
enabling them to charge higher rents, thereby providing for their future. Her 
plan must have m et w ith some success; w hen Chloe died in 1815, she left 
behind a house on one Boston's main thoroughfares, as well as $500 to a 
grandson and other smaller bequests.131 Black w om en like Chloe experienced  
the confining pow er of the law throughout their lives—through being the 
legal property of another and as a wife 'covered' as a legal being by her
130 Nelson, Americanization o f the Common Law, 103.
131 We Are Your Sisters: Black Women in the Nineteenth Century, ed. Dorothy Sterling (N ew  
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1984), 93. Sterling reprints an excerpt from "A Lady of Boston" who  
wrote a Memoir of Mrs. Chloe Spear. The Spears are also in the Thwing database.
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husband—as w ell as its ability to em power by outlining the Spears' right to 
ow n and im prove property as they w ished for their own benefit.
Signing deeds was a fairly routine act. But for black m en and women, 
some of w hom  had recently been enslaved and others w ho had relatives or 
friends w h o  had been slaves, this simple act, made during an age of slavery 
and emancipation, must have carried a different meaning than it did for 
white property owners. Some were probably more conscious than others of 
the significance of these legal actions. Whatever their level o f awareness, 
signing deeds was one legal act that delineated specific rights. Rights, as 
Patricia W illiams has argued, have the power to provide autonomy and 
distance from potential oppressors. Rights also create m eaningful boundaries 
that enable the holder to define w hen an intrusion occurs. The ability to 
commit one's name to a property deed did more than establish geographical 
boundaries; it also helped construct boundaries around a sense of self by 
defining the individual as a legal and social being with certain rights.132
W hite Americans understood the importance of m aintaining those 
boundaries. The freedom to possess property and the expectation that the 
rule of law  w ould  protect legal title was a specific kind of liberty—the liberty of 
secure possession—that colonials had long accepted as a normative part of 
civil society. This kind of liberty stemmed not from the particular form of 
government, "but rather from specific arrangements that in time became 
institutionalized [and] were concrete and verifiable."133 By entering into 
those institutionalized arrangements, free black property owners grounded
132 See Patricia Williams, "Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed 
Rights," Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 22 (Spring 1987), 401-433.
133 Joyce A ppleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s 
(New York: N ew  York University Press, 1984), 18.
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their claim to one kind of liberty that had become central to a developing  
American identity.
The law, then, had something of value beyond emancipation to offer 
black men and w om en like the Lockers and Chloe Spear. Individual 
manumissions and general emancipation in 1783 broadly defined black 
women and men as legally free beings; deeds helped further define black 
property owners as legal beings by creating specific boundaries protecting a 
fundamental liberty.
This in turn influenced black identity formation. The formation of an 
African American identity was shaped in part by simple, practical acts that 
placed them in a legal context, a context in turn tied to a broad constellation of 
ideologies in the Early Republic that intertwined liberty with independence, 
independence with citizenship, and citizenship with what it meant to be an 
American. Joyce Appleby describes how the growth of commercial capitalism  
in Britain and the colonies had undermined the traditional Old World social 
and political hierarchical system, and how a more subversive ideology of 
liberty bloomed as individuals engaged in unregulated market relationships 
for their own and society's mutual benefit. The market became the driving  
force legitimizing the pursuit of self-interest and, combined with the impact 
of the French Revolution, presented a vision of men freed from the chains of 
custom. Jeffersonians eventually seized on this vision to promulgate a liberal 
identity of Americans as free, autonomous, and independent beings.
The law—which, as Tom Paine had declared in Common Sense, was 
king in America—w as the central mechanism undergirding the liberties of 
these independent Americans and ensuring their free participation in  the 
market. Seemingly mundane acts like signing deeds or procuring badges that 
protected one's vocation outlined the legal boundaries of liberty over which
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others could not trespass. Defining these boundaries in effect helped secure 
liberty to "the enjoyment of legal title to a piece of property or the privilege of  
doing a particular thing w ithout fear of arrest or punishment."134 Former 
slaves entered into this security when they were able to sign deeds, make 
wills, or gamer legal protection of their vocation as free African Americans. 
W hen Tobias, a slave o f John Cookson was em ployed as a chimneysweep in  
1716, Boston's selectmen granted the license to Cookson, not Tobias. But 
w hen Juba Andrew, a free black man in 1787, obtained Sweepers Badge N o. 2 
from the selectmen "to sw eep Chimnies in the Town," his vocation became 
protected by the law and publicly affirmed his rights as a citizen to earn his 
ow n living as a chimney sw eep .135 Andrew's legal affirmation stood in 
contrast to the selectmen's punishment just four days previous of two white 
sweeps "charged with taking illegal Fees" who were subsequently forbidden to 
practice their vocation in  Boston. Just as engaging in commerce structured 
Americans' self-conception as autonomous and equal beings, engaging in 
legal actions structured free blacks' self-conception as legal beings with equal 
citizenship rights. Wills, contracts for labor, licenses to work, are all examples 
of simple actions that established specific rights to do something and limited  
the ability of others to infringe on those rights. All of these legal acts 
contributed to defining a sense of self during an era of transition.
134 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, ed. Isaac Kramnick (New York: Penguin Books, 1985), 98; 
Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order, 17.
135 See Paul A. Gilje and Howard B. Rock, "Sweep O! Sweep O!': African-American Chimney 
Sweeps and Citizenship in the N ew  Nation," William and M ary Quarterly 57 (July 1994), 507- 
538. Tobias is in the Thwing Database; Juba Andrew's liscensing and the punishment of the 
white sweeps appears in A Report of the Record Commissioners o f the C ity of Boston,
Containing the Selectmen's Minutes from 1787 through 1798 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 
1896), Nov. 12,1787. The Boston Town Records document several other black chimney sweeps 
applying for and obtaining badges; Cesar Capen, for instance, obtained Badge No. 11 in 1794. 
Ibid., Nov. 5, 1794.
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Deeds and wills also affirmed black community. Despite black-white 
interaction being the daily norm, and despite being less than 5% of Boston's 
population, black property owners frequently sold land to other African 
A m ericans.136 Black property owners also commonly bought property 
adjacent to other African American dwellings, thereby physically building a 
black community. In every w ill I have found thus far, black testators named 
other African Americans as executors. At times both forms of legal activity 
converged: in 1780, Cesar Wendell, a free black property owner, appointed 
another free black man, his "Worthy and Honored Friend" Jack Austin, 
executor of his w ill and recepient of all of his personal and real estate. Later 
that year, Wendell died. Austin, a pewterer and shopkeeper, initiated the 
exchange of property mentioned in the opening. On occasion, the intent to 
affirm relationships was explicit: in 1839, the w idow  Remember Ransom, 
shortly before her death, sold her lot for one dollar out of "the love and 
affection I bear to John Brooks, of Salem." Though the intention may not 
have always been to build 'community', these legal acts formally bound black 
w om en and men to one as a free people that had not been possible as an 
enslaved people.137
Black identity was reinforced by legal transactions that defined 
boundaries while engaging African Americans with w hites on a field where
136 Over half of the deeds involve transactions between African Americans, and the number 
may be higher. Some of the individuals that appear may have been African American but, 
since they do not appear in any other records that identify them as such, it is not yet possible to 
be certain. On black-white interaction and residential living patterns in urban areas, see James 
Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, In Hope of Liberty: Culture, Community, and Protest among 
Northern Free Blacks, 1700-1860 (N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 96-100; Henry L. 
Taylor, "On Slavery's Fringe: City-Building and Black Community Developm ent in Cincinnati, 
1800-1850," Ohio History 95 (1986), 5-33; and Leonard P. Curry, Free Blacks in Urban America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
137 Cesar Wendell appears in the Thwing Database; Remember Ransom's deed is in the Robert 
Morris box at the Boston Athenaeum.
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the same rules applied to each participant. Legal transactions also engaged 
African Americans with one another in n ew  ways. Far from being static or 
simply a matter of maintaining distance from white Americans, black identity 
was dynamic and a matter of engaging w hites and blacks in multiple arenas. 
The law provided perhaps the only arena in which black men and women— 
though for w om en it was sometimes indirectly, as in the case o f Chloe Spear— 
could forge equitable relationships with w hites, while simultaneously 
reinforcing connections with other African Americans.
While deeds and wills demonstrate a more purposeful and 
harmonious cooperation that indirectly created or reinforced social ties 
through formal legal mechanisms, justice of the peace records reveal a more 
contentious and complicated picture of comm unity and identity. Here, where 
the law manifested itself through a relatively informal and accessible court, 
an oppressed people found that at least one of the articulated ideals of a 
professed democratic and egalitarian republic—equality before, and access to, 
the law—could at times come close to being realized.
In early nineteenth century Boston, the path to justice had few  
obstacles. Anyone who perceived them selves as a victim of an alleged crime, 
the first step was getting a constable to arrest the perpetrator. George Reed, 
the constable w ho made the arrests in m any of the cases involving African 
Americans, was an easily identifiable and familiar figure for many black 
Bostonians. Standing six feet tall, wearing a "broad brimmed high crowned 
felt hat, [and] a bright spotted red bandana," Reed's daily patrol took him 
through the streets of Boston's sixth ward, which had the highest proportion 
of black residents. He became so familiar that one chronicler of Boston 
remembered black mothers invoking the specter of "Old Reed cornin' to 
gobble yis up" to keep their children in line. One account demonstrated how
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easy it was to engage Reed's services. Around 1830, a customer passed 
counterfeit m oney to a boy working as a clerk in a shoe store. The boy 
showed the storeowner the counterfeits, w ho asked his young clerk if he 
knew 'Old Reed.' The clerk, thinking "what manner of boy did not know  
him," ran to the O ld Court H ouse in the center of Boston, found Reed, w ho  
immediately follow ed the boy back to the shoe store. Though the suspect 
eluded capture for three more days, this account indicates how close at hand 
justice lay: common folk knew the constable, knew where to find him, and  
knew that his response was likely to be immediate. In the same way, they 
knew the justice of the peace.138
The people of Massachusetts had long been in  the habit of resorting to 
the justice of the peace to resolve civil and criminal disputes. In keeping with  
English law and custom, "Puritan reformers emphasized the role of the 
justice of the peace, for it, above all other local legal institutions, had 
weathered the effects of social and political change and had demonstrated a 
power and a flexibility lacking in the others....Puritan leaders placed great 
responsibility on the justice o f the peace."139 During the latter half of the 
seventeenth century, as the church and the tow n meeting proved to be 
inadequate venues to handle the wide range of disputes cropping up in a 
society transitioning to new  social and economic environments, the courts 
"helped establish and enforce a 'totality of norms' to regulate the 
relationships of private individuals."140 Many N ew  Englanders became
138 George Hugh Crichton, Old Boston and its once familiar faces: sketches of some odd 
characters who have flourished in Boston during the past fifty  years (unpublished manuscript, 
1881). Located at the Boston Athenaeum.
139 David Thomas Konig, Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts: Essex County, 1629-1692 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 5.
140 Ibid., 69.
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accustomed to using the courts to manage their conflicts, making litigation 
and the law an integral part of maintaining and interpreting social order as 
"standards of neighborliness had to be demanded and asserted in court." 
While the law could specify w hat constituted a crime, it "could not set 
standards of daily interpersonal activity which had to be tested and 
established in court." People expected each other to conform to what the 
court affirmed as normative behavior; anyone w ho did not could expect to 
find themselves in front o f a justice of the peace.141
This had been the intent of the English court system. More serious 
crimes were generally dealt w ith by higher courts, while the justices of the 
peace were expected to handle the sort of persistent disruptions that might 
regularly plague a community. Justice needed to be easily available on a local 
basis in order to ensure social order. Hence, justices of the peace could hear 
cases and deliver verdicts individually in their ow n homes or as a group 
during one of the quarterly sessions in their ow n county. They were given  
the authority to punish through corporal punishm ent, imprisonment, or 
fines and sureties. They had the authority to act as a constable, accusing and 
arresting suspected violators. Conviction in a justice of the peace court was 
meant to be "an easy prom pt matter upon the testim ony of one or two  
witnesses."142 They were protected in English, and later in American, law  
against countersuits—for instance, from being accused of trespassing if they 
had gone on another's property to order an arrest. The authority and duties 
of the justice of the peace rem ained fairly consistent throughout the
141 Ibid., xiv-xv. William N elson also notes that the courts became the primary method of 
dispute resolution. See W illiam E. Nelson, Dispute and Conflict Resolution in Plymouth 
County, Massachusetts, 1725-1825 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1981).
142 Konig, Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts, 16; and Nelson, Americanization of the 
Common Law, 15.
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eighteenth century and into the nineteenth. Late in the eighteenth century, 
the jurisdiction of justices of the peace actually expanded somewhat, as post- 
Revolutionary reformers sought to make the judicial system  more accessible 
and efficient. During the first tw o decades of the nineteenth century, as 
Massachusetts bounced judicial responsibilities from one court to another in 
a spasm of attempted reforms, one constant was the continued jurisdiction of 
the justice of the peace court over daily neighborhood civil and criminal 
conflicts.143
That steady connection w ith  the life of the neighborhood meant the 
justice of the peace was often a natural recourse for m anaging conflict. The 
justice of the peace that black Bostonians resorted to m ost frequently 
adjudicated cases in the new Suffolk County Court House. Completed in 
1812, the Court House was a rather im posing granite structure with a front 
lawn in the heart of the dty, w ith  space and style that communicated power 
and authority. The initial complaint, however, was probably made to the 
justice in his office in the Tudor building, at the end of a row of buildings 
facing the back of the Court H ouse, and spoke less of pow er and more of the
143 Michael Stephen Hindus, Prison and Plantation: Crime, Justice, and Authority in 
Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1767-1878 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1980); Nelson, Americanization o f the Common Law, 166. Comparison of three manuals 
written as guidebooks for justices o f the peace indicates that even as late as 1847, the justice was 
expected to fulfill virtually the same function. While these manuals give no suggestion as to 
how the types of cases brought to a justice o f the peace may have changed over time, the justice 
of the peace records that I use here clearly indicate a pattern consistent with this description of 
the justice's intended function of dealing w ith day-to-day disputes ranging from forgery to 
assault to AWOL sailors. The m anuals are Samuel Freeman, The Massachusetts Justice: Being a 
Collection of the Laws of the Commonwealth o f Massachusetts, Relative to the Power and 
Duty of Justices of the Peace (Boston: Isaiah Thomas & Ebenezer T. Andrews, 1802); Rodolphus 
Dickinson, A Digest of the Common Law, the Statute Laws of Massachusetts, and of the United 
States, and the Decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Relative to the 
Pozoers and Duties of Justices of the Peace, to which is subjoined and extensive Appendix of 
Forms (Deerfield, Mass: John W ilson, 1818); and John C Davis, The Massachusetts Justice: A 
Treatise upon the Powers and Duties o f  Justices o f the Peace. With Copious Forms (Worcester: 
Warren Lazell, 1847).
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ordinary daily affairs of a growing city. This dichotomy epitom ized the justice 
of the peace: his position in the judicial hierarchy reconciled what was 
intended to be an image of the power and majesty of the law w ith an image of 
egalitarian justice and accessibility in the Early Republic.144
Once a plaintiff lodged a charge with either the justice or the constable, 
the constable escorted the accused into the courtroom, where the defendant's 
name was called and charges read aloud. For those new to the court, it could 
be an intimidating experience; one w hite defendant charged w ith  stealing 
molasses remembered the command to plead guilty or not guilty "came forth 
in a nerve destroying voice."145 Part of the intimidation m ust have stemmed 
from the powerful position held by the justice of the peace. Though a minor 
judicial figure, he had a fair amount of autonomy in early nineteenth century 
Boston-enough autonomy, in fact, to worry the selectmen, w ho expressed 
concern that too much power was concentrated in the justice of the peace and 
that the office could be easily abused. The long-standing practice of providing 
the justices' salaries from the fines and court fees imposed by the justices 
themselves was a primary reason for the selectmens' fears. In an attempt to 
"give the justices of the peace an opportunity to exercise their offices in a
144 Photographs of the Court House and the Tudor building in Old Boston in Early Photographs, 
1850-1918: 174 Prints from the Collection of the Bostonian Society (New York: Dover  
Publications, 1990), 11, 37. According to an 1821 tax list, Stephen Gorham's office was at the 
Court House on Court St. Likewise, the Boston Directory lists his office at 6 Court St. up to 1809. 
The 1813 Directory, however, has Gorham's office in the Tudor building. It makes sense that he 
would have relocated to be immediately adjacent to the new Court House. The tax list may 
have been noting the general location, whereas his office in is recorded as being in the Tudor 
building in the 1813, 1816, 1818, and 1820 directories. Tax list in At A Legal Meeting of 
Freeholders and Other Inhabitants of the Town o f Boston...a correct list stating the amount of 
Real and Personal Estate on which the Inhabitants of the Town have been valued, doomed, 
assessed and taxed for the year 1821 (Boston: True & Green, Merchant's Hall, 1822). Location of 
the court house and jail also determined from John G. Hales' 1814 map of Boston, which, along 
with the tax list and Boston Directory is located in the Massachusetts State H ouse Library.
145 Crichton, Old Boston and its once familiar faces...
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manner more publick and responsible", the selectmen proposed establishing  
a Police Court, composed of three justices of the peace with fixed salaries. It 
was not until 1822, seven years after the selectmens' proposal and the same 
year that Boston m oved from the status of town to incorporation as a city, 
that the Police Court began functioning. Before that, a significant amount of 
power resided in the hands of the justices, w ho could dispatch the accused to 
jail on the spot or levy fines that dem anded immediate payment.
Recognizing this, black Bostonians began to use this power as a tool in  
managing conflicts across and within racial boundaries.146
The justice of the peace court also w ielded a significant amount of local 
power in part because of the unique space it occupied in the legal system. 
Barbara Yngvesson and Lynn Mather have described how even in 'simple' or 
'tribal' societies, institutions devised for dispute resolution may be 
characterized by restricted participation, specialized language and procedures, 
and several layers of organization for dispute resolution. More com plex or 
m odem  societies nearly always exhibit these characteristics in their court 
systems. In both types of societies, "these contextual features often allow  for 
those of higher social status to dominate in the handling of individual 
disputes and, in so doing, to reinforce broader patterns of social order." 
Similarly, the developm ent of an "official language of law increases the 
power of certain political interests by restricting access to the disputing forum, 
by defining the kinds of disputes which can be placed on the agenda of the 
forum."147 The court system in Boston, a focus of reform during the first few
146 A Volume of Records relating to the Early History of Boston containing Boston Town Records, 
1814-1822 (Boston: Municipal Printing Office, 1906), 40-41; Theodore Ferdinand, Boston's Lower 
Criminal Courts, 1814-1850 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992), 34.
147 Barbara Yngvesson and Lynn Mather, "Courts, Moots, and the Disputing Process" in 
Empirical Theories about Courts, ed. Keith Boyum and Lynn Mather (New York: Longman,
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decades of the nineteenth century, exhibited these characteristics to varying 
degrees. The low est court, however, was not highly specialized, and w hile it 
m ay have reinforced the basic power structure, the justice of the peace court 
remained highly accessible and minimized those 'contextual features' that 
facilitated domination by litigants of higher status.
This does not m ean the significance of status was entirely mitigated; a 
higher proportion of black defendants were penalized when prosecuted by  
white plaintiffs than were white defendants w hen  prosecuted by black 
plaintiffs. Also, a black defendant stood a greater chance of being convicted 
w hen the plaintiff was white than when the plaintiff was black. Here the 
justice of the peace court, at the bottom of the court hierarchy, did indeed act 
to reinforce one of the m ost fundamental patterns of social order— white over 
black.
Table 1
Success rates in interracial court cases. 1818-1820
# of cases charge proved not proved Conviction rate
Black plaintiff-white defendant 68 40 28 59%
White plaintiff-black defendant 75 60 15 80%
Conviction rate, all cases — 70%148
1983), 73; and Yngvesson and Mather, "Language, Audience, and the Transformation of 
Disputes," Law and Society Review 15 (1980-81), 796.
148 'Conviction' may not be the m ost accurate term. Included in this term as I use it in this chart 
are all adverse verdicts against a defendant. Certain charges, such as threatening, apparently 
fell into a different category, as Gorham did not fine defendants he deemed guilty, but ordered 
defendants to provide a surety, obstensibly for the purpose o f keeping the peace for a unstated 
period. When defendants could not or would not provide this surety, however, they went to 
jail, just as defendants did who did not pay fines when other types of charges, such as assault, 
were 'proved.'
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Race, then, appears to have been a factor in this court. Stephen 
Gorham, the justice of the peace in all of these cases, may or m ay not have 
been conscious of his predilection borne out in the statistics. The 'haves' do 
better in court for a number of reasons, and the higher conviction rate that 
white plaintiffs attained against black defendants could be explained by a 
number of factors in addition to race.149 When black defendants were brought 
into court by white plaintiffs, it was for theft more than an any other charge, 
and these plaintiffs tended to be merchants or other m en w ith occupations of 
potentially m iddle class status. Though class may have worked more in their 
favor than race, statistics suggest that it was not a huge advantage: between 
1808 and 1820, against black defendants, white merchants w on 85% of their 
cases, while white traders and laborers w on 75%. More importantly, it is 
doubtful that black Bostonians were acutely aware of this statistical bias. They 
did, after all, experience more success than failure against white defendants. 
And some black defendants did succeed in obtaining judgments of 'charges 
not proven'— Lucretia Hunt did so in  1818 despite being charged with theft by 
a jeweler and a cooper who each had witnesses. Her experience surely 
heightened HunTs awareness, and that of her friends, that the law could 
protect as w ell as prosecute. Twenty percent of black defendants charged by 
white plaintiffs were acquitted- and the general acquittal rate was around 30%, 
not such a huge disparity that people at that time, from their limited 
perspective, w ithout the benefit of statistical analysis, w ould  have necessarily 
perceived this as a glaring inequity.150
149 See Marc Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of 
Legal Change," Law and Society Review 9 (Fall 1974), 95-148.
150 Gorham, Criminal Actions from Feburary 2 1818 to [une 2 1819 Hutchinson v. Hunt and Clapp 
v. Hunt, Feburary 26 1818.
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Black litigants also likely felt the court was not grossly inequitable 
because the system  of private prosecution imparted some sense of control 
over one's fate. Though the courts became more formalized as urbanization 
accelerated in early nineteenth century Boston, a simple process of private 
prosecution ruled the day in the justice of the peace court. The victim - 
tumed-plaintiff opened the case by stipulating the charge and offering proof 
and having any witnesses testify. The defendant then cross-examined the 
plaintiff and witnesses, after which the plaintiff could question the defendant. 
Each was allowed a final rebuttal. The justice then rendered his decision.151
The looseness of the legal system proved to be a good match for the 
needs and aims of black litigants. They could choose a justice of the peace 
likely to be sympathetic, and the process of getting justice was informal 
enough that even poor black women, who stood at the bottom of the social 
and economic ladder, could press charges, argue their case as plaintiffs or 
defendants, secure witnesses, and enhance their chances of succeeding in 
court without any formal legal help.152 The mechanics of the legal sy stem -  
legal terminology, arrest procedures, enforcement mechanisms, and the 
appeal process—were fairly simple in Boston during the Early Republic era. 
This simplicity no doubt appealed to many African Americans, w hose  
opportunities to resolve disputes and maintain order through other public 
means were dim inishing in the early nineteenth century.
151 John C Davis, The Massachusetts Justice, 69. Rodolphus Dickinson's A Digest of the Common 
Lazo, as well as Samuel Freeman's The Massachusetts justice, give similar descriptions.
152 On the minor judiciary and private prosecution, see Allen Steinberg, The Transformation of 
Criminal Justice: Philadelphia, 1800-1880 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1989); and Roger Lane, Policing the City: Boston, 1822-1885 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1967), 1-8.
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The trend toward using the lower courts coincided with the trend 
towards formalizing popular political participation. In Revolutionary 
America, mob action often functioned as one means of political expression by 
ordinary folk. On several occasions, when the protest expressed shared 
values, these mobs were interracial—black and w hite urbanites, for instance, at 
times joined forces against neighborhood brothels. While mob actions 
continued into the nineteenth century, voting and office-holding opened up 
new and safer avenues for ordinary white men to participate in politics. But 
African Americans were increasingly marginalized in political affairs as 
northern states persistently sought to remove or lim it black voting rights. At 
the same time, mobs in the north took on an om inous character. Though 
nineteenth century interracial mob actions were not unheard of, white 
working class mobs more frequently targeted black neighborhoods. In 1823, 
when Boston's Mayor Quincy led raids against brothels, he focused on the 
black section of Beacon Hill. Squeezed out of traditional modes of public 
expression against undesirable neighborhood elements, many black men and 
women appear to have increasingly turned to the lower courts to reinforce 
shared values.153
To some extent, this turning to the courts also replaced cultural forms 
of managing disputes that had existed during slavery. Election Day and 
Pinkster festivals in N ew  England had appointed black governors and kings 
who crowned an "informal system  of black government." Whites had 
sanctioned their power to adjudicate disputes am ong slaves. After 
emancipation, however, this system  gradually disappeared. Historian Shane
153 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (N ew  York: Vintage Books,
1991), 287-305; Horton and Horton, In Hope of Liberty, 162-170; also see Paul A. Gilje, The Road 
to Mobocracy: Popular Disorder in New York City, 1763-1834 (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1987).
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White has noted that by 1820, black festivals occurred only sporadically, and 
African Americans in the north developed more public and political means, 
such as parades, of displaying themselves "as both African Americans and 
citizens of the new nation." The lower court, while perhaps revealing a more 
contentious side of black life, had advantages over parades as a forum to 
exercise public citizenship: going to court was not dependent on the black 
elite's organizing, it was not occasional, and it was not restricted to men. 
Permitted no prominent public role in the parades, black w om en became 
leaders in the black court experience and were integral to the growth of a legal 
consciousness as African Americans came to use the lower court with 
increasing frequency during the second decade of the new century.154
Any possible rise in the crime rate does not adequately explain this 
increase. Cases not settled at the justice of the peace level w ent to the 
Municipal Court, and the number of criminal cases adjudicated by that court 
did almost double between 1814 and 1816. But the increase w as due almost 
entirely to a rise in cases involving property crimes, while assaultive crimes 
declined steadily from 1814 to 1820.155 African Americans litigants typically 
appeared in the justice of the peace court as plaintiffs or defendants in cases 
dealing with assault or threatening; property crimes represent less than 13% 
of the cases involving African Americans, who were generally defendants in 
property cases. In short, any rise in the crime rate—if indeed there was such 
an increase—can at best explain only a small portion of black Bostonians' 
increased usage of Stephen Gorham's court.
154 William D. Piersen, Black Yankees: The Development of an Afro-American Subculture in 
Eighteenth Century New England (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 134-135; 
Shane White, " 'It Was a Proud Day7: African Americans, Festivals, and Parades in the North, 
1741-1834," Journal of American History 81 (June 1994), 15-16.
155 Ferdinand, Boston's Lower Criminal Courts, 1814-1850, 135-148.
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Table 2
Frequency o f T.P. court appearances by black Bostonians
Year # of black # of black #of total average # of appearances
plaintiffs defendants appearances per month
1808 20 55 75 6.25
1809 21 60 81 6.75
1810 24 53 77 6.4
1811 36 43 79 6.6
1812 40 76 116 9.7
1813 39 75 114 9.3
1814 39 56 95 8











The data pointing towards an uneven yet undeniable increase in is 
drawn from nine record books of only one justice of the peace. Black 
Bostonians did appear before other justices of the peace, made evident by 
occasional references in writs, dockets, and summaries of cases that reached 
the Municipal Court. It seems probable, however, that Gorham was the
156 Data assembled by counting each appearance of a black litigant in the criminal record books 
of Stephen Gorham. By my count, black Bostonians made 1319 appearances in 877 cases.
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justice of choice for most black Bostonians, due to his central location and, 
especially after 1817, the high numbers that came to him. Between February 
of 1818 and the end of October in 1820, 350 African Americans appeared in 508 
cases—this out of an adult population of about 1300.157 Unfortunately, the 
nine record books are thus far the only extant records that consistently 
document the court activities of any Boston justice of the peace. And though 
these nine record books give a minimum of detail—names, charges, fines, if 
the defendant complied or had to be jailed for nonpayment—Gorham typically 
recorded occupations for white male litigants, marital status for white female 
litigants, and race for African American litigants. A typical page in Gorham's 
book appears as follows (cases used here did not appear together):
157 The Fourth Census o f the United States, 1820.
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Figure 1
Reproduction of Gorham's record book
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Master of the 
Schooner Laurel











of Boston Col woman
Though these books do not reveal the details of the disputes or of what 
transpired in court, Gorham's fairly regular identification of black litigants— 
uncomm on for similar records—permits useful quantitative analysis.
Town records and other sources indicate that the first record book, 
which begins in June of 1806, marked the beginning of Gorham's tenure as a 
justice of the peace. Previously, Gorham had served as an Overseer of the 
Poor, and may have had som e contact with members of Boston's black 
community. Any such familiarity, however, d id  not necessarily mean 
African Americans were immediately attracted to his courtroom; for the first 
year and a half of his service as a justice, only 8 cases before him involved
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black litigants, and none with black plaintiffs charging w hite defendants. 
When Gorham saw a black face in  his courtroom, it w as typically a defendant 
charged with theft, or an occasional runaway slave dragged to court and 
ordered by Gorham to be held until the slaveowner could procure transport 
back to the South. It w ould be over two years before Gorham adjudicated a 
case w ith a black plaintiff and a white defendant, w hen Trim Tyng and three 
black w itnesses managed to have a white man tossed into jail for threatening 
Tyng.158
Black plaintiffs, especially black women, were responsible for the 
increase in black litigants. While free men of color used the court as plaintiffs 
against their fellow black Bostonians about twice as frequently as they did 
against whites, free wom en of color such as Rebecca Freeman demonstrated a 
proclivity to pursue justice almost exclusively against other blacks. Rebecca 
Freeman appeared on 13 occasions, five times as a plaintiff, five as a 
defendant, and three times as a witness. All of the cases but one were against 
African Americans. Eighty-six percent of all black female plaintiffs charged 
other African Americans. The number of black defendants brought into court 
by whites remained fairly constant over a thirteen year span, while the total 
number of black defendants rose due to black prosecution of other African 
Am ericans.
158 Tyng v. McDaniel, August 5 1808 in Gorham, Criminal Actions from July 16 1807 to November 
18 1808.
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Table 3
Prosecuting Black Defendants
Year # of black % of black def. %of black def. charged
defendants charged by blacks by black females
1808 55 22% 7%
1809 60 30% 7%
1810 53 47% 32%
1811 43 51% 9%
1812 76 45% 21%
1813 75 43% 28%
1814 56 64% 29%











Ultimately, it is difficult to pin dow n causal factors that lead growing 
numbers of African Americans to the justice of the peace court. The 
constriction of opportunities to manage conflict and exert control within their 
neighborhoods no doubt pushed more black Bostonians to a forum that had 
long been a part of N ew  Englanders' dispute resolution. In addition, there 
may have also been a simple human force behind the substantial jump in 
number of appearances from 1818 to 1820. From 1806 to 1816 the number of 
wom en who appear more than once as plaintiffs varies from 0 in 1807 to a
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high of 14 in 1814. In 1818, the number of appearances by female plaintiff 
repeaters jumps to 35 in 11 months. Many of these wom en, some of whom  
also came to court as plaintiffs before 1818, can be tied to other black litigants 
or witnesses, who in turn can be tied to still others. In short, a relatively 
small number of black w om en who demonstrated a proclivity for going to 
court introduced others to the court by charging them w ith various offenses 
or enlisting them as w itnesses. As leaders in the black court experience, these 
litigious black wom en were directly and indirectly responsible for 
constructing spiraling networks of black litigants w ho became familiar w ith  
the utility of the justice of the peace court, broadening the realm of court 
experience in the black com m unity.
Occasionally sources make evident how  these networks were 
constructed within the black community. In January of 1816, William 
Jackson managed to have another black man jailed after charging him w ith  
assault. Jackson's witness w as his wife Nancy. Nancy Jackson appeared ten 
days later as a witness for Jane Robins, who succeeded in having another 
black woman, Elsa Johnson, thrown in jail after charging her with 
threatening. Robins appeared three more times over the next three years in 
this justice of the peace court, twice as a defendant on the same day and losing  
each case, and finally as a successful plaintiff. Her neighbor, John Francis, 
pressed assault charges against a white mariner in 1818 and against a black 
man in 1819. It is easy to im agine Nancy Jackson, having served as her 
husband's witness in his successful prosecution, being present when an 
argument broke out betw een Jane Robins and Elsa Johnson. Jackson, perhaps 
motivated by a friendship w ith  Robins, or animosity towards Johnson, or 
because she believed Johnson posed a genuine threat to maintaining a 
peaceful neighborhood, or all three motives, informs Robins that Johnson's
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words constitute a prosecutable offense, and that it is a fairly simple process to 
bring Johnson to justice. Some time after finding that she can indeed charge 
and prosecute Johnson with speed and ease, Robins hears about her neighbor, 
John Francis, being attacked and instructs him accordingly: where the justice 
of the peace court is, how  the process works, and how  to best make his case. 
Though Francis was not ultimately successful, this type of pattern appears 
repeatedly, and often with positive results for black litigants. These litigants' 
legal genealogy also demonstrates how  networks of communication spread 
throughout Boston's black com m unity and the interconnectedness of the 
black community: Robins and Francis, residing on Charter St., lived in the 
northeast end of Boston in Ward 1, while Nancy Jackson lived a mile away 
on the w est side, near Belknap St. in Ward 6.159
Rebecca Freeman, w hose court exploits outdid m ost of her 
contemporaries, can be tied to multiple networks of litigious women.
Charged as a minor in 1813, she managed to defeat an assault charge; in 1815, 
George Reed brought her to court for profane swearing, a charge that Freeman 
w ould eventually use herself in July of 1819 against another woman of color, 
Lucy DeCosta, who was found guilty and paid the standard fine plus costs.160 
Assisting Freeman's prosecution were three black wom en, Am y Jackson, 
Harriet Hubbard, and Delia Jordan. These three black wom en, in addition to
159 W. Jackson v. Thomas Bush, January 19 1816 and Robins v. Johnson, January 29 1816 in 
Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 28 1815 to September 2 1816 ; Robins v. Coatman and Robins 
v. George, December 12 1818 in Gorham, Criminal Actions from Feburary 2 1818 to June 2 1819; 
Robins v. Freeman, October 23 1819 in Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 
1820; Francis v. Grice, September 18, 1818 in Gorham, Criminal Actions from Feburary 2 1818 to 
June 2 1819 and Francis v. Potter, September 28, 1819 in Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 3 
1819 to November 6 1820; Robins and Francis in the same cluster of hom es on Charter St. in the 
The Fourth Census of the United States, 1820; location and distances determined from John G. 
Hales' 1814 map of Boston.
160 Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820; July 3, 1819.
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Freeman and one other who was similarly associated, w ould appear before 
Gorham a total of eighteen times in fourteen cases over a tw o year span as 
plaintiffs, defendants, and witnesses. Their success rate was remarkable; only 
two of the wom en experienced defeat, and one of those w om en w on on an 
appeal to the Municipal Court.
Jackson came before Gorham in three cases as a defendant, twice 
charged with theft and once with assault; each time her antagonist was white. 
The decision in each case was "not proven." Two months prior to first being 
charged w ith theft in October of 1819, she appeared as a plaintiff and managed 
to have a white woman jailed for one day on a 'profane swearing' charge.
One of the witnesses for Jackson w as Harriet Hubbard, who, after assisting 
Freeman and Jackson in successful prosecutions, would appear in again as a 
witness in June of 1820, helping a black woman named Mary Williams 
successfully prosecute another black wom an on the familiar charge of profane 
swearing.161
Am y Jackson's other witness in her complaint against the white 
wom an was Sally Garry. Garry was accused of the same theft as Jackson in 
October of 1819, and likewise received a decision of "not proven." One year 
later Garry again escaped punishment w hen accused of assault by a black man 
w ho could not prove his case. Her only defeat in court came in July of 1819 
w hen charged with assaulting a woman; instead of paying the fine, however, 
Garry appealed the decision to the Municipal Court, who declared her not 
guilty. The Municipal Court records reveal that Garry's accuser, Hepzibah 
Easte, was found guilty of assault by another justice of the peace the day before
161 Ibid. Jackson appeared as a defendant twice on October 19,1819 and once on November 11, 
1819; as a plaintiff on August 5,1819, with Hubbard as a witness. Hubbard appeared as witness 
for Williams on July 29,1820.
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Garry w as brought before Gorham. It is possible that Garry or an associate had 
successfully charged Easte before this other justice. Delia Jordan, the third of 
Rebecca Freeman's witnesses, was brought to court twice later that summer by 
other black Bostonians for threatening and assault. Both times Gorham  
rendered a decision of not proven.162
The consistent success of these five w om en of color suggests an 
"intricate network of exchange" of information and savvy regarding how  the 
justice o f the peace could be used as a weapon against neighborhood 
antagonists, and how  to best defend oneself w hen charged. Since this 
knowledge was used m ost frequently against other people of color, the sphere 
of learning expanded. This sharing of experience and knowledge forged  
relationships both amicable and hostile and were part of bedrock of  
'community', where the seeds for both solidarity and dissension lay.
Christine Stansell notes that within female relationships there were  
"structured expectations of reciprocal help" but that this "cooperation did not 
automatically engender harmony" as quarrels were common, resulting at 
times in  fighting, cursing, or other manifestations of dissatisfaction.163 The 
justice o f the peace court provided a stage upon which the conflicts of the 
neighborhood were acted out, but also displayed the interconnectedness of the 
black community, particularly for black women.
Many of the black female plaintiffs charged black defendants w ith the 
verbal crimes of threatening and profane swearing. From 1818 to 1820, of the
162 Ibid. Garry appeared with Jackson on October 19,1819, and was charged with assault onjuly 
15,1819 and October 2,1820. Jordan appeared on July 20,1819 and August 24,1819. Accounts of 
the trials on Garry's and Easte's appeals are in Boston Municipal Court Record Books, August 
1819, pp. 112 & 117.
163 Christine Stansell, City o f Women: Sex and Class in New York 1789-1860 (Alfred A. Knopf: 
New York, 1986), 41, 57-58. 'Community', as I use it here, is clearly not synonm ous with  
harmony, but connotes multiple and continuing layers of relationships.
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11 profane swearing charges, all were pressed by black women against other 
women, and all but one were made against other African Americans. O f the 
78 threatening charges brought by black plaintiffs, 60 were brought by wom en, 
and 56 of those were issued against other African Americans. Assault charges 
were evenly split, w ith  66 female plaintiffs and 65 male plaintiffs. But again, 
gendered differences arise: black women only charged 11 whites with assault, 
whereas black men did so 38 times. Clearly, black w om en stood at the 
forefront of transmitting legal experience to other African Americans. Like 
Rebecca Freeman, by bringing others to court as defendants and witnesses, 
they broadened the scope of interactions with the legal system.
The procedures of the court itself, intentionally or not, encouraged the 
evolution of networks of African Americans familiar with the workings of 
the legal system. W hen proved, certain types of charges, such as threatening— 
which black plaintiffs used  more than any other charge except assault—did  not 
generate fines for defendants. Instead, the court required a surety “to keep the 
peace" for a specified period. The defendant had to then either demonstrate 
that she or he could pay the amount levied by the court if the peace w as not 
kept, or muster enough friends who were w illing to permit a fine "to be  
levied on their goods or chattels, lands or tenements, and in want thereof, 
upon their bodies" if the defendant broke the peace and was unable to pay.164 
Between 1806 and 1820, 251 black defendants were judged guilty in cases that 
required a surety instead of a fine or jail time. Ninety-three of those 
defendants (37%) were able to comply. It is doubtful that more than a 
handful, if any, of those 93 had the personal wherewithal to convince the 
justice that a surety—w hich ranged from a low  of fifty dollars up to several
164 Freeman, The Massachusetts Justice, 178.
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hundred dollars—would be paid. It is probable, then, that m ost or all of the 93 
defendants who complied w ith the order to come up w ith  a surety enrolled 
the help of friends, perhaps several friends, some of w hom  were likely black. 
Thus, the court's enforcement process acted as a kind of 'radiating effect7 to 
introduce still more black Bostonians to the legal system .165
This again places black w om en in the center of the expansion of the 
black legal experience. Of the 93 black defendants w ho complied with a surety 
order, 55 had been charged by a black woman, and 48 of those were charges of 
threatening. Whenever a black Bostonian, who may have had no previous 
contact with the court, w as approached by a penitent friend seeking financial 
support in order to stay out of jail, he or she could likely thank a black 
wom an for connecting them to Boston's legal system.
Black wom en found that accusing someone of threatening gave them a 
good chance of succeeding in court. Only four black female plaintiffs failed to 
obtain some sort of verdict against white or black defendants when they 
applied this charge. That type of success likely spurred black women to use 
this charge more frequently; the incidence of threatening cases accelerated 
over the course of the decade.
Overall, both w om en and m en experienced significant success—two out 
of every three black plaintiffs succeeded in getting the justice of the peace to 
make some sort of judgm ent against their antagonist. The chance for success 
no doubt encouraged their w illingness to use the court. In 1810, black 
litigants appeared in an average of 6.4 cases a month, and defendants 
outnumbered plaintiffs 2 to 1. By the end of the decade, black litigants 
averaged about 15 appearances a month, with a nearly 1:1 ratio of plaintiffs to
165 Marc Galanter, "The Radiating Effects o f the Courts" in Empirical Theories about Courts, 
117-142.
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defendants. Succeeding entailed required recasting their complaints in a 
language designed to elicit a response from the court.166
African Americans learned to rephrase disputes through the justice of 
the peace's instructions, through informal discussion, and by being brought to 
court. It was probably not unusual for someone to come to the justice or the 
constable, telling a story about an antagonist doing or saying certain things, 
behavior labeled by the constable or justice as a criminal charge. Others 
learned by being charged themselves, by coming as witnesses, or by having 
others with previous court experience helping them define a particular 
experience in legal terms. Being able to name an adverse experience in 
prosecutable legal terms was a subtle form of power. Naming an offense, and 
claiming redress in court, publicly defined the plaintiff as attempting to 
operate, at least for the moment, w ithin the norms established and reinforced 
by the courts. Conversely, naming and claiming threatened to place the 
defendant outside those norms.167
When African Americans rephrased their personal disputes in terms 
that spoke to larger concerns of social order, they were, consciously or not, 
publicly declaring their civic worth. The Municipal court reinforced this 
more explicitly w hen Venus Synix, a black widow, charged a black man, John 
Bowers, with keeping a "bad noisy house." Synix was not just complaining 
about late-night parties. This court found that Bowers "with force and
166 I deemed a prosecution successful if the plaintiff achieved one of six possible decisions 
rendered by Gorham: 1) defendant paid a fine; 2) defendant fined but jailed for nonpayment; 3) 
defendant sentenced to a jail term; 4) defendant pledged a surety; 5) defendant ordered to 
pledge a surety but "refused" and subsequently jailed; 6) defendant ordered to pay a fine or 
pledge a surety but appealed. Conversely, I deemed a defendant successful if he or she managed 
to avoid all of these and achieved a verdict of "charge not proven."
167 See William L. F. Felstiner., Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat, "The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..." Laio and Society Review 15 (1980- 
1981), 631- 654.
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arms...did keep and maintain...a certain com m on ill governed and disorderly 
house...for his ow n  wicked gain, [permitting] diverse people of evil name and 
fame and dishonest conversation, both black and white, to frequent and come 
together... there Whoring and otherwise m isbehaving themselves... to the 
common nuisance of all the good citizens." The court found Bowers guilty, 
fined him $100 and ordered him to post another hundred dollars to ensure 
good behavior for six months. While the several references to the "good 
citizens of the commonwealth" were standard language for the court records, 
it nonetheless carried some meaning by casting behavior like Bowers' as 
antithetical to good citizenship. Furthermore, cases of this sort w ere of 
particular importance to the courts and to the town government, w h o  
sharpened the focus on organized vice in the first decades of the n ew  
century.168 Synix's use of the justice of the peace court affirmed her status as a 
"good citizen" and her success in punishing a neighborhood nuisance no 
doubt increased her status in the black community. Furthermore, it  was an 
expression of her attempt—backed by the pow er of the legal system—to 
maintain som e amount of control over her daily life.169
African American litigants also learned to exploit the power of the 
legal system and the moral codes it attempted to reinforce for their ow n  ends. 
On a summer Sunday in 1820, while many o f their fellow citizens o f color 
were attending the African Baptist Church, tw o black men came across 
Nelson Mason, an African American bootblack, busily running a cockfight. 
The two men, Henry Steward and James Hanson, probably had little trouble
168 Ferdinand, Boston's Lower Criminal Courts, 1814-1850 , 23.
169 Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820, Synix v. Bowers, A ugust 31, 
1819; Boston Municipal Court Record Books, September 9, 1819, p. 129. Located at the 
Massachusetts State Archives.
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finding Mason since the cockfighting likely took place in one of the public 
markets that evolved out of w est African and slave culture and had a long 
history in N ew  England. Steward and Hanson knew  that many whites 
frowned on these Sabbath-day markets and took advantage of that to have 
Mason charged w ith "using sport on the Lord's Day." The justice found 
Mason guilty and fined him  four dollars plus costs. But it is doubtful that the 
motives of Steward and Hanson were very-high minded; Thomas Hanson, 
probably related to James, had unsuccessfully prosecuted Mason for beating 
him up in December o f 1819. Steward had also assisted Thomas Hanson in  
prosecuting another black man in November of 1819. In the cockfighting 
case, James Hanson served as a witness for Steward, who, with several 
previous appearances before the justice as plaintiff, defendant, and witness, 
prosecuted the case. U sing Mason's violation of a moral standard as a 
springboard, Steward and Hanson jumped at the opportunity to gain revenge 
through the legal system .170
Similarly, Rebecca Freeman found herself at the receiving end of a 
prosecution aimed at revenge when Mary M. Williams, a black woman, 
charged her w ith profane swearing in November o f 1819. Freeman, unable or 
unwilling to pay the $1 fine that was assessed w hen found guilty, spent the 
next three days in jail. Mary Williams' education in  using the court came 
from none other than Freeman herself, who had charged Williams with  
threatening and profane swearing a month earlier. Williams, no doubt 
chagrined at being forced to shell out the fines, turned the neighborhood 
conflict into a legal dispute.171
170 Pierson, Black Yankees, 102-103; Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 
1820 , Steward v. Mason, July 20,1820.
171 Gorham, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820 , Steward v. Mason, July 20, 
1820; Williams v. Freeman, Novem ber 2, 1819; Freeman v. Williams, October 5,1819.
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Whether borne out of tensions emanating from racial or class 
stratification, or personal animosities, using the court to repay antagonists 
was a deliberate choice. Vengeance, after all, can be carried out in a number of 
ways, some more acceptable to notions of social order than others. Pursuing 
vengeance may have often been an attempt "to restore symmetry to 
imbalanced social exchange" by preventing relationships from getting too 
unequal and potentially exploding into more serious acts. Steward and 
Hanson channeled their conflict w ith Mason through the court instead of 
seeking private retribution that could have escalated violently. Freeman and 
Williams moderated whatever tensions existed in their relationship through 
the court, which offered a controlled environment that produced outcomes— 
fines, removal to jail, or declarations of innocence— sanctioned by the law.
For these litigants, the law became "an instrument for private [and] public 
vengeance." It was private in that the conflict was not confined to the 
incident rephrased for the court into a specific charge, but involved personal 
histories of tangled relationships. By taking their private disputes to the 
court, black litigants transformed their conflicts into a public matter before a 
judge and spectators. In doing so they learned to rephrase and narrow 
disputes into recognizable legal claims that could be dealt with quickly in a 
venue that offered a decent chance of success.172
When Mary Jane Boylston charged John Williams with bastardy in 
June of 1812, she 'narrowed' a conflict that probably sprang out of a 
complicated relationship. In contrast to the pre-Revolutionary concern with
172 On revenge and the law, see Jonathan Rieder, "The Social Organization of Vengeance" in 
Tozuard a General Theory of Social Control, ed. Donald Black (Orlando: Academic Press, 1984), 
vol. 1,132-133. On transformation of disputes and rephrasing, see Yngvesson and Mather, 
"Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes." On court spectators, see Steinberg, 
The Transformation of Criminal Justice.
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immorality, courts in the early republic era were not interested in mediating 
personal sexual relationships or in  punishing potentially illicit wom en. The 
focus had shifted to fixing paternity in order to ensure that unw ed mothers 
did not become a burden on communal resources. Here the interests of one 
member of a group that stood at the bottom of the sotial, economic, and 
political structures of power— black wom en— merged with the interests of 
those who possessed power. Williams was ordered to come up w ith $300 in 
surety to ensure that he would abide by the order of the Municipal Court.
The records do not reveal what that court's order was, but it probably 
compelled Williams to shoulder som e responsibility for the care of Boylston's 
child. Boylston worked within the 'normative framework' to achieve a 
desired end.173
Interpreting the meaning of black litigants' experiences has it dangers. 
Court records, as Shane White has noted, are often characterized by "spare 
details and dry language [that] tend to flatten out black behavior, making it 
appear little different from that of whites who broke the same laws."174 That 
description fits the records used here. Without knowing what these black 
women and men said in  court as they made their case, or what they said out 
of court when they complained about adverse decisions or reveled in legal 
victories, reading the growth of a  legal consciousness from these records may 
seem a bit tenuous.
173 Gorham, Criminal Actions from November 24 1813 to June 28 1815, Boylston v. Williams, 
June 20, 1815; on the shift in attitude towards unwed mothers, see Nelson, Americanization of 
the Common Law, 111. N elson notes that in the post-Revolutionary era, "in paternity cases... 
the courts not only overlooked the plaintiff's sinner status, but also rendered the sinner 
affirmative help in obtaining relief from the consequences of sin."
174 White, Somexohat More Independent, 183.
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But that very lack of detail and the tight descriptions are in  themselves 
revealing, however. Courts have m ethods and procedures to keep a case 
'cool'— to make a potentially explosive or emotional dispute that m ight be 
accompanied by an entire range of em otive display, a rational and orderly 
presentation o f the litigants' interpretations of the conflict. The rather dry 
and flat language Gorham employed to record disputes suggests an attempt 
through the official record to keep these disputes 'cool/ Whether or not this 
was indicative of the court/s atmosphere is hard to know, although it seems 
likely that if Gorham attempted to do this in the official record, then he may 
have also done so in his demeanor and through the procedures of the 
court.175
And legal procedure held the potential to affect the identity of the 
litigants. Sally Engle Merry notes that "conflicts are rarely matters of simple 
interest and rational argument but instead tend to be passionate encounters 
in which the w hole person is on the line. Some conflicts have m eaning for 
how the person thinks about himself or herself and his or her social world, 
her ability to cope and to defend herself, and her ability to create an acceptable 
image of herself and her life." Every time a black woman or man stepped  
into Gorham's court, there was essentially a meeting of cultures— the public 
street culture of the neighborhood, with all its irritants, rage, frustrations, 
poverty, hardships, and racism confronted the rationality and control that 
legal culture attempted to impose on conflicts. Even though interaction 
between African American culture and the dominant culture happened on a 
daily basis, and was therefore less remarkable from Black Bostonians' 
standpoint, black litigants nevertheless w alked into the courtroom faced with
175 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even, 98.
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the challenge of presenting a version of self that fit into the courtroom  
environment—a version of self that would merge w ith how the court defined  
a rational, self-cotrolled being. Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey have described 
how the law  recreates "social relations in a narrower, relatively discrete, and 
professionally m anaged context."176 Though Ewick and Silbey may n ot have 
intended the term 'social relations' to be defined as narrowly as literal 
relationships and interactions between individuals, the concept applies: the 
relationship of the litigants to one another, and of each litigant to civil 
society, was played out in the more managed environment of the court. In 
order to succeed in  court, black plaintiffs and defendants learned to fit 
themselves, to som e extent, into this recreation. They strove to present 
themselves as responsible citizens exercising their right to use the court.
As a part of that process, black litigants learned to manage conflict by 
rephrasing both the dispute and themselves for the court. More than simply 
learning to apply the correct legal categories to a dispute, rephrasing involved  
"a particular construction of a dispute, a construction which orders facts 
according to norm ative claims which are seen as persuasive." Black litigants 
learned that "veracity consists of the extent to which situations can be 
persuasively interpreted and presented." And perhaps most importandy, 
black litigants learned that arguing their cases in court was actually 
"competing ways o f construing events and selves within particular 
normative frameworks." They presented not just competing versions of 
events, but also com peting versions of selves against white and black 
antagonists. D oing so must have transformed, to som e degree, self­
conception—it is unlikely that most black litigants neatly and completely
176 Ibid.; Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, "Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An 
Account of Legal Consciousness," New England Lazo Review 26 (Spring 1992), 731-749.
122
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
separated the self they presented to the court from their total identity. For 
wom en and men losing power in many other arenas, discovering one in 
which they had a real chance to exercise some form of pow er through 
presenting a version of events and self must have fostered a sense of the self 
defined in part by the law.177
This is not to say that legal actions, whether litigation or signing deeds, 
destroyed or overwhelmed African American identity. Legal actions did not 
make black Bostonians 'American/ One legal historian points out that while 
law does not destroy culture, "law and legal consciousness can, however, 
work in concert w ith other forces to alter culture." In early nineteenth 
century Boston, because the law was accessible and did deliver justice where it 
mattered~in personal relationships and drcumstances~it worked in concert 
with African Americans' diminishing opportunities to shape black identity.178
African Americans in Boston used the court with increased frequency 
through the first two decades of the nineteenth century. They took advantage 
of an accessible forum to manage conflict to punish neighborhood antagonists 
by fine or by removal to jail. They did so to such an extent that in less than 
three years over one-fourth of Boston's black citizens appeared before one 
justice of the peace. Their involvement in the lower court—and their 
frequent success — likely developed a "conscious sense of legal entitlement 
that encourages individuals and groups to use legal beliefs in disputes about 
their status, rights, duties, and problems." Some of those beliefs certainly 
would have included a self-conception as legal beings with the right to 
protection, the right to prosecute, and the sense that the law  was to somehow
177 Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even, 92.
178 Mari J. Matsuda, "Law and Culture in the District Court of Honolulu, 1844-45: A Case Study 
of the Rise of Legal Consciousness," American Journal of Legal History 32 fianuary, 1988), 40.
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be responsive to their needs. This encouraged them to use the law  to get 
justice and to manage conflict with neighbors, reinforcing a sense of self as a 
legal being w ho could lay claim to a group of rights, and em ploy those rights 
in ways that had immediate effects.179
Ideally, this argument w ould  end by revealing that many of the African 
Americans, or at least their sons or daughters, who participated in various 
forms of legal activity eventually em ployed legal beliefs in efforts to protect 
and expand rights and opportunity for African Americans. There are some 
connections. Sdpio Dalton, who bought land in Boston in 1799 and became 
vice-president of Boston's African H um ane Society, probably had a hand in  
writing or approving the Society's charter and by-laws. Dudley Tidd, a 
member of the Board of Directors, w as likely related to the Tidds who  
appeared twice before Gorham in 1812 and once in 1816. Thomas Paul, the 
pastor of Boston's first black church, w as President of the Society and also 
appeared as w itness in Gorham's court in 1808.
The Society, founded in 1818, prefaced its by-laws with a preamble 
refering to the Constitution, stating that "our laws protect all classes of men 
in all their rights." The Secretary and Treasurer had to be sworn in as officers 
in front of a justice of the peace, and the Board of Directors had the 
responsibility of acting as a court to determine the veracity of any charge 
against a member of the society for misconduct. The by-laws charged the 
Directors to "impartially try the charge in question according to the evidence, 
with due consideration." The leaders of this society chose to identify 
themselves as African in naming the organization, as many churches and 
benevolent societies did in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century,
179 Michael Grossberg, A Judgment for Solomon: The D'Hauteville Case and Legal Experience in 
Antebellum America (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.
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but turned to the legislature and the courts for guidelines on how the 
organization actually w ent about its business. They chose a public 
identification of 'A frican/ while building the structure of the Society and  
outlining its function w ith specific legal procedures. As James Oliver Horton  
and Lois E. Horton have pointed out regarding the generational change from  
African-born to American-born, for African Americans in the nineteenth  
century, "Africa w as more their heritage than their home." For the members 
of the African H um ane Society, heritage com pelled them in naming the 
organization, but their hom e dictated its form, function, and governance.180
Sdpio Dalton em erged as one the leaders in Boston's black community, 
helping to organize the first black church in the city. His son Thomas became 
the first president of the Massachusetts General Colored Assotiation and  
remained a prominent figure in black activism for fifty years. Dalton also 
worked closely with David Walker. Another likely associate of Walker w as 
James Gould, a plaintiff before Gorham in 1818 and again in 1819. Gould was 
one of the Boston distributors of Freedom's Journal, the nation's first black 
newspaper, and a toaster at a Boston antislavery banquet. Henry Tyler, 
charged and jailed for bastardy in July of 1820 by a black woman, was also 
listed as toaster at the same banquet and likely an associate of David Walker 
in the late 1820s. Thomas Brown, another associate of David Walker and a 
member of the African Lodge in 1828, appeared before Gorham as a boy in  
1818, charged with assault by a white victualer. Robert Roberts, who 
successfully prosecuted a white woman for assault in 1819, eventually became 
a member of the state's Negro Convention and was a central figure in 
pushing for the fulfillm ent of promised civil rights. Finally, William
180 Horton and Horton, In Hope of Liberty, 191; The By-Laws, rules and regidations, of the 
African Humane Society.
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Brown, another leader w ithin Boston's black community in  the 1820s and 
later, appeared numerous times before Gorham, three tim es as a plaintiff 
between 1816 and 1818. And there are other more indirect connections.181
These are, admittedly, loose connections. Men like Dalton and Tidd 
and the other founders of the Society could have been influenced by multiple 
sources in addition to appearing in court or signing a property deed. But that 
is in some respects the point: the law shaped African Americans identity 
through a variety of means. The African Humane Society's charter was a 
product of that identity. Even if the founding members had someone else 
draft the by-laws, they adopted the charter and carried out the activities of the 
Society under the charter's strictures and guidelines.
But most of the m en and women who engaged in  legal activity, 
particularly in the justice of the peace court, were not leaders in the 
traditional sense. Most were not even heads of households in the 1810 and 
1820 censuses. It is not surprising, then, that they do not emerge later as 
political leaders in the black community. But this did not minimize their 
influence on the formation of individual and corporate identity formation as 
they shared knowledge of how  to negotiate legal transactions or stories of 
courtroom triumphs and defeats. In fact, the apparent sparsity of 'leaders' in
181 Some of the other possible indirect connections: other officers o f the Society may have had 
relatives who appeared before Gorham—Dudley Tidd, for instance, was likely related to the 
Tidds who appeared before Gorham in 1812 and 1816. John Pero, also an associate of Walker 
and a member of the African Lodge, was probably related to Henry Pero, who as a boy escaped 
conviction when charged with assault in 1820. Many other members o f the African Lodge were 
hairdressers, and may have known Samuel Francis, a black hairdresser w ho appeared before 
Gorham several times as a plaintiff over several years. Material on the African Lodge in Peter 
P. Hinks, To Awaken M y Afflicted Brethren: David Walker and the Problem of Antebellum 
Slave Resistance (University Park: The Pennsylvannia State University Press, 1997), 265-266. 
On Thomas Dalton, see James Oliver Horton, Free People of Color: Inside the African American 
Community (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993), 43-44.
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their ranks m ay have been a strength as common black folk  communicated a 
legal sense of se lf to one another in  straightforward and effective ways.
On som e level, black litigants accepted the authority of the legal system  
and invested it- w ith  a legitimacy that meant something in  the black 
community. Even those who did not directly participate in  the legal system  
were likely affected. Through their experience, litigants gained leverage based 
on knowledge o f what a court m ight do. By going to the justice of the peace, 
black Bostonians gained knowledge of what norms were affirmed and 
enforced by the courts. Even losing defendants, forced to experience first­
hand the pow er and procedure of the court, could have used  this knowledge. 
It is not difficult to picture a formerly punished offender, nursing a grievance 
against a neighbor, threatening court action, and em ploying a type of 
'bargaining endow m ent'—by giving weight to her threat by communicating 
what happened to her when she committed a similar offense.182
In the late eighteenth century, holding power over a piece of property, 
protecting one's vocation, or controlling an inheritance helped establish 
certain boundaries for free black m en and women who had directly or 
indirectly experienced bondage. In the early nineteenth century, those bom  
before emancipation and the first generations of African Americans to be 
raised in a free community, while still no doubt aware of the law's Dower to 
be oppressive, learned to "harness the power of the law" in their attempt to 
maintain som e boundaries over their daily lives.183 M any of Boston's black 
citizens either reinforced or constructed concepts of personal rights and a 
sense of self being expressed, protected, and perhaps even expanded, through
182 Marc Glanater, "The Radiating Effects o f the Courts," in Empirical Theories about Courts, 
ed. Keith O. Boyum and Lynn Mather, (N ew  York: Longman, 1983), 117-142.
183 Phrase borrowed from Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even, 180.
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their legal activity, w hether in signing deeds or through courtroom litigation. 
Legal actions began to structure the way black folks perceived them selves. 
Legal actions helped construct notions of self as a legally defined individual 
with certain rights. For African Americans, though, it may have also m eant 
corporate conceptions, as they cemented communal connections through  
formal legal m echanism s like deeds and wills, and by building alliances 
through enlisting w itnesses against neighborhood antagonists. This m ay not 
have been their intent, and it may have been a natural thing to do—it w as  
what whites did—but it did  not necessarily m ean the same thing for black  
people as it did for w hite people. For black Bostonians, a sense of the legal self 
would play an important role in their struggle for full citizenship. It may  
have even been a necessary precursor to their corporate attacks in the m id­
nineteenth century on  segregationist laws and practices in the North.
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Chapter Three
Limits and Possibilities of Legal Consciousness- 1822-1855
John Robinson w as a m an w ith a problem. It was, by most measures, 
not a serious problem; definitely not as serious as the difficulties that many of 
his fellow free people of color faced from time to time in a racially oppressive 
society. As an occasional figure among black Boston's cadre of leaders during 
antebellum era activism, Robinson was well aware of those obstacles, minor 
or major. This particular problem, though, was an obstacle of the literal sort. 
Robinson dealt with it by drafting a letter in the late summer of 1842, signed 
by several other residents of Bridge Court. His letter m ay have been aimed at 
the d ty  selectmen, or it m ay have been intended for circulation in the 
immediate neighborhood. Robinson stated that the he and the other 
residents of Bridge Court had been "and are still annoyed by certain 
obstructions being placed in  the passage-way of said Court, much to our 
inconvenience." Robinson took the lead in rectifying this nuisance — the 
letter begins "This is to Certify that I, John Robinson, w ith others." The 
annoyed residents of Bridge Court stipulated "that such obstructions be 
forthwith removed and said Court in future be kept clear" and directed that 
"there shall not be any thing placed in the said passage-way of said Court, and 
will also discountenance the sam e in others."184
184 Letter of lohn Robinson in the Robert Morris box, located at the Boston Athenaeum. Signed by 
six other residents.
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The Bridge Court petition never mentioned exactly what type of 
obstructions plagued the residents. Boston had been steadily growing in 
population, and as a regional econom ic center. A large portion of the region's 
exports and imports flowed through the city, causing increased problems with 
traffic in the narrow streets of the city and with construction materials being 
left in the streets. Boston's truckmen, carting heavy loads of these goods 
about town manually, or carpenters leaving planks or rubbish, may have 
been the perpetrators of the inconvenience irking John Robinson and his 
neighbors. Ordinances had been passed long before to deal with these 
problems; the obstruction of streets meant the obstruction of commerce, an 
intolerable circumstance in an expanding economy.185
Robinson's petition demonstrates a certain sensibility and expectation 
that control and use of this public street belonged primarily to the residents, 
and not to the truckmen or whoever w as placing the obstructions in the 
court. Streets labeled as courts in Boston typically denoted either a dead end 
street or a narrow street that connected two major streets, so the passage-way 
Robinson referred to was probably the entrance into the court from the main 
street. Blocking the passage-way effectively made the court inaccessible. 
Though there had been attempts to regulate traffic and obstructions to traffic, 
it would not be until 1846, four years after Robinson's letter, that the city's 
police force actually put any significant effort into enforcing those 
ordinances.186 Robinson knew that any improvement in the situation would 
have to come at the initiative of the Bridge Court residents.
185 Francis X. Blouin, Jr., The Boston Region 1810-1850: A Study of Urbanization (Ann Arbor, 
Michigan: UMI Research Press, 1980); Roger Lane, Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 68, 109-110.
186 Lane, Policing the City, 62.
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Robinson clearly manifested a legal consciousness. Legal scholars 
Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey define legal consciousness as "the w ays in  
which people make sense of the law and legal institutions" and how  those 
understandings "give meaning to people's experiences and actions." Legal 
consciousness is that and more: it is, as the previous chapter suggested, not 
only how people perceive the law, but a "conscious sense of legal entitlement 
that encourages individuals and groups to use legal beliefs in disputes about 
their status, rights, duties, and problems." Legal consciousness is revealed in  
how  individuals choose to put those perceptions — those 'legal beliefs' — into 
action.187
One of the signifiers of John Robinson's legal consciousness was his 
choice of words in his brief letter: in a manner mirroring the language of 
formal legal documents, he referred back to Bridge Court three times as "said 
Court," and after specifying that the obstructions were being placed in the 
passage-way of Bridge Court, he referred once again to the "said passage-way  
of said Court." Though typical of official legal documents, this letter w as not 
a product of a formal court proceeding; it was handwritten and probably 
directed to the selectmen, the police department, or simply a draft of a notice 
to be posted. Robinson obviously thought this kind of legalistic wording  
carried weight. By appropriating the authority that legal language carried, he 
attempted to inscribe legality on the mundane. Whether Robinson's letter 
had the desired effect is uncertain, although the lack of further complaints 
m ay be an indication that the obstructions ceased to impede the comings and 
goings of the Bridge Court residents.
187 Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, "Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An Account 
of Legal Consciousness," New England Law Review 26 (Spring 1992), 734; Michael Grossberg, A 
Judgment for Solomon: The D'Hauteville Case and Legal Experience in Antebellum America 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2.
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African Americans in antebellum Boston, like the members o f the 
African Hum ane Society and the litigants in the justice of the peace court, 
were comfortable using beliefs about the how  law worked to exert som e kind 
of control over their daily lives. In many respects, the manner in  w hich they 
did so likely d id  not differ substantially from that of their white neighbors, 
particularly w h en  it came to using the courts to manage conflicts. Black 
urbanites in Boston and other northern cities found, however, that using the 
courts provided fodder for the perpetuation of racist ideologies, as 
newspapers began to regularly lampoon black litigants. Court reporters' 
published accounts of the legal travails of black litigants fit w ithin a larger 
context of increased public derision of northern African Americans in  
broadsides, newspapers, and minstrel show s.188 Employing legal 
consciousness by using the courts became something of a double-edged sword: 
as African Americans exerdsed their right to use the law, white observers 
used their efforts to help fashion a radst caricature, making that public space 
more perilous.
Nevertheless, black Bostonians like John Robinson developed  and 
wielded a legal consdousness that outlined ways in which they believed the 
law  should and could work. Frequently these beliefs were m ade manifest 
through formal legal interactions, such as in  the courts. On other occasions, 
these beliefs w ere put into action in informal ways invested w ith the
188 On the deteriorating atmosphere of race relations and increased public denigration of 
northern African Americans, see Gary Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation of 
Philadelphia's Black Community, 1720-1840 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); 
Lamont D. Thomas, Rise to be a People: A Biography of Paul Cuffe (Chicago: U niversity of 
Illinois Press, 1986); Leonard P. Curry, Free Blacks in Urban America (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981); David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the 
American Working Class (N ew  York: Verso, 1991); Eric Lott, Love and Theft: Blackface 
Minstrelsy and the American Working Class (N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Shane 
White, " 'It Was a Proud Day': African Americans, Festivals, and Parades in the North, 1741- 
1834," Journal of American History 81 (June 1994), 13-50.
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authority of the law, which, could work in the interest of both African 
Americans and legal authorities.
Richard Crafus, a legendary figure in Boston, epitomized the manner 
in which the law could work for both groups by occupying a position between  
the white legal system 's formal mechanisms for maintaining social order and 
the black community's informal means of m anaging conflict. Crafus, one of 
many African Americans who had served in the United States Navy in the 
War of 1812, was captured and sent to Dartmoor prison in England, where he 
soon became the leader of nearly one thousand imprisoned black mariners. 
Popularly called King Dick, Crafus was a man of such size and strength that 
he reportedly fought off an attempted coup by some other black prisoners 
who sprung an ambush while he was sleeping by seizing "the smallest of 
them by his feet, and thumped another with him," successfully quashing the 
rebellion. The anecdote may have been more m yth than fact — though at w ell 
over six feet, perhaps weighing as much as three hundred pounds, and by all 
reports of great strength, he surely could have sw ung a small man around by  
his feet. As W. Jeffrey Bolster points out, though, Crafus' size and strength 
were not the only assets that propelled him to dominance among Dartmoor's 
black prisoners; along with physical ability, African custom required other 
character traits for leaders to attract and retain support. His 1831 obituary 
eulogized him as "this king Richard IV" who w as "a man of good 
understanding, and he exercises it to a good purpose. If any one of his color 
cheats, defrauds, or steals from his comrades, he is sure to be punished for it." 
Another white Bostonian remembered him as a "generous, magnanimous 
man" who always advocated the "cause of right, preventing the strong from  
triumphing upon the weak." African Americans in Dartmoor and Boston
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recognized Crafus' unique combination of personal and physical traits and 
bestowed upon him a position o f high status.189
Sometime after being repatriated at war's end, Crafus moved into a 
similar position of leadership am ong the black community on what was then  
called 'Nigger Hill.' The Hill, straddling Wards Five and Six, and bounded on  
the south by the Commons, on the w est by the Charles River, and on the east 
by court and government buildings, held the heaviest concentration of 
African Americans in Boston. Black Bostonians quickly became familiar w ith  
those traits that set him apart at Dartmoor. So, too, did many white 
Bostonians, and recognizing the respect he received from African Americans, 
Boston's law enforcement establishment approached Crafus and offered him  
"a special position," apparently as a sort of unofficial constable, which he 
accepted and "filled with distinction." Crafus reportedly kept his "muscles in  
full play... quelling riots and settling disputes. He did the work of ten men of  
the Constabulary force." Another chronicler of Boston described Crafus w ith  
a bit more complexity, calling him  the "bully of the hill" but also "a 
peacemaker by practice." By reputation and action, King Dick was a potent 
force in helping to maintain som e semblance of order on the Hill throughout 
the 1820s.190
189 For more on Crafus' experiences at Dartmoor Prison, see W. Jeffrey Bolster, Black Jacks: 
African American Seamen in the Age of Sail (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 102- 
113; the story of the attempted coup is taken from Crafus' obituary, printed in The Liberator, 
February 26, 1831; George Hugh Crichton, Old Boston and its once familiar faces: sketches of 
some odd characters who have flourished in Boston during the past fifty years, 1881, an 
unpublished manuscript located at the Boston Athenaeum. See chapter entided "Big Dick." 
Crafus became a figure of such interest that, according to Crichton, he "sold his body to the 
Medical College, where his skeleton hangs to this day." Edward Savage's history of the 
Boston Watch also mentions that in 1865 Crafus' "stately figure may still be seen not a mile 
from his former residence."
190 Crichton, Old Boston; Edward H. Savage, A Chronological History of the Boston Watch 
and Police, from 1631 to 1865; Together with the Recollections of a Boston Police Officer, or 
Boston by Daylight and Gaslight (Boston: 1865), 69.
134
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Crafus acted as a de facto constable at a transitional time in northern 
urban policing. In Boston, city leaders like Josiah Quincy were bent on 
establishing a moral and social order in the m idst of a growth in population  
and in economic potential. City officials focused in particular on using the 
courts and the police force to implement reform.191 In his mediatory role, 
Crafus aided the police and city government in their efforts towards social 
reform, and so furthered the law's function of social control. But he also 
provided a buffer o f sorts between black citizens and a white police force that 
often perceived African Americans as a threat to the goal of an orderly society. 
As a prisoner-of-war, Crafus gained valuable experience working as an 
intermediate betw een African Americans and white authorities. He did  
likewise in Boston.
To some extent, Crafus' ability to maintain the law's function of control 
and enforcement within the black community w as no doubt strengthened by 
acting with the mandate of the 'special position' bequeathed upon him by the 
police. In fact, during a time when the black festivals were waning, and the 
traditional judicial function of black kings and their subordinates was 
undermined by competing alternatives such as the justice of the peace court, 
the backing of the police may have briefly reinvested this particular black king 
with a kind of paralegal authority within the black community. Black 
offenders knew the alternative to the justice of King Dick was the justice of
191 Ferdinand, Boston's Lower Criminal Courts; Lane, Policing the City; Paul Boyer, Urban 
Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978); 
see also W illiam J. N ovak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), particularly 149-190.
Novak argues for greater continuity in the policing and governance of public morality from the 
colonial era through the early republic era instead o f  seeing the efforts of Quincy and others as 
an era of new reforms.
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the white legal system, and many probably w illingly abided by his rules and 
submitted to his penalties rather than risk other consequences.192
Black Bostonians had long recognized and acted within two  
overlapping legal systems: the formal w hite legal system and the system of 
enforcement and punishment that existed w ithin the black community.
Even the internal judicial systems of the black community, however, had 
been influenced by the white legal system; Joseph Reidy noted the white 
influence in the festivals' judicial functions. Any self-enforcement 
continuing within the nineteenth-century black community, particularly 
after the end of King Dick's reign, remains largely hidden. But in an era of 
increased regulation and reform, and with the strengthening of the police's 
purpose and function, it seems unlikely that African Americans enjoyed 
much of the occasional legal autonomy once provided by the festivals. And it 
is important to keep in mind that occasional nature; African Americans, 
including Crafus, interacted with the law and courts on nearly a daily basis, 
while the festivals were a once-a-year affair. The legal consciousness of 
Crafus and his subordinates, heavily informed by the white legal system, 
likely facilitated the acceptance of his role as a sort of ancillary constable.
As a black king in Boston, and as the leader of the black prisoners in 
Dartmoor, Crafus had operated within an African American tradition of the 
"quasi-legal system" of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century festivals. 
Whites had supported the festivals in part because of the self-policing that
192 See Shane White, "It Was a Proud Day/'; W illiam D. Piersen,Black Yankees: The 
Development of an Afro-American Subculture in Eighteenth-Century New England (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1988); and Joseph P. Reidy, " 'Negro Election Day' and 
Black Community Life in N ew  England, 1750-1860," Marxist Perspectives 1 (Fall 1978), 102-117. 
Black kings and governors continued to exist in N ew  England into the 1850s, but the festivals 
became more sporadic and and some places, such as Massachusetts, stopped altogether by about 
1830.
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slaves and free blacks undertook during the festivals. For Crafus, operating in 
conjunction w ith the white legal system  was a natural transition, as it 
apparently w as for most black Bostonians who readily used the lower courts. 
But it was not a case of more of the same. White support of the festivals was 
more than permitting blacks to deal w ith lesser crimes internally; it was also 
manifested in  providing food, drink, and clothes for black participants. For a 
few days of each year, African Americans expected and received largess from 
whites, a material manifestation of the role reversals performed during the 
festival. But in the nineteenth century, free black Bostonians received 
nothing of the sort — in fact, even during Crafus' reign as king and his tenure 
as an unofficial constable, dty officials bypassed Crafus at will by making 
forays into black neighborhoods to shut dow n brothels, unruly taverns, or 
other immoral activities, such as Mayor Quincy's 1823 crack down on girls 
"shaking down" on the Hill.193 There were certain responsibilities that fell 
within Crafus' 'jurisdiction', but those responsibilities were defined by the 
white law enforcement officials and reform-minded politicians. Ultimately, 
his jurisdiction existed only so long as whites in positions of power deemed 
the arrangement advantageous. Furthermore, the 'jurisdiction' and 
mediating influence of Crafus and subsequent governors had boundaries: 
although the Hill supported the heaviest concentration of Boston's black 
population, anywhere from 45% to 70% of African Americans lived  
elsewhere in  Boston.194 African Americans' self-rule, though it persisted to
193 Savage, A Chronological History of the Boston Watch and Police, 63.
194 George Levesque, Black Boston: African American Life and Culture in Urban America, 1750- 
1860 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1994), Tables 1-14 and 1-15. The reason for the wide 
statistical spread (45%-70%) is because the 1820 census records about 55% of black Bostonians 
living on the Hill, or Ward 6, but only 32% in 1830. The dty  census of 1825 puts the figure at 
27%. The ded ine between 1820 and 1825 may have been due to a significant relocation, of 
which there is presently no evidence; it is possible that the dty census of 1825 undercounted the
137
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
some degree, became more circumscribed. Nonetheless, Crafus' role in  acting 
on behalf of both the black community and the white legal system provided a 
transitional phase as black Bostonians' legal consciousness became less 
connected to the older traditions and more tied to the law that was growing in 
its reach into the daily  lives of all Bostonians.
The growing encroachment of the law did not necessarily mean black 
Bostonians sim ply subjected themselves to it, however; like John Robinson's 
use of legal language, other blacks figured out how  to sometimes bend even  
the reformist im pulses of the legal establishment to their own devices. One 
of Crafus' successors, 'Governor' Riggins, demonstrated this when he turned 
one his subordinates, Wilham Patterson, over to the court for violating a 
standing order. One of Patterson's responsibilities was procuring unlicensed  
liquor, but he made the mistake of doing this on a Sunday and supplying it to 
a party of fellow black Bostonians. Riggins adm onished Patterson, reminding 
him that Patterson and his friends could "drink in m y house, as comfortably 
as in the parlor of any gentleman of Boston" on a Saturday night. But doing  
this on a Sunday w as just plain foolish. Riggin's chagrin may have been 
partly because he kn ew  that during a time of heightened attention to 
temperance and morality, a party of drinking blacks would attract unwanted  
attention from dty  authorities. By leaving Patterson to the mercy of a w hite  
judge, Riggins used the law to remind Patterson of his proper place, and 
forestall a stronger response from legal authorities. Riggins, telling Patterson 
"I hope the law will m ake you smart," in effect used the law to reinforce his
black population, but this seem s unlikely since the total number of African Americans counted 
increased by 187. The m ost likely explanation is that the ward boundaries were either redrawn 
or the census takers, as the 1825 census records a substantial decrease inWard 6, while recording 
substantial increases for adjacent Wards 5 and 7.
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ow n quasi-legal authority within the black community, and used the law to 
prevent law enforcement.195
Black Bostonians som etimes put legal consciousness to use in 
mediating relationships without ever going to court. The inadvertent 
remark of one white Bostonian revealed black Bostonians" ability to use their 
knowledge of how to use the threat of the law  to gain retribution. This white 
man, brought to court for not shoveling the snow  off his walkway, had 
attacked an elderly black man earlier in the week, and now  assumed his 
victim had pressed an assault charge. Before discovering the actual charge, he 
blurted out that after the beating he "went and paid him seven and sixpence, 
and he acknowledged sastisfaction."196 It is possible the white assailant 
merely felt guilty; it is more likely that his black victim  put to use his "legal 
beliefs' and threatened to take his attacker to court. By paying this elderly 
black man directly, the assailant avoided paying a fine and the possibility of 
spending time in jail.
African Americans also understood how  to use more formal and direct 
methods to take advantage of the protection the law  afforded for everyday 
life. Remember Ransom, an elderly black wom an living in Salem, worked 
w ith her brother, Cato Freeman, to arrange for her care. They had a 
handwritten contract drawn up in 1838 directing Freeman to pay another 
black woman, Flora Brooks, fifty dollars after Ransom's death in return for 
Brook's caregiving. The contract also stipulated that Brooks could live with 
Ransom rent free, have use of the house for three m onths after her death, 
and make use of the produce from Ransom's garden. If Brooks left Ransom
195 Selections from the Court Reports orginally published in the Boston Morning Post, from 1834 
to 1837, (Boston: Otis, Broaders, & Co. 1837), 173-174.
196 Ball Fenner, Raising the Veil; or Scenes in the Courts (Boston:1856), 55.
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at any time, the contract was null and void. Brooks put her mark to the 
contract, witnessed by two other men. Cato Freeman signed another brief 
handwritten note agreeing to pay Brooks so long as she m et the terms of the 
contract.197
This relatively unremarkable agreement, articulating legal ties between  
its black participants, evinces a conscious choice by Ransom and Freeman to 
use a formal legal process to ensure that Ransom w ould  receive aid in her 
later years. Ransom and Freeman could have maintained an informal verbal 
agreement with Brooks, or sim ply paid her on a regular basis. Instead, they 
put to use their understanding of the law to construct a legally defined 
relationship with Brooks. Brooks, too, experienced the benefits of the legal 
nature of the agreement, as it guaranteed housing for herself and her child, 
som e food, and wages at the end of her service.
Ransom knew the ability of legal documents to safeguard one's 
property and well-being. Her husband, a laborer named Cato Ransom, and 
one of the property owners mentioned in the previous chapter, not only 
designated her as the heir of m ost of his personal and real estate, but he also 
appointed Remember as "the sole executrix of this my last will". The fees for 
inventorying an estate could add up to over fifty dollars; if a public official 
performed these duties, the fees could exceed one hundred dollars. When the 
Ransoms decided to have Remember operate in these capacities, they 
protected years of work and investm ent by keeping as much money as 
possible in the family. The judge of probate in Salem verified Remember 
Ransom as the executrix after Cato's death one year later in 1820.198 As a
197 Contract with Flora Brooks is in the Robert Morris box, located at the Boston Athenaeum.
198 Carol Bulchalter Stapp, Afro-Americans in Antebellum Boston: An Analysis of Probate 
Records (N ew  York: Garland Publishing, 1993), 4-5; Cato Ransom's will and the probate 
certificate is in the Robert Morris box, located at the Boston Athenaeum.
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property ow ner and executrix of her husband's estate, Remember Ransom  
had sufficient experience with the legal system to appreciate the importance 
and usefulness of using the law to secure an arrangement with Flora Brooks.
A  variety of legal experiences schooled Africans Americans in making 
the best u se  of the law. In 1837 Amy Jackson had a will drawn up to dispose 
of her estate, which consisted of two small houses on a comer lot and another 
house and lot a block away on May Street. Three years later, her estate would  
be assessed at over $2600 when she died in 1840. Her 1837 will designated 
Mary Clark, the adopted daughter of her dead husband, as the sole heir. A  
year later, however, Jackson had a change of heart, and made out a new  will 
naming Venus Senex, a nurse, as the only heir and the executrix. After 
Jackson's death, the will was contested first by Phineas Blair, Public 
Administrator, w ho argued that Jackson had left no heirs or kin within the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, since Clark lived with her husband in 
Portland, and therefore legally had died intestate. Mary Clark contested the 
will after notices had been published in  newspapers. Finally, Senex contested 
Clark's claim, and the judge of probate ruled in her favor.199
Senex eventually asked the court to appoint one of the w itnesses to the 
second w ill, Samuel E. Sewall, as the executor, for reasons unknown. Sewall, 
a prominent lawyer and one of the founders of the New England Anti- 
Slavery Society, m ust have put this low  on his list of priorities, for a year 
went by w ith no progress on settling Jackson's estate. Senex did not sit idly by. 
Eventually she told the judge of probate, in a note apparently written in her 
own hand, that she wanted "the property of Amy Jackson sold by the SE 
Sewall by the sixteenth of March which will be a year and one day since her
199 Ibid., 122.
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death." A year after her death, Jackson's debts had yet to be settled. Senex also  
informed the court that she had "another gentleman" ready to take over the  
process immediately if  Sewall continued to be slow  about settling the matter. 
She demonstrated her determination to get the entire affair behind her w h en  
she wrote the judge and asked him "please not to publish it in the Liberator 
for it is not so public a paper as some others this paper is very limited indeed" 
and requested that notices for the sale of Jackson's property be placed in the 
Boston Morning Post and the Daily Advertiser. Senex succeeded, and the 
estate was sold and the accounts settled within a few  m onths.200
Jackson and Senex both had a history of taking initiative with the law  
in an effort to exert som e control over their daily lives. Amy Jackson w as one  
of the circle of black w om en who learned to effectively use the justice of the  
peace court. As a m iddle-aged woman, Jackson m ade eleven appearances in  
Stephen Gorham's court between 1812 and 1820; four as a witness, three as a 
plaintiff, and four as a defendant. Brought to court in 1819 twice on charges of 
theft and once on an assault charge, the justice of the peace exonerated her on  
each occasion. An assault charge in 1814 proved to be the only time Jackson 
suffered a defeat in court, for which she paid a sm all fine.201
200 Ibid. Sewall is described as a leader of the white abolition m ovem ent and co-founder o f the 
NAAS in William M. W iecek, The Sources of Anti-Slavery Constitutionalism in America, 
1760-1848 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 160; and in Horton and Horton, Black 
Bostonians, 83.
201 Amy Jackson appeared as a plaintiff in the record books o f justice of the peace Stephen 
Gorham: Jackson v. Armstrong, June 27 1812, Criminal Actions from August 11 1810 to July 18 
1812; Jackson v. Pricklow, June 7 1814, Criminal Actions from November 24 1813 to June 28 1815; 
and Jackson v. Francis, A ugust 15 1819, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820. 
Jackson appeared as a defendant in Gould v. Jackson, December 12 1814, Criminal Actions from  
November 2 4 1813 to June 28 1815; Garry v. Jackson and Case v. Jackson, October 19 1819, and 
Gibbs v. Jackson, Novem ber 11, 1819, Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820. 
Jackson appeared as a witness in Pemaby v. Olcott and Pem aby v. Hopkins, December 29 1812, 
Criminal Actions from July 19 1812 to November 24 1813; Renouf v. Cousins, November 26 1818, 
Criminal Actions from February 2 1818 to June 2 1819; and Freeman v. DeCosta, July 3 1819, 
Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 1820.
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Venus Senex was undoubtedly the same wom an who appeared as the 
plaintiff Venus Synnex in Gorham's court in A ugust of 1819 against John 
Bowers for operating a house of gambling and prostitution in her 
neighborhood. Synnex had the confidence to see the case through to the 
Municipal Court, resulting in  a hefty fine for Bowers and the end of his 
business for the time being. Twenty years later, she apparently displayed little 
compunction in contesting the claims of the Public Administrator and Mary 
Clark; nor did she have any qualms in pushing Samuel E. Sewall by appealing 
to the judge of probate to m ove matters along w hen Sewall's timetable 
proved unsatisfactory. It is likely both of these w om en continued to appear in 
other courts whose records that have been lost or have yet to be uncovered.202
For African Americans, the ability to use the law  and employ legal 
beliefs m ost likely held greater significance than it did  for whites. When 
black m en and women like John Robinson or Remember Ransom employed 
legal terminology and concepts, they used a form o f pow er to maintain some 
measure of control amid life's vagaries. In those struggles African Americans 
frequently employed beliefs about how  they thought the law should work, no 
doubt more often in ways left unrecorded, but at times that legal 
consciousness expressed itself in sources like John Robinson's letter. Black 
m en and wom en had m ultiple sources for the evolution of a legal 
consciousness through regular involvem ent with the legal system. Robinson 
posted a surety in 1840 for the administration of William S. Jinnings' estate, a 
black trader who owned a business just a few doors dow n the street from
202 Gorham, Synnix v. Bowers, A ugust 31 1819,Criminal Actions from June 3 1819 to November 6 
1820; Commonwealth v. Bowers, September 9 1819, Boston Municipal Court Record Books, p. 129, 
located at the Massachusetts State Archives.
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Robinson's clothing business.203 As a business and home owner, Robinson 
would have dealt with various ordinances regulating life in a growing 
metropolis. He and his wife were probably aware of the arraignment of David 
Walker and tw o other black clothes dealers on theft and conspiracy charges in 
1828, and the subsequent acquittal of all three due to Walker's heady 
defense.204
John Robinson's use of legal language in 1842 to clear his street fit 
within a pattern of bending the law  to accomplish certain goals. The most 
dramatic manifestation of this pattern occurred in 1837, w hen Robinson and 
his wife, Sophia, were brought before the Municipal Court on charges of 
kidnapping Elizabeth, a five-year old African American, from her white 
guardians. During the course of this dispute, the legal consciousness of the 
Robinsons and other black Bostonians revealed itself as they attempted to 
apply their interpretation of how  they believed the law should work.
The Robinsons suspected Henry Bright, Elizabeth's guardian, of being 
nothing m ore than a slaveowner masquerading as a benevolent caretaker 
who had brought his chattel north. Fueling their suspicion of the Brights 
may have been information imparted by Bright's former slave, Stephen Burt. 
When the case came to court, Burt testified that on the day of her mother's 
death, Elizabeth had been given to another slave named Eleanor. Other 
members of the African American community claimed Elizabeth bore 
suspicious bruises, and that her hair had not been combed for a long time.
203 Stapp, Afro-Americans in Antebellum Boston, 77-78.
204 Boston Municipal Court Record Books, February 1828. The other two defendants were John 
Eli and John Scarlett; Peter Hinks notes that a Boston newspaper mentioned Walker's defense. 
Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate any written record of his defense; the file papers, 
which may or may not have contained such a document, for Municipal Court cases in 1828 
appear to be m issing the month of February.
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Above all, they feared Elizabeth's return to slavery in the south. It is not clear 
if black Bostonians, once they discovered Elizabeth had been a slave, had bona 
fide information pointing to plans by the Brights to sell or transport Elizabeth 
south, or if they m ade assumptions based on  Burt's knowledge. Henry Bright 
did, however, acknowledge his plan to travel south for the winter months, 
but testified that he had "no design of taking her back." Some free people of 
color presumably found this daim rather dubious. Later they would tell one 
of Boston's leading abolitionists that slaveholders like Bright "with their 
smooth tongues, could deceive" even prominent whites, but slaveholders 
"could not deceive the colored people."205
Bright, the former owner of Elizabeth's deceased mother, 
acknowledged Elizabeth's previous slave status when they lived in Alabama, 
but insisted he and his wife now considered her virtually a part of their ow n  
family. In fact, said Bright, his wife was an "immediate abolitionist." After 
Elizabeth disappeared, Bright contacted "some leading abolitionists in 
Boston," since he correctly assumed the child had been taken either by  
abolition activists or their sympathizers. Bright insisted the child was not 
now  a slave and that he and his wife had no intention of selling her into  
slavery. After advising Bright to put their intentions in writing, Samuel E. 
Sewall, an attorney w ho was one of those 'leading abolitionists,' spoke to 
Samuel Snowden, one of Boston's prominent black ministers. Snowden, 
who said he "could probably find the child," relayed a message requesting a 
bond to guarantee that Elizabeth would not be sold into southern slavery.
This request was another example of black Bostonians using their
205 peter Oxenbridge Thacher, Reports of Criminal Cases, Tried in the Municipal Court o f the 
City of Boston, before Peter Oxenbridge Thacher, Judge of the Court from 1823 to 1842, ed.
Horatio Woodman (Boston: 1845), 492-493, 495. Located at the Social Law Library.
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understanding of the law  for leverage; the Supreme Judicial Court had earlier 
ruled that in the case o f children about to be carried out of the state and into  
slavery, a writ of habeas corpus could be obtained and a surety required of the 
child's guardians. Even though no writ had been obtained, and therefore the 
request had no genuine legal weight, Bright consented, and Sewall m ade out 
a bond for five hundred dollars.206
Another attorney and abolitionist, Ellis Gray Loring, having been in  
contact with members of the African American community who knew  about 
the kidnapping, told Bright he would continue negotiating while 
recommending that the child be given back to the Brights. Eventually, four 
or five days after what the Brights called an abduction and black Bostonians 
called a rescue, Henry Bright managed to arrange a meeting with the 
Robinsons. The impression from his account is  that Sophia operated as the 
leader; Bright said "I called on Mrs. Robinson w ith  my wife....Her husband  
was present a part of the time."207
According to Bright, Sophia Robinson gave them the runaround.
After immediately acknowledging that, accompanied by her husband and her 
ow n children, she had indeed taken the child w h ile  Elizabeth was playing in  
the street in Cambridge, Robinson revealed she had only been acting at the 
behest of two unnam ed white ladies, to whom  she had delivered the girl 
immediately. She instructed the Brights to com e back the next morning, and  
in the meantime she w ould  speak to the w om en and get their permission to 
return the child. The next day, Robinson told the Brights to go see "the tw o  
M isses Parker." The Parker wom en informed the Brights that Robinson had
206 Ibid., 489-491, 497.
207 Ibid., 489-490.
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com e to them the previous evening, after she had spoken with the Brights, 
and explained the situation to them. The Parkers claim ed this was the first 
they had heard of the abduction, and that Robinson had come back in the 
morning, before the Brights arrived, and asked if she could bring the girl to 
the Parkers' house. Apparently, either Sophia Robinson had a change of 
heart or the Brights arrived at the Parkers before she did with the girl. At any 
rate, the Parker wom en agreed that the child should be returned, and one 
w ent w ith the Brights back to the Robinsons.
Returning to the Robinsons, the Brights and M iss Parker found the 
Reverend Snowden awaiting their arrival along w ith  John and Sophia 
Robinson. Snowden, again serving as the spokesman for those members of 
the black community involved w ith  what they labeled as assisting an attempt 
to escape, told the Brights that "some of the colored people thought the bond 
w as not sufficient" and recom m ended increasing the amount. The Brights 
agreed. Sophia still balked. She said "some other persons had taken an 
interest in the child and she d id  not like to give it up without consulting 
them," and once again m anaged to put the Brights off until the next morning 
with the promise of a final resolution, one that w ou ld  probably see the child 
returned to the Brights. W hen the Brights arrived at Ellis Gray Loring's office 
bright and early the next m orning, however, they found several free people of 
color and no child.
Sophia Robinson's explanation is telling: she told that Brights that 
"notwithstanding the w hite people w ished to them to give up the child, the 
colored people thought differently and were determined not to give her up 
unless there was some law to compel them." [emphasis added] Here a 
portion of the black com m unity expressed their interpretation of the law as it 
applied to this situation — they hoped the law w ould be on their side, and
147
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
thought it should be, and despite the exhortations of the w hite abolitionists, 
refused to give up the child. There was, however, a recognition that there 
might be conflicting laws: the law  m ade slavery illegal, but it also made 
kidnapping illegal. Ultimately a court w ould decide if their interpretation — 
that this w as a case of slavery and therefore the law against enslavement took 
precedence — was a correct interpretation.208
In fact, in the Revised Statutes of Massachusetts, statues 20 and 21 
commingled both situations: it w as illegal to "forcibly or secretly confine, or 
imprison any other person...against his will...or kidnap any other person...or 
to cause such person to be sent out of this state against his w ill or to be sold as 
a slave" as w ell as hold anyone "to service against his will."209 Black 
Bostonians essentially argued that the Brights held Elizabeth in 'service 
against her w ill/  while the Brights argued that it was the Robinsons holding 
Elizabeth against her will — to w hich the Robinsons and others responded 
that they were acting lawfully by preventing the Brights from violating the 
state law that not only prohibited sending or selling anyone out of the state, 
but also declared that any slave brought into the state was considered a free 
person.
It is important to understand that when Sophia Robinson took 
Elizabeth from the Brights, it was no rash act. By the mid-1840s, a well- 
established network of black and w hite abolitionists in Boston effectively hid 
and relocated fugitives, and the testim ony from this case indicates that the 
roots of this network were already in  place in the 1830s. Robinson clearly 
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than their ow n indicates that the Robinsons knew who to go  to. The decision 
to abduct Elizabeth may have been m ade quickly, but it was not made 
im p u lsively .210
Before Elizabeth was taken, a member of Boston's black community 
other than the Robinsons initially approached the attorney Loring and 
informed him that "there was a child at Cambridge, who was held  by a 
slaveowner, and who would soon be carried into slavery." According to 
Loring, w hose testimony cast black Bostonians in a favorable light, this 
person explored ways of protecting Elizabeth without breaking the law. He or 
she asked Loring if a writ of habeas corpus m ight free the child from the 
Brights. No doubt the basis of this request was an earlier ruling by the 
Supreme Judicial Court that in  the case of a child about to be carried out of the 
state and into servitude, the court w ould  grant such a writ, require a surety, 
and possibly even place the child with a new  guardian. In fact, tw o years 
earlier, the Court had granted a writ of habeas corpus and recom m ended a 
new  guardian for a six year-old black girl named Med who w as about to be 
taken from Boston back to Louisiana; and in  1841 the Supreme Judicial Court 
ruled likewise in the case of seven year-old boy whose owner reportedly
210 On the organization of the Boston's black comm unity in cases of fugitives, see Irving H. 
Bartlett, "Abolitionists, Fugitives, and Imposters in Boston, 1846-1847," The New England 
Quarterly 55 (March 1982), 97-110; and James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, Black 
Bostonians: Family Life and Community Struggle in the Antebellum North (N ew  York: Holmes 
and Meier Publishers, 1979), 97-114. Bartlett7s article reprints documents from the Committee 
of Vigilance, the short-lived predecessor to the Boston Vigilance Committee, and notes that in 
the 1840s, "helping fugitives was a much more businesslike procedure" than romantic 
conceptions of the underground railroad. The Hortons state that the Robinsons "were part of no 
organized antislavery group," but appear to base this on the fact that their names may not 
appear on lists o f antislavery groups. While this may have been the case, it is highly unlikely 
that the Robinsons were not connected to individuals who were formal members o f such groups. 
Just by virtue o f being a clothing dealer and knowing William Jinnings, John Robinson probably 
had regular contact with John Hilton, a prominent black activist in Boston from the 1830s 
through the 1850s. The other man who posted a surety, along with Robinson, for the 
adminstration of Jinnings' estate — for which Hilton was the executor — was John Scarlett, an 
African American clothes dealer who had also been an associate of David Walker.
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intended to take him  back to Arkansas.211 But Loring replied that since the 
girl was allowed to go  outside on her own, she was apparently "not restrained 
of her liberty" and doubted that such a writ could be obtained. The child  
would have to "take its ow n liberty." At this point, more free people of color, 
probably including the Robinsons, entered into this discussion. Asking  
Loring "what remedy there was" and "if they assisted the child to escape, 
whether they w ould be liable," they learned that "they might law fully receive 
the child, but had best return its clothing." Presumably Loring advised they 
not keep the clothing to avoid any possibility of being charged with theft. 
Loring operated under the assumption that Elizabeth was seven or eight years 
old and therefore old enough to make some kind of conscious choice about 
leaving the Brights; he testified that had he known she was only five, he  
would have "hesitated at giving the advice I did give."212
Taking Elizabeth, then, was not an act of militant civil disobedience. 
The Robinsons and others had the option of sim ply taking Elizabeth 
immediately upon learning of the Brights' plans to return to Alabama for the 
winter, and spiriting her away. They clearly had the ability to hide Elizabeth. 
The day after taking Elizabeth, in fact, "some five or six colored people came 
to Robinson's house.... one of the men asked if there was a slave child in  the 
house .... then put on its bonnet, and took her off." Sophia Robinson's sister, 
who gave this testimony, also commented that "all the colored people were 
entire strangers" to her, and suggested the child might be in Salem.
Obviously, an effective network of communication and action existed in  the
211 Thacher, Reports of Criminal Cases, 497. For the 1836 and 1841 cases, see Judicial Cases 
Concerning American Slavery and the Negro, ed. Helen Tunnicliff Catterall (W ashington,
D.C.: The Carnegie Institution, 1936), vol. 4, 506-510.
212 Thacher, Reports of Criminal Cases, 493.
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black community. The Brights discovered who had taken Elizabeth only 
because her abductors came forward. Boston's police force w ould not have 
been very helpful. It had been established primarily for squelching public 
disturbances, and, still in its early stages of organization, lacked a detective 
branch. The Robinsons and the unnamed accomplices thus stood a good 
chance of eluding prosecution. Instead, black Bostonians explored how  they 
might accom plish their goal of rescuing Elizabeth while staying within the 
bounds of the law, and they acted only after receiving som e indication from 
Loring that this was possible.213
But to stay within the law, African Americans interpreted the law. The 
consultation w ith Loring indicates not ignorance of the law, but awareness — 
awareness of how  the statute freeing slaves brought into the state applied, 
awareness of how  the statute outlawing transporting or selling anyone out of 
the state applied, and awareness of how  the statute against kidnapping might 
also apply. Because these three illegal acts were all bound up together in the 
Revised Statutes, African Americans interpreted the act of taking Elizabeth as 
not only lawful, but as an act preventing the commission of an unlawful act — 
the selling or transporting of Elizabeth south.
This process of interpreting and applying the law w as a further 
manifestation of black Bostonians' legal consciousness. They fully believed 
that the law  should and did apply to this situation, that the law  should and 
did entitle Elizabeth to protection from the Brights, and that the law  should 
and did entitle them to rescue Elizabeth. This was not a case of kidnapping, 
but a case of upholding the law by protecting the rights of a freed African 
American girl. The decision not to hide their involvem ent and give up
213 Ibid., 495; Lane, Policing the City, 26-58. The move to create a detective branch of Boston's 
police force did not begin until 1845.
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Elizabeth only if a law  compelled them indicates both their belief in the 
validity of this interpretation, but also a recognition that the court might 
decide otherwise.
In the eyes of the court, this interpretation turned on  whether the 
Brights held Elizabeth 'against her w ill/  and if they intended to return her to 
slave status. The Robinsons and som e other black Bostonians, based on their 
own assumptions or on more concrete evidence that did not come out in 
court, remained convinced that Elizabeth did not willingly stay with the 
Brights. They were convinced there was little chance Elizabeth ever would 
experience freedom again once the Brights returned to Alabama for the 
winter. The judge, however, used a strict legal logic that circumvented 
African Americans' interpretation of the law.
Judge Thacher of the Municipal Court instructed the jury "that the 
moment the master carries his slave into a country where domestic slavery is 
not permitted, he becomes free." Furthermore, no person could "restrain 
such slave of his liberty during his continuance here...against his consent." 
Since Elizabeth w as legally free, then, she was entitled to the full protection of 
the law. Nor could Elizabeth, as a free being, be held against her will or 
carried out of the state, either by the Brights or the Robinsons. Therefore, 
argued Thacher, the law entitled Elizabeth to protection against being taken 
against her will, and he inferred that her 'will' was to remain with the 
Brights, stating "it is in evidence, that the child was happy and contented with 
its natural protectors." He apparently based this conclusion on the Brights' 
testimony and the rationale that "if the child had been treated with 
inhumanity, any citizen might have complained in its behalf," and since no 
citizen had done so — apparently ignoring the testimony by Loring that some 
African Americans said the child had been ill-treated — the Brights were
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humane caretakers. In fairness to Thacher, there had been testim ony by 
Sewall, Loring, the Reverend Snowden, and the Parker sisters that cast Bright 
in  a favorable light. But Thacher7s jury instructions entirely avoided the 
issue of whether or not the Brights m ight take Elizabeth back into slavery.
H is definition of Elizabeth as a free legal being implied that even if she did go 
back to Alabama, she w ou ld  have done so voluntarily; therefore, the 
Robinsons had no legal grounds for 'protecting' Elizabeth from re­
enslavem ent.214
Thacher's jury instructions gave the jury virtually no room to do 
anything but find the Robinsons guilty. He described Henry Bright as acting 
"with humanity" and declared Bright7s statements as "confirmed by every 
material fact." The Robinsons, on the other hand, "inveigled the child into 
their possession" and had "set their ow n  will above the law." Thacher told 
the jury that Loring's advice — suggesting it might be lawful for someone to 
assist the child in an escape, which w as how  the Robinsons attempted to 
define their actions — w as immaterial. If the jury believed the Robinsons 
committed this act "innocently and w ithout an unlawful intent" an acquittal 
should result, but Thacher followed that admonishment by noting that "from 
the time the child was taken...it has been kept in secret confinement, away 
from its natural friends and protectors, and without their knowledge, and 
that the defendants now  refuse to put it under the protection of the law, [and] 
you must judge of the act done."215
The jury found the Robinsons guilty of kidnapping and confining 
Elizabeth against her w ill, and not guilty of intending to convey her out of the
214 Thacher, Reports of Criminal Cases, 497.
215 Ibid., 498-500.
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state. Thacher handed dow n a sentence of four month's imprisonment and a 
tw o hundred dollar fine. The Robinsons promptly appealed, and bonds of 
one thousand dollars were posted for John and Sophia. It is likely other free 
people of color and som e of the wealthier w hite abolitionists aided the 
Robinsons in coming up  w ith the bond m oney. The appeal seems to have 
been drawn out for nearly a year; on October 22 of 1838, Henry Bright asked 
the commonwealth's attorney to drop the prosecution because Elizabeth had 
been returned and the fine paid.216 Why the Robinsons and their accomplices 
decided to finally return Elizabeth is, unfortunately, unknown. Perhaps the 
specter of four months in jail proved too much; perhaps the Robinsons and 
others became convinced that the Brights w ould  keep Elizabeth in 
Massachusetts.
Running throughout the entire episode w as a struggle for power. This 
struggle had two inseparable focal points: Elizabeth, the object of the struggle 
and over whom each party wished to gain control; and the law, the tool by 
which Elizabeth, the object, would be gained. First by requesting a surety of 
the Brights, and then by trying to interpret the conflict as a case of 
slaveholding, those African Americans who participated in this struggle  
attempted to access the law 's power to negate the Bright7s power over 
Elizabeth. The Brights, initially willing to com ply with the requests for 
sureties and negotiate through abolitionists w ho were also attorneys, 
ultimately resorted to using the law's power to get Elizabeth back.
Though it may be understandable w hy Judge Thacher saw the 
Robinsons as setting "their ow n will above the law," his characterization, 
from the Robinsons' point of view, was inaccurate. The Robinsons and their
216 Ibid., 500. See Thacher's footnote.
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supporters believed they could locate their will within  the law. They 
explored how they m ight rescue Elizabeth without violating the law: they 
began by asking an attorney if a writ of habeas corpus w ould  force the court to 
remove Elizabeth; they asked for sureties from the Brights, modeling legal 
procedure; and, believing that the law was at least potentially amenable to 
their goals, they chose to use the law instead of defy it.
They made this choice primarily because they believed the law  applied 
and that using legal m eans was the best way to guarantee Elizabeth's 
permanent freedom. This belief was encouraged by the commingling of 
kidnapping and slavery in the statutes, the earlier ruling in the Supreme 
Judicial Court preventing Med, the African American girl, from being taken 
back to N ew  Orleans, and because the law had often been useful to black 
Bostonians. Ewick and Silbey have noted that "the multiple and 
contradictory character of law's meanings, rather than a weakness, is a crucial 
component of its power."217 Ewick and Silbey are concerned less with the 
m ultiple and contradictory meanings of formal statutes and focus instead on 
how  people interpret the law and infuse the commonplace with legality, as, 
for instance, John Robinson did in his Bridge Court letter. But the concept 
applies here as well: because the formal law could be interpreted in multiple 
and contradictory ways, in this case by the Robinsons and other African 
Americans on the one hand, and the Brights and Judge Thacher on the other 
hand, and because African Americans often were accustomed to being able to 
successfully and usefully apply the law, the law was an attractive and sensible 
forum for trying to secure Elizabeth's freedom.
217 Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, The Common Place o f Lazo: Stories from Everyday Life 
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1998), 17.
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Black Bostonians had other options to ensure her freedom. The 
network of people who hid Elizabeth for a year, and then only gave her up 
voluntarily, demonstrated their power to resist the legal system. But 
relocating Elizabeth permanently had the disadvantage of placing her and 
those involved at some degree of ongoing risk, while using legal means to 
separate her from the Brights had the advantage of a more secure freedom. 
Nevertheless, those African Americans involved with this endeavor had two 
choices: deny involvement and find another place for Elizabeth, or use the 
law. They chose the law.
N ot all African Americans in antebellum Boston became involved  
with the law and the courts for such noble principles as the Robinsons and 
their allies. For the most part, black Bostonians continued to come to the 
lower court for much the same reasons that black litigants appeared in the 
justice of the peace court during the first two decades of the nineteenth 
century: personal animosity, vengeance, or simply a fear for personal safety. 
But the court that now adjudicated many similar conflicts to those that Senex 
and other ordinary black Bostonians used so frequently during the 1810s, 
underwent a transformation when the town of Boston incorporated itself as a 
city in 1822. There had been numerous changes in the Suffolk County legal 
system between the end of the American Revolution and incorporation, and 
after 1822 a revised court system supposedly regulated the type of cases each 
court heard, and imposed some sense of order on the legal system. Contrary 
to the spasmodic changes of the first two decades of the nineteenth century, 
these changes w ould endure throughout the antebellum period. A  new  
court, the Police Court, was created to deal with minor crime that individual 
justices of the peace and the General Court of sessions had formerly handled.
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Composed of three justices of the peace, who rotated periodically, and w ho  
were paid a regular salary, the Police Court ended the practice whereby 
justices of the peace were paid by fines and court fees.218
The Municipal Court, established at the beginning of the nineteenth  
century, conducted litigation in a professional, formal manner, and retained  
that character into the antebellum years. This court handled appeals of 
decisions made by justices of the peace, along w ith  more serious crimes. 
Litigants were typically represented by lawyers, some of whom, along w ith the 
judges, were highly educated members of the political elite. In the early 1820s, 
for instance, Daniel Webster represented defendants in criminal cases, and  
Josiah Quincy, w ho w ou ld  go on to serve several terms as mayor of Boston, 
and eventually as president of Harvard, sat as the judge of the Municipal 
Court. By contrast, the justices who sat on the Police Court were frequently 
either aspiring office holders or drawn from the m iddle class.219
Initially, the Police Court handled a half dozen or so cases a day, which  
was only slightly more than Gorham typically adjudicated. The case load  
gradually increased, and by the 1850s one observer put the average number of 
daily cases at thirty-five and described days of fifty to sixty cases being nothing  
out of the ordinary.220 Since individual justices, who continued to carry out 
other functions, took turns sitting on the Police Court, many black Bostonians
218 A Volume of Records relating to the Early History of Boston containing Boston Town Records, 
1814-1822 (Boston: Municipal Printing Office, 1906), 40-41. The selectmen proposed a police 
court for this reason in 1815. Also see Chapter Two of this dissertation, p. 99.
219 Theodore Ferdinand, Boston's Lower Criminal Courts, 1814-1850 (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 1992), 9-17; A Volume of Records Relating to the Early History of Boston 
Containing Boston Toaon Records, 1784-1796 (Boston: Municipal Printing Office, 1903). See town  
meetings for May 18 1790, May 111795, March 211796, and April 25 1796.
220 Ferdinand, Boston's Lower Criminal Courts, 9-17; Fenner, Raising the Veil; or Scenes in the 
Courts, 26-28.
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would have been familiar with som e of the Police Court justices. The 
constable system also remained in place — George Reed, the constable referred 
to in the previous chapter as a regular figure in black residential areas, 
remained at his post at least into the mid-1830s. As they had done before, 
plaintiffs typically lodged a complaint with a justice of the peace or a 
constable. Courtroom procedure remained somewhat similar to what 
African Americans had know n in justice of the peace courts, and cases were 
frequently argued by the litigants themselves.
Yet changes did occur. The criminal justice system did become more 
codified, and the courts more streamlined. The attorney general gained 
authority at the expense of individual justices of the peace, and the courts 
became a more useful tool for men like Josiah Quincy, w h o wished to secure 
an orderly society during a period of economic and urban growth. Michael 
Hindus notes that "the sam e values that the legal system endorsed for the 
sake of economic growth- certainty, predictability, and rationality- can be 
found in the criminal justice system of Massachusetts." But change was 
layered. Even though legislators and court officials were in the midst of 
attempting to reorganize the criminal justice system, and make it more 
professional and predictable through centralization, the substance of the 
Police Court day-to-day activities was not altered dramatically in the 
antebellum era. The system  of private prosecution remained largely intact. 
The personal, face-to-face nature of adjudication, where litigants appeared 
before neighborhood justices of the peace, began to erode, but since those 
same justices sat on the Police Court, some element of familiarity lingered. 
Probably because of these similarities, the creation of the Police Court appears
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to have had little effect on African Americans' efforts at managing conflicts 
through litigation.221
Whether or not black Bostonians appeared in court as 
disproportionately as they had in justice of the peace Stephen Gorham's court 
is difficult to ascertain. Unlike Gorham, most Boston court dockets and 
records only occasionaly noted if a litigant was African American, and when 
they did, it was generally only if the black litigant was the defendant. In 1821, 
a state congressional committee, concerned about the "increase of a species of 
population, which threatens to be both injurious and burthensome," reported 
a ratio of one black convict out of every 146 African Americans in 
Massachusetts, while for whites the ratio was one to 2140. George Levesque 
has documented the significant fluctuations in these ratios up to the Civil 
War, w ith black Bostonians being eight times more likely to be incarcerated 
than whites in 1833, to a low of less than twice as likely in 1837. Overall, 
between 1823 and 1843, the average proportion of black convicts was five 
times greater than white convicts.222
Breaking those numbers down a bit further for one year reveals a 
gendered pattern of incarceration. In 1835 the Municipal Court record book 
placed the total number of incarcerations made by the Municipal and Police 
Courts by the end of November at 253 men and 151 wom en. Twenty-four of 
the m en and 34 of the women were black. Of the male convicts, then, black
221 Michael Stephen Hindus, Prison and Plantation: Crime, Justice, and Authority in 
Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1767-1878 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1980), xxii; on Quincy and others who viewed Boston's courts as a useful tool for social 
reform, see Ferdinand, Boston's Lower Criminal Courts, 15-17, 24-30, and 38-66.
222 Massachusetts Legislative Documents 1817-1822, "Free Negroes and Mulattoes," House No. 
46. Located at the Massachusetts Statehouse Library, Special Collections; Levesque, Black 
Boston, 384.
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men composed 9.5% of male convicts, or about twice their proportion of the 
population; while black w om en m ade up 22.5% of female convicts. If the 
pattern demonstrated in the previous chapter of black w om en being  
aggressive in using the court to prosecute other African Americans, 
particularly other black wom en, persisted into the 1830s, this w ou ld  partly 
explain the higher proportion of black female convicts.223
A high proportion of black prisoners means, of course, that there was a 
high proportion of black defendants. Because most court records in  Boston 
inconsistently identified litigants w ith racial categories, it is virtually  
impossible to determine whether or not there continued to be a high  
proportion of black plaintiffs, or to determine how many black defendants 
succeeded in avoiding guilty verdicts.
Savvy defendants knew how  to avoid the pitfalls of the court, while 
those unfamiliar with the courts risked being hurried along to jail, 
particularly as the dockets of the Police Court grew more burdensom e. One 
court observer recalled som e "poor bewildered devil," arrested for being 
drunk and disorderly, entering the courtroom in the morning, and stumbling 
out a not guilty plea. Two or three police officers quickly sprang up to attest 
to the defendant's guilt, and w hile the accused protested his innocence, the 
judge wrote out the sentence. Other witless defendants fell prey to lawyers. 
The "'pettifoggers" and "blood-suckers" waited outside the jail cell inside the 
courthouse and told the hapless defendants, as they came out of the cell on 
their w ay to a hearing that he, the lawyer, could get them "out o f this scrape" 
for $15 in advance "to pay court expense." A novice defendant w ou ld  
probably have been unaware that there would be no court expense to pay if he
223 Boston Municipal Court Record Books, November 1835.
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or she was acquitted. Without an "able attorney/' the lawyer told the 
defendant, a six-month sentence in the H ouse of Corrections loom ed. M ost 
defendants were brought to the Police Court for minor charges; small fines or 
sentences of a few  days to a few  weeks were common. Some lawyers may 
have been helpful; many were certainly unscrupulous.224
The jails in which these convicted black defendants served out their 
sentences m ade the dangers of being taken to court a serious matter. In 1808 a 
visitor to Boston's state prison in Charlestown, just across the river from the 
dty, was struck by "the high ramparts, the m assy walls, the comfortless cells, 
scarcely adm itting the light of heaven." This visitor did observe "a number 
of ameliorating circumstances" such as clean cells, opportunities to learn a 
trade, and that the "beer is the m ost palatable I have ever tasted." But m ost 
convicted defendants of less serious crimes w ound up in the municipal 
prisons that likely had few, if any, such amenities. An antebellum poem  
described the Leverett Street jail as
Here's the place which men (for being poor) 
are sent to starve in,
Rude remedy, "I trow, for sore disease,"
Within these walls stuffed by damp 
and stench doth hopes fair torch expire.
This particular jail sat about twenty feet below  street level, and passersby
could view  the jail through the iron railings on the sidewalk. The prisoners
within could be heard cutting stone in  the prison yard, and their only glim pse
of freedom came by "the aid of a small mirror" with which they m ight steal
"a glance of the free denizens as they passed along Leverett Street."
Defendants convicted in the Police Court typically wound up in the H ouse of
Corrections, where female convicts spent their days making men's clothing,
224 Fenner, Raising the Veil, 18-19, 28.
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and male convicts crushed stone to be used for street repairs, often working 
while shackled to ball and chain. While an early traveler's guide to Boston 
characterized the jailers and administrators as humane and remarked on the 
availability of good medical care, the guide also called the prison a "gloomy 
place."225
While som e African American litigants surely fell victim to harried 
judges and unscrupulous lawyers, others knew  how  to function effectively 
within the legal system, often from past experience or by learning from their 
neighbors' courtroom escapades. William W eevis, a light-skinned black 
mariner, who celebrated "the termination of each successive voyage in a 
flowing can of grog," came to court accused by his much darker-skinned wife  
of beating her w ith his belt. Weevis painted a picture of himself enduring 
bitter storms at sea, motivated by the thought of returning home to his wife. 
When he arrived, she was at the theater, in the gallery, with another man, 
and apparently had been doing this regularly. As they walked home, she was 
swearing at W eevis mightily. He tried to put his arm around her; she slapped  
him. He kissed her; she threw a plate at him. She told him she had another 
man in town that she preferred. "By gum" he said, "You've worn the 
breeches long enough, and may I be tetotally d— if you wear 'em any longer" 
and took off his belt and beat her over the shoulders. The judge admonished 
him, especially since he was "a stout man," for losing control with such a 
small woman and found him guilty. But the judge only fined him one dollar 
with no jail time since he had been "provoked". During an era of threatened
225 Judith Sargent Murray to Anna Parsons Sargent, August 31,1808. Judith Sargent Murray 
Papers, Mississippi Department of Archives; Leverett St. jail described in Crichton, Old 
Boston; the House of Corrections described in Abel Bowen, Picture of Boston, or the Citizen's 
and Stranger's Guide to the Metropolis of Massachusetts, and its Environs (Boston: 1829), 80-81. 
Located at the Bostonian Society Library.
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patriarchy, Weevis effectively used gender roles to transcend race by depicting 
himself as a hard-working man asserting control over his unfaithful and 
unruly wife.226
African Americans b y  no means came solely or even typically as 
defendants; as in the justice of the peace court, m any black defendants were 
brought to court by black plaintiffs. Their familiarity with the courts 
prompted many black Bostonians to resort to the courts for settling private 
matters even when other m ethods of managing conflict were available. 
Perhaps the most notable exam ple occurred w hen delicate fractures within 
the black community surfaced in the African Baptist Church, founded in 1805 
as the first black church in  Boston. The African Baptist Church had a history 
of abolitionist activism; Thomas Paul, the pastor until 1829, was an active 
supporter of the m ovem ent, and William Lloyd Garrison and others began 
organizing the N ew  England Anti-Slavery Society in the church's basement 
classroom in 1832.227 But in  part due to that activism and divergent views on 
colonization, the church also began to build a history of dissension. In the 
1830s, as the following list indicates, the leadership was wracked with 
upheaval.
226 Selections from the Court Reports, 205-210; on 'threatened patriarchy,' see Paul E. Johnson 
and Sean Wilentz, The Kingdom of Matthias; A Story of Sex and Salvation in 19th-Century 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
227 Edward D. Smith, Climbing Jacob's Ladder: The Rise of Black Churches in Eastern American 
Cities, 1740-1877 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1988), 47-51.
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Table 4
African M eeting House Pastors. 1832-1841
A rrived Left
Thomas Ritchie 10/32 11/33
Sam uel Gooch 11/33 5/35
John Given 5/35 ?/36
Armstrong Archer 2 / 37 ? /3  7
George Black 11/38 7/41
In the span of nine years the Joy Street congregation saw  five pastors come 
and go, and endured lenghty periods w ith no pastor. In 1840, George Black 
led forty members out to form Twelfth St. Baptist, effectively ending a decade 
of conflict. This division was undoubtedly due in large part to disagreements 
over how  m uch time and energy should to devoted to abolitionism, as the 
Twelfth St. church became deeply involved in the abolition movement.228 
But in the m idst of that decade of conflict, members w ent outside the church 
in an attempt to resolve some of their problems.
The conflict ostensibly grew out of a sharp disagreement over the 
political leanings of the African Baptist Church. The Reverend John Given, 
who had taken over the pastorate in May of 1835, reportedly had "fallen 
under the suspicion of his colored brethren" as a supporter of colonization. 
Rumors of visits to Liberia fueled suspicions. Never a popular cause among 
northern African Americans, colonization nevertheless did find support 
among a minority of free blacks. Some members of the African Baptist 
church, perhaps in part motivated by a desire to ensure that Given had no
228 The New England Historical Genealogical Register (Boston: Samuel G. Drake, 1847) vol. 1. 
The Register lists all the ministers, black and white, in the Boston area from 1620-1847;
Mechal Sobel, Trabelin' On (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1979), 258; Smith, Climbing Jacob's 
Ladder, 51.
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opportunity to w in  any converts over to colonization, decided to starve him  
out by refusing to pay pew  rents. But they still showed up for Sunday 
services. The church leadership responded by sending home the pew  cushion 
of at least one member, George Putnam, in  effect notifying that him that he 
was no longer welcom e.
Putnam did not let the issue die that easily. Putnam used a legal 
argument, arguing that the church was not an incorporated body, and 
therefore could not dem and pew  rent or sue him for nonpayment. He 
marched into church with a young boy carrying his pew  cushion. Cyrus 
Foster, a member of the committee that sent Putnam's cushion home, told 
Putnam that he w ou ld  by no means be allowed to set his cushion in its 
customary place. Foster may have then tried to grab the cushion. Thomas 
Dalton, another church member, "stripped off his coat and flew  to Putnam's 
assistance." With tensions escalating, Putnam seized Foster by the throat, and 
Charles Virgin Caples, formerly a minister and another ally of Putnam's, 
managed to get hold of the controversial cushion and place it in the pew.
Due to the "uproar and confusion created by this contest," Sunday services 
were suspended for the day.229
Later that evening, members of the church m et and voted to instruct 
the church committee to take the matter to the Police Court. Putnam, Dalton, 
and Caples were charged with "disturbing a religious meeting" and 
subsequently ordered to put up a surety of $60 each to ensure their appearance 
at a Municipal Court trial. Not to be outdone, the trio, along with two other 
members, lodged a counter-charge of "disturbing a religious meeting" against 
Foster and three of his allies. Perhaps by the time the case came to the
229 Selections from the Court Reports, 50-51.
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Municipal Court, tempers had cooled. After one day the case was postponed, 
and did not appear in this court's record books again. The case was not 
dismissed, however, w hich at least ostensibly gave the court continuing 
authority to intervene should the dispute flare up again.230
The Sunday scuffle involved some of Boston's most prominent black 
citizens. As ministers, Caples and Given occupied positions of leadership. 
Thomas Dalton, a former confidante of David Walker, had long been a leader 
in agitating against racist policies and slavery. Cyrus Foster, a deacon at the 
church, was also a Revolutionary war veteran.231 All of these men were no  
doubt aware of biblical warnings against using secular courts to settle disputes 
between believers. Churches had internal means of dealing .with disputes 
between members. But in this charged dispute, they believed the court's 
authority was a more effective means of disciplining one another than 
traditional church procedures. In a manner very different than Richard 
Crafus, but with a similar result, the leaders of the African Baptist church 
furthered the law's function of social control by opening the doors of the 
church to the authority of the court. In this incident black Bostonians used  
the court as an arbitrator to reinforce acceptable behavior, even in the sacred 
world.
Most black litigants did not occupy such positions of prominence, and 
most of the conflicts bringing African Americans to court did not stem from  
political divisions over the place of abolitionist politics in the church. Far 
more common were dom estic and neighborhood disputes like those of
230 Selections from the Court Reports, 51; Boston Municipal Court Record Books, August 1835, 
cases 333 and 334.
231 Peter P. Hinks, To Awaken M y Afflicted Brethren: David Walker and the Problem of  
Antebellum Slave Resistance (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press,
1997), 77.
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William Weevis and his w ife. W hen Rosanna Tum ey charged Samuel 
Wallace with assault, Wallace got w ind of her intentions and quickly 
obtained a writ of slander against Tumey. Wallace m anaged to have his 
slander charge prosecuted first, probably in the Court of Common Pleas, 
resulting in Tumey being in  jail w hen her case against Wallace came to the 
Police Court. The court issued a writ of habeas corpus to enable Tumey to 
testify, foiling Wallace's plan. Tum ey produced two black wom en as 
witnesses, but, like William W eevis, Wallace argued that Tumey provoked 
him with a torrent of abusive language and by refusing to get out of his way. 
Even at that, claimed Wallace, he had only given her a shove. The justices 
found him guilty, but fined him  a mere fifty cents.232
Not all black men w ho assaulted women escaped so easily. In 1834 
Richard King appeared in the Police Court after he attacked his wife Sarah 
and then jumped dow n a cistern in an attempt to kill himself. The water was 
too shallow, though, and eventually Reverend Taylor, a well-known 
minister of seamen, black and white, succeeded in getting King to come out. 
King also told a story of his ow n  long-suffering with an unfaithful wife. But 
this was no simple assault. King reportedly struck Sarah several times on the 
neck with a hatchet, prompting a charge of attempted murder. The 
seriousness of the charge required the Police Court to bind him over for trial 
at the Municipal Court, which, noting King had "grieviously beat bruise 
wound, & cut to the great hazard of [Sarah's] life," sentenced King to four 
years hard labor at the state prison in Charlestown.233
232 Selections from the Court Reports, 135-137.
233 Ibid., 144-145; Boston Municipal Court Record Books, 1834. A  brief biography of Rev. Taylor 
appears in Crichton, Old Boston, "Father Taylor."
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African Americans' involvem ent w ith the courts in the antebellum  
era, had at least one significant new  development. Media scrutiny of court 
proceedings had become increasingly common, and it rarely worked to the 
advantage of free people of color. The combination of the presence of court 
reporters and an intensifying racism made black litigants into public fodder 
for evolving racist ideologies.
The persistent presence of African Americans in the Police and 
M unicipal Courts garnered considerable attention from court reporters. Ball 
Fenner, w ho wrote what he considered an expose on the lower courts in 1856, 
described the omnipresent court reporters as "fellows of infinite jest."
African Americans in particular attracted their attention. Fenner reported 
that "when a colored individual is arraigned for some minor offence, they 
always seem ed determined to have a little sport among themselves."
One young biradal wom an with dark blue eyes, arrested during a raid 
on a brothel, had been seen earlier by a reporter when she sang at "a negro 
concert." The reporter knew she had " sw eet and m elodious voice" and he 
knew the clerk of the court had a fondness for music. Taking the young lady 
aside before her arraignment, the reporter told her to enter her plea in song. 
She com plied, singing a line from "a well-known German song, 'Thou, thou, 
know'st that I love thee.'" The judge, clerk, and officers sat in stunned 
silence. Recomposing themselves and asking again for her plea, she 
answered not guilty and then sang 'Let me go where fate may lead me. Let me 
cross yon  troubled deep; Where no strange ear shall greet me, Where no eye 
for m e shall weep.' The officers gave minimal testimony, the clerk declared 
"That w om an can't be guilty of any crimel", and the judge discharged her.234
234 Fenner, Raising the Veil, 121-122.
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During the 1830s and throughout the antebellum era, newspapers in 
Boston and other northern cities ran court reports as regular features for their 
readers. The courts became, in some respects, a kind of free public theater. 
Centralizing the lowest rung of the criminal justice system, which had been 
the individual neighborhood justice of the peace courts, into the Police Court 
no doubt spurred on the theatrical aspect by giving spectators and reporters a 
predictable performance. Complainants could show up at the office of a 
justice of the peace with no warning and at all hours, but the Police Court 
provided a forum with regular hours, and the courtroom in the recently 
completed Suffolk County Courthouse was more accessible and roomy for 
reporters and spectators. Some of the spectators would have been litigants 
waiting their turn on the docket. Boston's lower courts likely mirrored 
Philadelphia's courts, described by Allen Steinberg as a "free popular theater, 
w ith friends and neighbors as the performers."235
African Americans appearing as 'performers' in court, unwittingly or 
not, fit within a broader antebellum context of public 'black' performance for 
w hite entertainment. African Americans attracted attention in Boston, 
sometimes in unusual ways. In the mid-1830s, when the W ashington Hotel 
served as "the Rubicon for all notables who visited Boston" from Chief 
Osceola to Andrew Jackson, a N ew  York military escort by the name of the 
Lafayette Guards camped out on the hotel grounds for a week, feasting and 
drinking. One of the highlights of the week was entertainment provided by 
som e of the regiment7s black servants, in particular one "round, bullet­
headed little fellow." The officers wagered on his butting ability, and one
235 Allen Steinberg, The Transformation of Criminal Justice: Philadelphia, 1800-1880 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 18. Ball Fenner mentions spectators in Boston's 
courtrooms in Raising the Veil.
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witness remembered seeing him "dive through the panel of a stout door, 
disappearing bodily into the room...without displaying the slightest sign of 
mental or bodily perturbation." This so impressed local boys that they 
attempted to imitate him, only to acquire many sore heads. The black 
servant's feat actually had deep African cultural roots, and similar scenes 
whereby African Americans entertained whites in  this manner persisted at 
least through the Civil War.236
There had been a long history of public performance by Africans and 
African Americans w hen eighteenth century slaves in the Boston area and  
other northern towns adapted white election holidays into distinctly African 
American celebrations. Though some whites in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries disapproved of the noise, drinking, and general revelry, 
others enjoyed and participated in the week long festivals. After electing or 
appointing a black king or governor, the inaugural parade's "music and flying 
colors made the black election parades something special to white and black 
N ew  Englanders alike." Other activities during the festivals included 
different forms of combat, foot races, and dancing. In Boston, the tradition 
continued at least sporadically into the nineteenth century. Historians have 
noted the cultural significance of these festivals, but have perhaps overlooked  
the significance of the activities as public performances before white 
observers. Even though Election Day festivities seem to have become 
sporadic before ceasing altogether in 1831, in Boston the black parades, lead by 
the legendary Richard 'King Dick' Crafus and composed of a "squad of colored
236 Crichton, Old Boston, chapter one. W. Jeffrey Bolster describes head-butting among black 
sailors from New England to Brazil in Black Jacks, 119-120; also, David A. Cecere has 
documented white Union soldiers from N ew  England being entertained by head-butting black 
soldiers during the Civil War. See Cecere, "Carrying the Homefront to War: Race and N ew  
England Culture during the C ivil War," in Looking Homeward, ed. Paul Cimbala (N ew  York: 
Fordham University Press, 2000).
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brethren of all sizes an costumes, marched around and through Boston 
Common "amid the shouts and laughter of the assembled crowd w ho came 
to witness." That whites gained som ething from watching is apparent; it was 
the only time of public gathering or celebration that white m en did not chase 
black Bostonians off the Comm ons.237
Though the laughter may have had moments of genuine innocence, 
much of it was no doubt a part of the heightening public denigration of 
African Americans throughout the North. Black Balls and parades also 
elicited derision from white observers; in 1828 Freedom's Journal reprinted a 
story from the Pennsylvania Gazette on an alleged disturbance at what the 
Gazette claimed was a "fancy ball." Supposedly a group of white boys 
attempted to break up the ball by scaring carriage horses and insulting the 
wom en. Freedom's Journal claimed the ball had been a "plain" one, and that 
no disturbance had taken place, and that actually a white ball on the same 
night had degenerated into an unruly affair. Regardless of which report was 
correct, the Gazette's portrayal of the black celebrants as pretentious buffoons 
epitom ized m any public renderings of African Americans.238
Court reports did likewise. W hen Rosanna Tumey prosecuted Samuel 
Wallace, she was labeled a "dandizette." The Boston Morning Post described 
one of her witnesses as "a real grandee—of middling stature, but magnificent 
breadth of beam, and w ould come to a good round penny if bought by weight. 
She was a first-chop pattern for an empress of Morocco....the expanding skirt 
of her figured calico gown, diverging equi-distant from her sable and stable
237 Piersen,Black Yankees, 122-123; Reidy, " 'Negro Election Day' Crichton, Old Boston, "Big 
Dick, King of darkies"; Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness, 101; White, " 'It Was a Proud 
Day'," 17.
238 Freedom's Journal, March 14, 1828; Gary Nash, Forging Freedom, 253-259.
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ankles, in branching out in picturesque folds of light and shade, covered an 
immense area, like a field-marshal's marquee." The depiction concluded by 
comparing her to "the cloud-capped dom e o f the State House."239
In the nineteenth century, what w hite observers gained beyond sim ple 
entertainment was probably similar to w hat D avid Roediger argues white 
audiences of blackface minstrel shows gained: defining whiteness against the 
outlandish behavior of blacks. Eric Lott has also pointed out that an 
important aspect of the popular support for minstrel shows was the 
simultaneous attraction and repulsion m any w hites experienced. Black 
parades and celebrations likely stimulated similar reactions among gawking  
white Bostonians. A t the same time these celebrations were disappearing 
from Boston, minstrel shows took the stage. Robert C. Toll places the 
beginning of the touring minstrel shows around 1830, and they appeared in 
Boston at about the same time. Shortly after the demise of Negro Election 
Day on the Commons in 1831, a well-known nineteenth-century chronicler of 
Boston's police force m ade a note of "Jim Crow Rice jum ping  at Tremont 
Theatre" in 1833. During the 1840s, Ordway's Aeolian Vocalists, a "company 
of Negro Serenaders," performed regularly at Harmony Hall in Boston on  
Friday and Saturday evenings. Though the Aeolian Vocalists were described 
as "negro minstrels," the performances were a classic example of a blackface 
minstrel show, one so popular that it did not have to tour, enjoying a ten- 
year run in Boston. It soon out grew the capacity of the Province House, an 
old Boston mansion, prompting its conversion into a theater with the 
Aeolian Vocalists as the headline act in 1851, prompting a public "howl of 
righteous indignation... giving to the citizens farce in the place of tragedy."
239 Selections from the Court Reports, 135-137.
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An 1847 program listed a three-part performance of "Whites and Ethiopians": 
part one "As Citizens," traditionally performed without blackface, partly to 
ensure the audience knew the performers were actually white; part two "As 
Northern Darkies"; and part three "As Southern Darkies."240
The north-south division of the blackface performances is intriguing, 
especially since one of the songs, "A Darkie's life is always gay," sung in the 
northern part of the show, was no doubt a take off of "A Nigger's Life Is 
Always Gay." The latter song, a favorite on the minstrel circuit, focused on 
depicting slave life as a day of hard work. But minstrel shows typically 
depicted northern African Americans as "lazy, pretentious, frivolous, 
improvident, irresponsible, and immature — they very antithesis of what 
white men like to believe about themselves." The m ost common 
characterization was the black man as "completely self-centered dandies...who 
thought only of courting, flashy clothes, new dances, and their looks." 
Furthermore, on stage these pretentious upstarts who "tried to live like 
'gemmen'.... [were] jailed for violating laws they did not understand." The 
"Northern Darkies" part of the show  mocked and ridiculed northern African 
Americans, in part by communicating that a free black man or woman in the 
North was really no different than an enslaved black man or woman in the 
South. Several of the song titles in the northern part of the show had a 
southern flavor, including "Sugar Cane Green" and "I'm Off for Charleston." 
Ordway's Aeolian Vocalists was one example of a comprehensive and
240 Robert C. Toll, Blacking Up: The Minstrel Show in Nineteenth-Century America (New  
York: Oxford University Press, 1974), 27-32, 68; Eric Lott, Love and Theft: Blackface Minstrelsy 
and the American Working Class (N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 20-21; Savage, A 
Chronological History of the Boston Watch and Police, 73; Crichton, Old Boston, "Old Province 
House." The 'Jim Crow Rice' that Savage mentioned was undoubtedly Thomas D. Rice, who 
Toll credits with creating and popularizing 'jump Jim Crow'.
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efficient minstrel show constructing whiteness by denigrating blackness, 
whether it appeared in conditions of freedom or bondage.241
Minstrel shows and court reports both served to crystallize ideas about 
race that were still forming in antebellum America. African Americans had 
no control over whites' appropriation and uses of black culture in the 
minstrel shows. The tragic irony of the court reports was that the propensity 
of African Americans to use the courts, a propensity fostered in part by the 
courts' intentional accessibility and attempted impartiality, provided material 
for the court reporters. The Police Court remained accessible after the 
incorporation of Boston, and as the previous chapter indicated, even though  
adjudication in the lower courts may have been affected by racism, the 
differences in conviction rates were not great enough to drive black litigants 
away. When African Americans used the law  to gain control over 
circumstances important in their ow n lives, they often did so because they 
believed the law  could provided useful remedies. The court reports, 
however, transformed these attempts into public performances. W hen one 
black man nam ed White brought an action of trover to recover what he 
believed was his parrot from a white man, he judged the matter important 
enough to bring witnesses and a lawyer. White's case may have been solid. 
But under the hand of the court reporter, White became a dim-witted and 
petty fool pursuing a trivial matter. The report mocked White for bringing 
the case to court, and then appealing the Police Court's acquittal of the white  
defendant, w hen at m ost "the value of the parrot was estimated at f iv e  
dollars."242
241 Crichton, Old Boston, "Old Province House"; Toll, Blacking Up, 68-71; Roediger, The Wages 
of Whiteness, 120.
242 Selections from the Court Reports, 25; on racial formation in the north, see George M. 
Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and
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Other court reports closely mimicked the kind of depictions the 
minstrel shows perfected. In contrast to the story in  chapter one of the 
eighteenth-century black m an w hose extremely literal interpretation of the 
law enabled him to successfully dodge being persecuted for not carrying a 
lantern in the darkened streets, one court report m ocked a nineteenth- 
century black man's attempt to elude prosecution by his own 'cleverness/ 
Robert Gardner came to court charged by the city marshal for smoking a cigar 
in a fire-conscious tinderbox part of the city. Gardner, however, pointed out 
that he had actually been sm oking a pipe, and since he was specifically 
charged with smoking a cigar, he should be acquitted. The court promptly 
dispatched a messenger to get the city marshal to amend the charge. The 
newspaper described Gardner as greatly amused by the all the trouble the 
court was going through — for a moment, it appeared that this poor bootblack 
held the upper hand. But the court report quickly restored the proper 
hierarchy by turning Gardner into a smug fool, concentrating in particular on  
prominent physical racial markers. Gardner, "whose face shone like his 
customers' polished boots" had been "licking his purple lips with his poppy- 
red tongue" when he believed he had trumped the court, "didst look blue...as 
blue as a black-a-moor could look" when the court fined him five dollars, 
while his "twine eyeballs glistened, and shot their quick gleams crosswise 
over [his] unpretending nose" as he pressed "the broad heel" into the carpet — 
implying that Gardner had come to court barefoot. The court report painted a 
blackface performer for the newspaper's readers, m any of whom had no doubt 
been to a minstrel show.243
Destiny, 1817-1914: (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 97-129; on the role of minstrel show s in 
racial formation, see Lott, Love and Theft, and Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness.
243 Selections from the Court Reports, 92-93.
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Court reports in the newspapers rendered another kind of black public 
performance, even though it was not intended as a performance by black 
participants. Nevertheless, court reports transformed black litigants into 
spectacles for white readers. Ironically, the young African American 
chanteuse w ho actually did perform in the courtroom was one of few  black 
litigants to come close to being favorably portrayed by court reporters. In 
general, court reports depicted black litigants as pretentious, deceptive, 
violent, or bumbling, and at best naive. The church dispute, William 
Weevis, Richard King, the dispute between Rosanna Tum ey and Samuel 
Wallace were all reported in m ocking tones, sometimes subtle and 
sometimes obvious. Weevis' hair w as described as "mongrel," and his wife 
as having a complexion "one shade darker than a lump of coal in a cloudy 
day." Wallace was a "mulatto exquisite," and Turney's skin was "some 
shades darker—say the color of a dun cow." Thomas Gill, perhaps the dean of 
court reporters, made plain his racism w hen he criticized a jury for freeing a 
white wom an who, in his opinion, was an unsavory character. His evidence 
for her deviancy: "she is now the house-keeper of a colored man...[and] two 
years ago, she became the mother of a colored child." Another column he 
wrote described a formerly married wom an lured into prostitution, and "as if 
her cup of sham e was not already full enough, Watchee [a watchman] here 
added that he 'had been called to take her out of a colored house, in Page's 
court, where she was hugging a nigger round the neck, and that the nigger 
could only get rid of her by chucking her out of doors.'" For Gill, such 
familiarity w ith African Americans represented the depths of depravity.244
244 Ibid., 158, 181.
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But, like the minstrel shows, humor and ridicule, not indignation, was 
the usual method of making black litigants into public spectacles. One black 
man, who successfully prosecuted two sailors for assault in the Police Court, 
became a different kind of victim in the newspaper report. The paper 
reported that sailors "licked a nigger in Ann street. It might have been 
supposed that such an abolition taste carried its own penalty with it; but our 
courts will not allow  any such public indulgence of the licking propensity. 
Therefore they had to pay for their peculiar gratification." The black victim, 
w ho became the protagonist in court, was slapped down again as the public 
recounting made him an object of ridicule and identified the white assailants 
as objects of favorable humor.245
Southern immigrants, particularly "a genuine African, or one of 
African descent, who knows nothing of our courts of law" provided especially 
rich material. Characterized as polite but ignorant, they supposedly called the 
judge 'General' and the clerk 'Yer Honor.' One recently freed slave was cast as 
a "comical negro witness" who, when asked of his past, said he w as a slave in 
Virginia, but "I'se m y own nigger now! The free darkey shook his sides with 
laughter...many of the court officers and spectators involuntarily joined 
him ."246 What the court officials, spectators, and court official missed, 
however, was the import of this former slave's public declaration in court of 
his transformation from a person with no rights to a free legal being whose 
testimony, impermissible in the south, now  had legal weight.
Court reports and minstrel shows w ent hand-in-hand so far as the 
lampooning of aspects of black life that were of some importance to African
245 Ibid., 87.
246 Fenner, Raising the Veil, 238.
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Americans. They differed, however, in complexity. Minstrel shows engaged  
in a complex pattern of cultural borrowing whereby whites ridiculed African 
Americans by mirroring black culture — and som etim es mirrored blacks 
imitating whites. Court reports did not possess the degree of intricacies.
White reporters did not mirroring black behavior; they simply and blatantly 
mocked it. Eric Lott argues that minstrel show s functioned to repress 
genunine interest in black life by ridiculing black life, and while this dynamic 
may have been present in  the court reports, the primary function w as 
undermining any notions of black citizenship. The reaction of the court 
officials and spectators to the Virginian freedman's assertion that he was now  
his own man spoke to the uneasiness many w hites felt about free people of  
color asserting rights and citizenship. Because whites were not w illing to 
undermine the law by denying this man the right to testify, laughing at the 
"free darkey" served to assuage, but not erase, discomfort with African 
American participation in such an important social institution as the law .247
In the antebellum era, using the law to manage daily life sometim es 
became something of a two-edged sword. The black man attacked on Ann 
Street benefited from being able to punish his assailants, but he and other 
African Americans who came to court — which w as intended to be accessible - 
- attracted unwanted attention that contributed to the construction of 
whiteness through the continuing stereotyping of black men and women. 
Even informal manifestations of legal consciousness could attract unwanted  
attention. When a North End black man disappeared and his body surfaced 
two days later at Charlestown, a group of black m en apparently gathered 
together for an informal inquest. The newspaper report noted that this w as
247 Lott, Love and Theft, 6.
178
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
common practice. African Americans probably did this to determine if foul 
play had been involved, especially g iven  the North End's reputation for 
bawdy taverns and violence. The Boston Evening Transcript, a paper never 
sympathetic to free people of color, exploited the occasion to pillory the efforts 
of the black 'jury' in minstrel show  fashion, reporting that they "brought in a 
verdict som ething as follows: 'Dat going home one berry dark night, he fell 
from the wharf, and was killed; and the tide coming in strong, it floated him 
over to Charlestown, and he was drowned; dat the wedder being berry cold, 
he froze to deathV" Not content with depticting these black m en as such great 
fools that they believed the man could drown and then die again from 
hypothermia, the paper recorded the possibly apocryphal witticism of the 
coroner, "who was very waggish, nothwithstanding the solem nity of the 
occasion, [and] said, 'You may as w ell add died in the wool!"248
Nevertheless, in the face of public ridicule, African Americans 
continued to em ploy legal beliefs in a variety of ways, and, as the next chapter 
docum ents, African American leadership in particular became more vocal 
and active in  pushing their interpretation of how the law should benefit the 
black com m unity. Whereas most black Bostonians wielded a legal 
consciousness in more mundane or personal matters, as John Robinson had 
in dealing w ith  the obstruction of Bridge Court, other activist members of the 
black com m unity also employed legal beliefs in the public arena of ideas to 
argue for their rights as citizens. The antebellum articulation of an African 
American identity based on the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution w as in some ways a natural evolution stem ming from the long 
history of legal consciousness among free people of color, and served as a
248 Boston Evening Transcript, March 24, 1840; on the reputation of the North End, see Horton 
and Horton, Black Bostonians 34-35; Levesque, Black Boston, 377-378.
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counterpoint of sorts to the ways in which minstrel shows, court reports, and 
other cultural and social forces attempted to exclude African Americans from  
any claim to an American identity.
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Chapter Four
From "No Country!" to Our Country: African Americans Defining 
Themselves and the Boundaries of Rights and Citizenship, 1773-1855
During the early republic era, African Americans in Massachusetts and 
throughout the North faced an array of challenges. Minstrel shows cast blacks 
as exotic 'Others." Pressure on black laborers m ounted from job competition 
with lower class whites. Antagonistic and paternalistic whites in the 
colonization m ovem ent attempted to remove African Americans from the 
nation, and proslavery forces challenged the right of African Americans to be 
called citizens. Am id the strain of surviving in this environment, ordinary 
free people of color used the law as one tool to retain som e kind of control 
over daily life. At the same time, black leaders used a legal rights ideology to 
challenge exclusion and racial subordination.
Black writers and orators, who at best had expressed a hesitant and 
qualified connection to notions of American nationality in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, began to respond with determined 
definitions of themselves as American in the second decade of the nineteenth  
century. During the Revolutionary War and the first decades of the Early 
Republic, black leaders expressed virtually no allegiance to the ongoing 
construction of an American identity. But nineteenth-century black leaders 
articulated a vision of Africans as Americans, sparked particularly by the 
abolition of the slave trade in 1808 and the rise of the colonization m ovem ent 
in the next decade. As slaves and free blacks had done during the
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Revolutionary era, they validated this African American identity in part by 
appealing to a biblical view  of hum an rights and a natural rights philosophy. 
Increasingly, however, they buttressed black identity formation by making a 
rights discourse the central part of the argument for full inclusion in  the 
polity. Coinciding with the rise of black parades as a public and 
confrontational means of asserting African American citizenship, black 
leaders constructed an African American identity intimately connected to 
legal notions of citizenship and rights stemming from the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution, thereby finding another means of 
publicly reinforcing to both white and black Americans an African American 
identity.249
Massachusetts slaves sensed, in the 1770s, that the time was ripe to 
push for freedom. Cognizant of revolutionary rhetoric and hopeful that it 
m ight provide the impetus for freedom, slaves petitioned the legislature four 
times for freedom. Each petition, delivering a qualified challenge within the 
respectful and deferential language that characterized m ost eighteenth- 
century petitions, attacked slavery w ith different strategies. The first, 
submitted in January of 1773 by slaves in Boston, pointed out that slaves 
w ould make good subjects, "able as w ell as w illing to bear a Part in the Public 
Charges," and that despite the bitter circumstances m ost found themselves in,
249 On African Americans' use of biblical and natural rights ideologies in Revolutionary era 
discourse, see Gary Nash, Race and Revolution (Madison: M adison House Publishers, 1990), 57- 
87; and Thomas J. Davis, "Emancipation Rhetoric, Natural Rights, and Revolutionary N ew  
England: A Note on Four Black Petitions in Massachusetts, 1773-1777," New England Quarterly 
62 (March 1989), 248-263; on black parades and their connection to citizenship and identity, see 
Shane White, " 'It Was a Proud Day': African Americans, Festivals, and Parades in the North, 
1741-1834," fourtial of American History, 81 (June 1994), 13-50; and David Waldstreicher, In the 
M idst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 294-348.
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slaves had already demonstrated, their virtue and faith, and w ould continue 
to do so. In one of the more striking statements, the petitioners cried out 
"We have no Property! We have no wives! N o children! We have no City! 
No Country!"250
Slaves could and did own property; they could and did have w ives and 
children. The petitioners' plaintive cry w as intended to make clear the 
desperate circumstances engulfing m ost black m en and women. All slaves, 
regardless of whether or not they owned property or had family, shared a lack 
of control over their future. The loss of fam ily and property was always a 
genuine risk should an owner decide to sell a slave south or to the West 
Indies, a point the third petition, offered in 1774, made clear w hen the 
petitioners protested that "we are no longer man and wife than our masters 
or mistresses thinkes proper" and grieved the loss of children "taken from us 
by force and sent maney miles from us." The legal status of slaves as spouse 
or parent w as alw ays in peril. The rights of the master to sell his chattel 
trumped any rights of the slave. And for virtually all black men and women, 
slave or free, the poignant cry of "No Country!" rang especially true.251
In the m idst of the revolutionary change in America, the black peoples 
of M assachusetts found themselves in the m idst of revolutionary changes in 
identity. W hile white Americans, busy constructing and validating an 
American identity distinct from English nationalism, "imagined them selves 
as a separate people," free and enslaved blacks were, in many ways, already a 
separate people.252 There was no country w ith which they identified. M ost
250 The four petitions are reprinted A Documentary History of the Negro People in the United 
States, ed. Herbert Aptheker (New York: The Citadel Press, 1951), vol. 1, 5-10.
251 Ibid., 9.
252 T. H. Breen, "Ideology and Nationalism on the Eve o f the American Revolution: Revisions 
Once More in N eed o f Revising," Journal of American History 84 (June 1997), 34.
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slaves and free blacks, the majority of whom  were at this point second or 
third generation, had been in New England long enough that identification 
with African roots w as through a generalized and idealized Africa. The 
petitions of 1774 and 1777, likely made by the sam e authors, and probably 
relying on a combination of personal memories w ith  what they had heard 
from other African-born slaves, nostalgically recalled Africa as "a Populous 
Pleasant and plentiful country." Though Africa remained a powerful source 
of identification and culture, there was no specific reference to ethnic or 
geographic origin.
Through a blend of a biblical worldview and natural rights ideology, 
black petitioners did place slaves within a broader human family. In a 
Massachusetts newspaper, Cesar Sarter, a Newburyport freedman, called on 
white colonials to extend "the natural rights and privileges of freeborn men" 
to slaves. Since he and many other slaves had been bom  free in Africa, those 
rights applied to them as well. The implication of his argument was that 
even those who had been bom  into slavery should be able to expect "the same 
natural rights of mankind." Sarter stretched the revolutionary rhetoric across 
the Atlantic, in essence arguing that natural rights knew no geographic or 
color boundaries. H e drove home his point by describing the physical and 
emotional horrors of captivity, and asking if whites could truly claim to be 
living out "that excellent rule given by our Saviour, to do to others, as you 
would, that they should do to you .',253
The first of the four freedom petitions to the Massachusetts legislature 
used similar strategies by pointing to both public opinion and God who "hath
253 Cesar Sarter, "Essay on Slavery," reprinted in Nash, Race and Revolution, 167-170; on the 
natural rights ideology in the four freedom petitions, see Davis, "Emancipation Rhetoric, 
Natural Rights, and Revolutionary N ew  England."
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lately put it into the Hearts of Multitudes on  both Sides of the Water," along 
with "Men of great N ote and Influence," to push for black emancipation. The 
second petition, subm itted just four m onths later, demonstrated that the 
black petitioners were w ell aware of the arguments white colonials were 
making in response to Parliament's attempts to reassert its authority over the 
colonies in the early 1770s. The petitioners expected "great things from men 
who have made such a noble stand against the designs of their fellozv-men  to 
enslave them," namely, for them to take the sensible next step and "give us 
that ample relief which, as men, we have a natural right to." This petition 
also exhibited the lack of attachment these slaves had to the colony.
Expressing a desire to "leave the province, w hich w e determine to do as soon  
as we can," the petitioners planned a return to Africa once they had earned 
sufficient funds. The follow ing year, the third petition claimed "a naturel 
right" to freedom "within the bowels of a free and Christian country," and 
issued a biblical rebuke, asking "How can the master be said to Beare my 
Borden when he Beares me dow n whith the Have chanes [heavy chains] of 
slavery an operson." Furthermore, this petition shrewdly pointed out the 
lack of any law ever declaring their children slaves —children who had been  
bom  in a free country — but custom had locked their children into slavery just 
as surely as if there had been such a law. One of the two petitions offered in 
1777 borrowed from the Declaration of Independence, arguing that slaves had 
"in Common with all other m en a Natural and Unaliable Right" to the 
freedom God had "Bestowed equally on all menkind."254
254 A Documentary History of the Negro People, 6-10; the biblical basis of the third petition's 
rebuke was Galatians 6:2, "Bear one another's burdens, and thus fulfill the law o f Christ." 
George H. Moore refers to a second petition by Massachusetts slaves, including Prince Hall, in 
March of 1777; see Moore, Notes on the History o f Slavery in Massachusetts (New York: D. 
Appleton & Co., 1865), 180-181. On public opinion as a factor in abolition in Massachusetts, see 
T.H. Breen, "Making History: The Force of Public Opinion and the Last Years of Slavery in
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Toward the close of the Revolutionary War, after hundreds of black 
m en had fought against the British to earn freedom, black petitioners still 
exhibited little indication of identifying them selves w ith the new nation. In 
1780, seven Massachusetts black men submitted a request to be relieved from  
tax assessments, arguing that decades of "Long Bondag and hard slavery" had  
left them in an abject state of having no inheritances or foundation upon  
which to build an estate. Only a few recently freed blacks had managed to 
gain even a "small Pittance of Estate... through m uch hard Labour & 
Industry," and their situation remained so precarious that taxes threatened 
even this shadow of security. Reminding the legislators of their own  
revolutionary rhetoric, the petitioners pointed ou t that no blacks, even those 
with small estates, shared the "Privilage of freem en of the State having no 
vote or Influence in the election of those that Tax us," and this despite the 
record of many black m en w ho "cheerfully Entered the field of Battle in the 
defence of the Common Cause...against a similar Exertion of Power (in 
Regard to Taxation)." But the overriding theme o f this petition is not a call to 
an active part in the polity, and there is no claim to the right to vote based on  
any notion of citizenship or identification w ith the state or country. The 
thrust of the petition w as sim ply to be excused from  taxation, and the 
argument was predicated upon the notion that the legislators and white 
society in general ow ed  something to those of "African extract." In contrast to 
later arguments made by African Americans, the petitioners did not argue for 
suffrage because free people of color were citizens and had a certain body of 
rights; in fact, they did not argue for suffrage at all. The debt arose out of two
Revolutionary M assachusetts" in Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal Identity in 
Early America, ed. Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, and Fredrika J. Teute (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 67-95.
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causes: first, because whites has historically denied slaves economic 
opportunity and therefore caused the present debilitating state of many freed 
people; and second, because many slaves and free blacks had aided whites in 
their cause against unfair taxation.255
There continued to be an absence of identification w ith  the new  
country in most of the writings and speeches by free people of color for the 
next two decades. In June of 1789, the members of Boston's African Lodge of 
Masons listened to the black minister John Marrant deliver a sermon on the 
biblical roots of masonry. Marrant, bom  in New  York in  1755, was converted 
after hearing George W hitefield and worked as an itinerant evangelist until 
an early death at age thirty-five. His experiences were truly transatlantic: bom  
in N ew  York, he spent his youth in Georgia and Charlestown before being 
captured by and living for several months with Cherokees, and then pressed 
into service by the British N avy for seven years. After a salvation experience, 
he began preaching in England before being called to preach in the Americas. 
Marrant eventually went to N ova Scotia and N ew  England, preaching to 
whites, blacks, and Indians.256
His message to the M asonic Lodge set out to prove "the andency of 
Masonry," and fixed his black listeners within a biblical and Masonic lineage 
that stretched back to creation. He more than tweaked the Old Testament in 
order to read it as a record of the Mason's divine lineage and ordination.
255 A Documentary History of the Negro People, 14-16.
256 Sidney Kaplan and Emma N ogrady Kaplan, The Black Presence in the Era of the American 
Revolution (Amherst: University o f Massachusetts Press, 1989), 111-116; John Marrant, A 
Narrative of the Lord's Wonderful Dealings With John Marrant, A Black, reprinted in Early 
Negro Writing, 1760-1837, ed. Dorothy Porter (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 427-447; John 
Marrant, "You Stand on the Level w ith the Greatest Kings on Earth," in Lift Every Voice: 
African American Oratory, 1787-1900, ed. Philip S. Foner and Robert James Branham 
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 27-38.
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When "great Architect" gave N oah a plan for the ark, Noah's sons become 
"like deputy and tw o grand wardens." In Marrant's sagacious rendering, 
Masonry becomes a historical redemptive force: not only was God's grace and 
salvation m anifested through Noah, but God gifted the Masons with skill 
and knowledge in order to use them to settle and rebuild the world after the 
post-flood disaster at the tower of Babel. God also inspired Solom on with 
wisdom "as grand master and undertaker" in order for the temple to be built, 
which points to "one grand end and design of Masonry," rebuilding "the 
temple that Adam destroyed in Paradise."257
Placing his audience of black Masons and African Americans in general 
within this grand context that transcended time and space, Marrant attempted 
to create a transatlantic and trans-historical bond. He connected African 
Americans with Africans of the biblical (and therefore also Masonic) past and 
present, and, w ithout mentioning whites or race, excoriated those who  
"despise those they would make, if they could, a species below them, and as 
not make of the sam e clay w ith themselves." Marrant reminded his audience 
that God had Africans to "stand on the level not only with them, but with the 
greatest kings on the earth." Marrant then placed his listeners within a 
network of obligation to all people, especially the weak and needy. They were 
"under a double obligation to the brethren of the craft of all nations on the 
face of the earth, for there is no party spirit in Masonry." A blend of 
Christianity, Masonry, and Africa provided the touchstones of identity and 
the bonds of community in Marrant's exhortations.258
257 Marrant, Lift Every Voice, 32-35.
258 Ibid., 36.
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The lodge's founder, Prince Hall, offered the same kind of formula in  
his addresses during annual St. John's festivals. He held up Tertullian, 
Cyprian, Augustine, and Fulgentius — all leaders of the early church, som e  
rendered as Africans — as examples for emulation. In 1797 Hall rem inded the 
lodge brethren "we shall call ourselves a charter'd lodge of just and law ful 
Masons... give the right hand of affection and fellowship to whom  it justly  
belongs; let their colour and complexion be w hat it will, let their nation be 
what it may, for they are your brethren, and it is your indispensable duty so to 
do; let them as Masons deny this, and w e & the world know what to think of 
them be they ever so grand."259 A few years previous, Hall had taken a 
leading role in subm itting a petition to the Massachusetts legislature 
requesting the state's financial aid for an emigration plan of black Bostonians 
to settle on the w est coast of Africa. The petition, signed by seventy-three 
black men, described Africa as a land "for w hich the God of nature has formed 
us; and where w e shall live among our equals, and... may have a prospect of 
usefulness to our brethren there."260
Themes of identification with Africa and the near-absence of 
identification w ith America persisted. In the 1808 pamphlet The Sons o f  
Africa, an unnamed m em ber of Boston's African Society repeatedly 
juxtaposed Africa in opposition to other nations, thereby creating and 
reinforcing a quasi-nationalism for African Americans. Asserting God's 
creation of all the nations from one blood, the writer noted that "All the 
Africans, at the present day, seem to be the butt of the nations over w hich
259 Prince Hall, "Pray God G ive Us the Strength to Bear Up Under All Our Troubles" in Lift 
Every Voice, 52.
260 Kaplan and Kaplan, Hie Black Presence in the Era o f the American Revolution, 207-208.
The 1787 petition is reprinted here.
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men choose to tyrannise, enslave, and oppress." He later prodded his readers 
to come up w ith any legitim ate rationale for slavery by asking if "Africans 
ought to be subject to the British or Americans, because they are of a dark 
complexion?" If Turkey, Spain, or Portugal enslaved Americans, America 
would rightfully consider those nations as "divested of all humanity," and 
therefore "what m ust be said of America... which treats the African in ways 
similar?" Furthermore, in  all references to anything American, the writer 
uses not the first but the third person possessive pronoun: 'their" and not 
"our/261
The writer of The Sons o f Africa participated in a process described by 
historians as the creation of a creolized 'Africa' in the m inds of African 
Americans that absorbed original ethnic and cultural distinctives. David 
Waldstreicher notes that during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, the "redefinition of Africa as one nation can be seen in virtually all 
contemporary black writing."262 This redefinition w ould  have been more 
pronounced in the North, where public orations and print culture provided 
forums for black northerners to articulate and disseminate view s on slavery, 
freedom, and the inequities of northern society. When they did so, black 
speakers and writers alm ost invariably invoked a representation of Africa in 
which regions encom passed the entire continent. The freedom petitioners
261 The Sons of Africans: An Essay on Freedom. With Observations on the Origin of Slavery. By 
a Member of the African Society in Boston (Boston: 1808), 20-21, 10. Located at the Boston 
Athenaeum; also reprinted in Early Negro Writing, 13-27.
262 See Waldstreicher, In the M idst of Perpetual Fetes, 320-322; W. Jeffrey Bolster, Black Jacks: 
African American Seamen in the Age of Sail (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 38- 
39; Sterling Stuckey, Slave Culture: Nationalist Theory and the Foundations of Black America 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). For an argument that does not refute but does 
complicate Stuckey's view, see Michael A. Gomez, Exchanging Our Country Marks: The 
Transformation of African Identities in the Colonial and Antebellum South (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1998).
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represented Africa through remembrance of the central or western African 
homeland as "a Populous Pleasant and plentiful country"; John Marrant and 
Prince Hall em ployed the names of early church fathers, som e of whom  were 
supposedly from northern Africa, in representing African heritage; the Sons 
of Africa author and others rooted the image of Africa as a nation from days 
following the biblical flood w hen God sent Noah's sons out to populate the 
earth.
Other black writers and orators in the North sounded similar themes 
and used similar terms in identifying black men and w om en in  America as 
part of a generalized African nation. Jupiter Hammon, the N ew  York slave 
whose 1786 serm on mixing rebuke w ith encouragement m ust have blistered 
the ears of som e of his black audience, sanctioned his message by identifying 
himself as a man of "your own nation and colour." Hammon did not mean 
the United States. The next year, one of the first formal black societies left out 
any connection to the United States and labeled themselves "the Free 
Africans and their descendants of the city of Philadelphia and the State of 
Pennsylvania or elsewhere." In 1794, writing from Philadelphia, Richard 
Allen and Absalom Jones typified a strategy of using Pharaoh's Egypt as a type 
for the United States: Egypt had been "destroyed by the protector and avenger 
of slaves," and so, too, could America be destroyed. And, as the white and 
black readers of this pamphlet knew, out of the destruction of Egypt a new  
nation was formed. Though Allen and Jones and other black writers usually 
did not go so far as explicitly stating that God would form a new  African 
nation out of a destroyed America, there remained an implication of 
impending judgm ent for an unrepentant America and redem ption for the 
oppressed African. Someday, they wrote, "princes shall come forth from 
Egypt." In a 1799 Absalom Jones led 73 black Philadelphians in a petition to
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the President and Congress protesting slavery and the slave trade, and linked 
themselves to those of "like colour and national descent." Again, the 'nation' 
here was Africa.263
Concurrently, the public discourse of African Americans betrayed little 
identification w ith  the American nation during the first two decades of the 
new republic. Because Africa was a som ewhat mythologized homeland and 
even those who d id  desire to return to Africa found it difficult to do so, the 
cry of "No country!" continued to ring true for m ost free people of color. 
There were, how ever, som e hints of articulating connection to an American 
polity. James O liver Horton has noted that m ost free people of color 
"identified with the words and the spirit of the Declaration of Independence 
and the Revolution." But this did not equate to defining them selves as 
Americans or as a permanent part of the America polity. The laws of the 
African Society d id  identify its members in 1796 as "We, the African 
Members...true and faithful citizens of the Commonwealth in w hich we 
live," and in a qualified but complimentary attitude towards that 
commonwealth in  The Sons of Africa, the author noted that "Massachusetts 
is greatly to be valued for the peculiar advantage which w e enjoy, as it 
respects our freedom." The town of Salem in particular received praise "for 
their particular benevolence to the Africans." But for the m ost part the 
author credited any benefits of living in Massachusetts to God, not to the 
benevolence of w hites, and even here he continued to juxtapose him self and
263 Jupiter Hammon, "An Address to the Negroes in the State of New York," reprinted in Afro- 
American Religious History: A Documentary Witness, ed. Milton C. Semett (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1985), 34; Aptheker, A Documentary History of the Negro People, 18; Richard 
Allen and Absalom Jones, A Narrative of the Proceedings of the Black People, during the Late 
Awful Calamity in Philadelphia, in the Year 1793: and a Refutation of some Censures Thrown 
upon Them in some late Publications (Philadelphia, 1794), 24, 28; 1799 petition reprinted in 
Early Negro Writing, 330.
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other free people of color against other Americans by calling blacks "Africans, 
who inhabit Massachusetts."264
Even though the rhetoric of black leaders in the late eighteenth 
century, and the first years of the nineteenth century, did occasionally define 
Africans as citizens and members of Americans society, the contrast w ith  later 
years remains striking: in 1829 even the militant David Walker called 
America his "native land" and emphatically stated "This country is as much 
ours as it is the whites." In 1832 Maria W. Stewart, labeled by one biographer 
as the first American wom an to deliver political lectures before m ixed-gender 
audiences, spoke before her Boston audience concerning the "American free 
people of color," w hile calling herself "a true bom  American." Later that 
same year, Peter O sbom e painted a picture for his N ew  Haven church of 
African Americans holding "the Declaration of Independence in one hand  
and the H oly Bible in the other," fighting for "our native country," thereby 
fulfilling the mantle laid upon them by their forefathers who had "fought, 
bled and died to achieve the independence of the United States."265
Surveying just the first year of The Liberator reveals pointed 
sentiments by African Americans claiming an American identity. A  
Philadelphia m an w ho wrote to The Liberator asserted his identity as an 
American by pointing to his ancestors w ho had lived in Pennsylvania since
264 James Oliver Horton, Free People of Color: Inside the African American Community 
(Washington: Sm ithsonian Institution Press, 1993), 150; The Sons of Africa, 14, 17; Laws of the 
African Society, instituted at Boston, 1796. Located at the Boston Athenaeum; also reprinted in 
Early Negro W riting.
265 David Walker, David Walker's Appeal, in Four Articles; Together with a Preamble, to the 
Coloured Citizens o f the World, but in particular, and very expressly, to those of the United 
States of America (Boston:1829), 55. I am using the 1995 edition of the Hill and Wang 1965 
reprint, with an introduction by Sean Wilentz; Maria W. Stewart: America's First Black 
Woman Political Writer, Marilyn Richardson, ed., (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1987), 46. This volum e reprints several of Stewart's speeches and essays; Peter Osbome, "It Is 
Time for Us to be Up and Doing," Lift Every Voice, 124-125.
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William Penn came to the colonies, and that during his time spent fighting  
in the American Revolution he had endured "the times that tried men's 
souls." "Am I now  to be told," he argued, "that Africa is my country, by some 
of those whose birth-place is unknown.?" Another "Colored Philadelphian" 
wrote "we are told Africa is our native country; consequently the climate w ill 
be more congenial to our health. We readily deny the assertion. How can a 
man be bom  in two countries at the same time? Is not the position 
superficial to suppose that American bom  citizens are Africans?" Brooklyn 
African Americans referred to the "United States of America, our native soil" 
and called them selves "countrymen  and fellow -citizens"  who demanded "an 
equal share of protection from our federal government."266
Another colum nist in The Liberator, w ho did not identify him or 
herself as white or black, suggested in July of 1831 that the term 'negro' was 
considered insulting and offensive by free people of color, and that 'colored' 
"recalls to mind the offensive distinction of color" due to prejudice in the 
United States. Nor w as 'African' suitable, for it was "no more correct than 
that of Englishman w ou ld  be to a native bom  citizen of the United States." 
This writer offered a "change of appellation," w ith the term Afric-American 
being most appropriate, since it "asserts...that the colored citizen is as truly a 
citizen of the United States of America as the white." William Lloyd 
Garrison, the paper's publisher, asked his 'colored' readers for a response, and 
the only direct response, from a letter writer w ho did not identify themselves 
by color, rejected the 'change of appellation.' More telling is the indirect 
response of African Americans: in the next issue, Robert Wood and John T. 
Hilton, two prom inent and activist members o f Boston's black community,
266 The Liberator, January 22, March 12, July 2, 1831.
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published a brief notice for a m eeting of free people of color about establishing 
a black vocational college, and used the term 'Afric-American.' Another 
notice of a meeting in Hartford used the same term, and in the fall a group of 
female black Bostonians organized a literary association under the name "The 
Afric-American Female Intelligence Society Of Boston." In December, Peter 
Osbome exhorted his N ew  H aven church to "take courage, ye Afric- 
Americans! "267
Though the individual and corporate identification with the United 
States became an integral part of northern African American identity, black 
Bostonians and other free people of color in the north by no means 
repudiated their African identity. The transatlantic perception combining 
African heritage and American themes came through clearly in a testimonial 
dinner in 1828, when David Walker and several other members of black 
Boston's leadership cadre welcom ed the West African Prince Abduhl 
Rahaman, an escaped slave w ho had come to Boston in an effort to raise 
support for gaining his family's freedom from southern slavery. The 
language of some of the toasts were infused with American notions of 
"Independence and Liberty" and hopes that "the Spirit of Liberty which 
pervades our Northern Hemisphere" would spread south and worldwide. 
Cato Freeman praised Haiti for being "founded on the basis of true republican 
principles," and Coffin Pitts anticipated the day when "Christianity, industry, 
prudence, and economy" w ould "characterize every descendant of Africa." 
James G. Barbadoes expressed a similar desire that the "sons and daughters of 
Africa soon become a civilized and christian-like people." Within these
267 The Liberator, July 16, July 23, August 13,1831. The lone writer who rejected the suggested 
term appeared in the September 24,1831 issue. Marilyn Richardson notes the 1831 founding of 
Boston's female literary association in Maria W. Stezuart, 127; O sbom e in Lift Every Voice, 125.
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testimonials, g iven for an African prince they called brother, Boston's black 
leaders affirmed both their African heritage by labeling themselves 'sons and 
daughters' of Africa, and their American character by defining their hopes for 
the future w ith ideological terms that had become central to American 
identity — republicanism, 'Independence,' 'Equality,' and 'Liberty.'268
Another less obvious example of the evolution from a virtual absence 
of affiliation to a strong identification w ith America was the formal 
expression of various societies' charters. In Boston, the African Society 
specified the law s of the society 1796 with the labels "1st," "2cd," and so on.
But twenty-two years later, the African Humane Society, formed in 1818 with  
Sdpio Dalton — who had been the vice-president of the African Society — as a 
founding member, wrote their by-laws and regulations in a manner distinctly 
different from the 1796 Society. The constitutions that black organizations 
wrote began to take on a decidedly constitutional character. The Humane 
Society gave each member a small book containing its Act of Incorporation 
and Constitution, which began with a paragraph stating "the constitution of 
the United States declares, 'ALL MEN ARE BORN FREE AND EQUAL;' and 
our laws protect all classes of men in all their rights." The Society's preamble 
also borrowed from the Constitutions's preamble in describing its purpose as 
"promoting the general welfare of all the people of colour." A list of twenty-
268 Freedom's Journal, October 24, 1828; The Black Abolitionist Papers, ed. C. Peter Ripley 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991 ), vol. 3, 78. According to the editorial 
note here, the Prince, w hose full name was Abd al-Rahman Ibrahima, had originally 
embarked on this tour to promote the American Colonization Society in return for their help in 
raising funds to free the rest of family. Freedom's Journal and other African Americans, 
however, typically portrayed the Prince's cause as the emancipation of his family (which was 
undoubtedly the Prince's sole motivation), and neglected to mention the colonization aspect to 
his northern tour.
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four 'Articles' follow ed the preamble. In 1831, the Afric-American Female 
Intelligence Society of Boston spelled out their by-laws in a similar manner.269
The same pattern played out in other northern cities. The 1787 society 
that preceded the form ing of the Bethel church in  Philadelphia laid out their 
financial rules in a sim ple unlabeled paragraph. In 1797 St. Thomas, an 
African Episcopal church in Philadelphia, d ivided their constitution into two 
sections, "Regulations" and "Rules." And in 1808 the Rhode Island African 
Benevolent Society o f Newport, who included them selves as part of "the 
African Nations," separated their constitution into several sections, labeled as 
the rules "Of Members," "Of the School," and so forth.270 But the 1810 
constitution for N ew  York's African Marine Fund had a preamble followed by 
laws labeled "Article I," and likewise to the final "Article Vffl." The 
Augustine Education Society of Pennsylvania listed its twelve Articles after a 
preamble in 1818.271
Other organizations throughout the north in the 1820s and 1830s 
followed suit. Philadelphia's Brotherly Union Society, formed in 1823, 
identified them selves in  a similar fashion to the 1787 society that Richard 
Allen and Absalom Jones founded. But while the 1787 group had identified  
their members as "the Free Africans and their descendants of the d ty  of 
Philadelphia and the State of Pennsylvania or elsewhere," forty years later the 
Brotherly Union Society identified themselves as "coloured men, of the
269 The Lazos of the African Society; The By-Laws, rules and regulations, of the African 
Humane Society, (Boston: 1820). The by-laws of the African Humane Society are in a small 
booklet, which had belonged to Cato Freeman, and is contained in the Robert Morris Box at the 
Boston Athenaeum; George A. Levesque, Black Boston: African American Life and Culture in 
Urban America, 1750-1860 (N ew  York: Garland Publishing, 1994), 324-325.
270 A Documentary History of the Negro People, 17-19; Early Negro Writing, 28-32 and 84-86.
271 Early Negro Writing, 42, 92-93.
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county of Philadelphia, citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and 
of the United States of America."272
Black Bostonians, then, were a part of this trend of northern black 
identity formation. Leaders of the community actively solicited copies of 
speeches delivered in other northern cities, and several, including David  
Walker, were the Boston agents for Freedom's Journal.773 James Oliver 
Horton has described northern black northerners' penchant for retaining 
institutional names that spoke clearly of their African heritage while  
incorporating American political structures and language, thus blending "the 
two aspects of their heritage to their advantage."274 But Horton places the 
1796 African Society in Boston and the later groups in New York and 
Philadelphia w ithin the same category of blended heritage, while the 
argument here parses the language these groups choose to employ in writing 
their charters more closely. While free people of color in the late eighteenth  
century and the first years of the nineteenth did, as Horton argues, begin to 
incorporate aspects of American principles into their organizational activities 
and identity, the change over time was and is significant. Claims of an 
American heritage or identity by free people of color in the late eighteenth 
and the first years of the nineteenth century were muted or non-existent, but
272 Ibid., 51. Constitutions with similar wording, also in this volume: the New York African 
Clarkson Association, 1825; the American Society of Free Persons of Colour, 1831; the Pittsburgh 
African Education Society,1832; and the Phoenix Society o f New  York, 1833. Also see the 
constitution of the Colored Anti-Slavery Society of Newark, 1834, in The Black Abolitionist 
Papers, 132-134.
273 For instance, a public meeting of black Bostonians in the African School published a few  
resolves, one of which recommended that free people of color get copies of speeches Garrison 
delivered to the black communities in Philadelphia and N ew  York. See The Liberator, July 16, 
1831.
274 Horton, Free People of Color, 154.
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as the nineteenth century progressed, northern African Americans 
consciously and stridently laid claim  to the American aspects of their heritage.
Signal events helped catalyze this evolution of identification, especially 
the abolition of the slave trade in 1808 and the rise of the colonization  
m ovem ent in the next decade. W hen Congress made the importation of 
slaves illegal as of January 1, 1808, African Americans finally had some cause 
to celebrate the nation for som ething specifically related to an essential part of 
their identity and heritage — what seem ed to be the ostensible end of the rape 
of their homeland. While the end o f  the slave trade furthered a connection 
to the United States, it did not cause an articulation of American identity to 
spring forth ex nihilo; but the abolition did provide opportunity for its 
expression. Public gatherings keynoted by orators extolling the virtues and 
sins of the United States marked w hat was essentially African Americans' 
first national day of celebration. The orations "fought American racial 
injustice while inventing and establishing black nationality." On a first 
anniversary celebration in N ew  York, William Hamilton's praise of the act 
"which for its justice and humanity, outstrips any that have ever been passed  
by that honorable body" of the United States Congress typified expressions of 
gratitude that many African Americans could now direct towards the 
national government.275
Other speeches made a more explicit identification w ith America: at 
the opening of his speech in 1808, Peter Williams defined him self and his 
audience as "Africans, and the descendants of Africans," and near the end  
told his audience that "As an American, I glory in informing you that 
Columbia boasts the first men w ho distinguished themselves eminently in
275 Early Negro Writing, 35; Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes, 344.
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the vindication of our rights." A year later, Joseph Sidney boasted that "in 
these United States, reason, truth, humanity, and freedom have finally 
obtained a glorious triumph over sophistry, falsehood, cruelty, and tyranny." 
Sidney, w ho had no trouble using the first possessive pronoun 'our' when  
referring to America, went further by not only identifying with America, but 
by also placing him self and African Americans in general as guardians of 
America's future through support of the Federalists and opposing "our 
enemies," the Jeffersonians, and "the great idol of democracy," Thomas 
Jefferson. On the sixth anniversary of the abolition of the slave trade, Russell 
Parrott pointed to the War of 1812 as proof that "we are faithful to our 
country... where her Hull, her Decatur, and her Bainbridge, fought and 
conquered, the black bore his part, stimulated by pure love of coimtry."
Parrott likely had in mind black sailors w ho fought in the war, many of 
whom made clear declarations of w hat W. Jeffery Bolster called "a radical 
African American patriotism" w hen impressed by the Royal Navy. Several 
months later, black N ew  Yorkers w ou ld  express their allegiance and stake 
their claim as a part of the nation by turning out unbidden to build  
fortifications in case of a British attack.275
Whereas the abolition of the slave trade provided a positive release for 
aligning w ith  the American polity, the rise of the colonization m ovem ent 
proved to be a negative force triggering a vigorous assertion of American 
identity am ong African Americans throughout the antebellum era.277 While
275 Early Negro Writing, 350, 357, 361, 390; Bolster, Black Jacks, 117; Shane White, Somezuhat 
More Independent: The End of Slavery in Nezo York City, 1770-1810 (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1991), 150.
277 On African Americans involved in furthering emigration to Africa, see Lamont D. Thomas, 
Rise to Be a People: A Biography of Paul Cuffe (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986); and 
Floyd J. Miller, The Search for a Black Nationality: Black Emigration atid Colonization 1787- 
1863 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975).
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African Americans continued without reservation to avow an African 
heritage, the characterization of Africa changed. The orations on the abolition 
of the slave trade had typically recalled an almost idyllic Africa, but in one of 
the first responses against colonization, James Forten and Russell Parrott 
referred in 1817 to "the burning plains of Guinea." Subsequent emigrants 
confirmed those opinions; in 1833 Joseph Dailey wrote back to Philadelphia, 
describing high death rates among emigrants to Liberia, crowded hospitals, 
poor agriculture, and corrupt politics. M eanwhile, Dailey referred to America 
as his "native coimtry." This varies from Floyd J. Miller's argument in The 
Search for Black Nationality, in which he asserts that colonization efforts 
provoked some free blacks to seek a n ew  nationality in Africa. That may 
indeed characterize the minority that supported emigration. But the vast 
majority of free blacks in Massachusetts and throughout the North did not 
have to search for their nationality. Colonization aroused a fierce black 
patriotism.278
Much of the impetus for sending African Americans to colonies on the 
west coast of Africa did come from black m en such as Paul Cuffe, but the twin 
forces of general disapproval from ordinary black folks and the seizure of the 
movement7s leadership by prominent w hites prompted most black leaders to 
repudiate all colonization schemes. A  significant part of the reason for 
rejecting emigration was a refusal to abandon enslaved black m en and 
women and leave their hopes for emancipation solely to the few  principled 
whites who m ight carry on the fight for abolition. James Forten told Paul 
Cuffe in 1817 that the three thousand black Philadelphians who rejected 
emigration suspected "the slaveholders w ants to get rid of them so as to make
278 Early Negro Writing, 267; The Black Abolitionist Papers, 74-77.
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their property more secure." But another powerful motivation crystallized in 
the unequivocal claim that African Americans already had a country, a 
country to which they belonged, and, perhaps more significantly, a coimtry 
that belonged to them. W hen David Walker and the other black writers in  
the Liberator called America their own country, they did so in the context of 
rejecting colonization.279
David Walker provided one of the more complex articulations of the 
American aspects of free black identity. When rebuking whites for prejudice, 
hypocrisy, willful ignorance, and all their other sins against enslaved and free 
blacks, Walker persistently refers to "the Americans." Using the term in a 
denigrating and bitterly sarcastic manner generated a distance between  
African Americans and 'the Americans' who perpetuated oppression. He 
does likewise with the term "the Christians." But just as Walker saw him self 
as a true Christian, so he saw himself and those who supported the cause of 
oppressed black men and women, whether they be black or white, as true 
Americans. Walker drew distinctions between blacks and their "white 
friends" who sought to refute claims of black inferiority that men like 
Thomas Jefferson had made; those charges needed to also be "refuted by 
blacks themselves." Furthermore, when black m en and women gained  
enough education and opportunity to make full use of all their talents,
Walker speculated that a freed people might w ant "perhaps more, to govern  
ourselves." This articulation of a potential black nationalism did not, 
however, exclude or even hint at a different nationality than an American 
one: for all his warnings of judgment and castigating the nation as a whole, 
Walker did not disassociate himself from America but claimed it as his
279 Wilson Jeremiah Moses, Classical Black Nationalism: From the American Revolution to 
Marcus Garvey (New York: N ew  York University Press, 1996), 51.
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nation. Walker included a letter Richard Allen wrote to Freedom's Journal to 
make his point: "This land which w e have watered w ith our tears and our 
blood, is now  our mother cou n tryZ'280
African Americans' assertion of America as a homeland and their 
claim to a stake in America rested on two intertwined arguments. First, the 
labor of generations of slaves entitled them to far more than they presently 
had. Second, they had a right to stay in their hom eland and realize a better 
future— a right conferred by God, by nature, and by legal rights based upon the 
Constitution. Relying on the law  and the Constitution may have signaled an 
acceptance of how legitimate change would be accomplished while  
weakening more radical challenges. Radical challenges, however, such as a 
separatist m ovem ent to establish a black nation w ithin the nation, were not 
realistic — the threat to white hegemony would have been to great to be 
ignored. Moreover, if their words are to be believed, m ost African Americans 
saw themselves as part of the coimtry and not as a separate nation that 
happened to exist within a nation. But African Americans' vision and 
interpretation of the law in general and the Constitution in particular did  
provide black leaders an effective tool for challenging w hite hegemony by 
calling for white Americans to live up to the prom ises of the revolutionary 
heritage they so loudly proclaimed.
The appropriation of the the form and language of the Declaration of 
Independence and of the Constitution by black leadership in the nineteenth 
century was a double-edged rhetorical thrust at racial oppression in
280 David Walker's Appeal, 58. For a thorough treatment of the David Walker's Appeal, see 
Peter P. Hinks, To Awaken M y Afflicted. Brethren: David Walker and the Problem of 
Antebellum Slave Resistance (University Park, Pennsylvania: University o f Pennsylvania 
Press, 1997).
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antebellum. America. It provided a cutting reminder of prom ises denied, but 
it was also a powerful expression of African Americans' belief — or at least 
their hope — in  the power and prom ise o f that document and the ideology  
they believed it represented.
Black leaders' constitutional argum ent for freedom used  the 
Constitution against itself. Free people o f color used sections of the 
Constitution to negate any right to ow n  slaves that other sections permitted 
and constructed arguments based on the principles of individual liberty and 
equality that they read in the Constitution. One tactic privileged the Preamble 
over the body of the Constitution. V incent Harding describes the concern of 
the Afro-American freedom m ovem ent for over two centuries as trying "to 
liberate the essential spirit of the docum ent, espedally as that spirit is 
represented in the Preamble." In 1851, William Howard Day, arguing for an 
interpretation of the Constitution as an anti-slavery document, quoted from 
the Preamble to point out that "if it says it was framed to 'establish justice,' it, 
of course, is opposed to injustice." H e supported his position further by using 
a portion of the Fifth Amendment: "if it says plainly 'no person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, w ithout due process of law,' — I suppose it 
means it, and I shall avail m yself of the benefit of it." African Americans, 
taking notice of the contradiction betw een the Preamble and the some of the 
more conservative parts of the main bod y  of the document, used  that 
contradiction as "a wedge by which they might engage the struggle for the 
transformation of the Constitution, the nation — and them selves."281
281 Vincent Harding, "Wrestling Toward the Dawn: The Afro-American Freedom Movement 
and the Changing Constitution, " Journal of American History, 74 (December, 1987), 720-721; 
Proceedings of the Black State Conventions, 1840-1865, ed. Philip S. Foner and George E. 
Walker (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979), vol 1, 262.
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Black writers and orators interpreted and applied the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution, just as John and Sophia Robinson 
interpreted and applied the law in their attempt to ensure Elizabeth's 
freedom. When they used the Constitution to push for equality and 
opportunity, they commonly referred to the Constitution in general and not 
specific terms. A t times the two documents became fused in black rhetoric, as 
in the case of a black Philadelphian who argued that racist practices were "in 
direct opposition to the Constitution; which positively declares, that all men 
are bom equal, and endow ed with certain inalienable rights — among which 
are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." Their arguments, at times 
constructed not from specific articles or amendments but from principles they 
believed the docum ent intended to profess, mirrored the broader process of 
Americans who "commonly spoke in constitutional terms w hen debating 
political and social issues."282 For free black leaders this habit began early on; 
in a 1797 petition to Congress, four southern black m en who had fled to the 
north referred to "the unconstitutional bondage" they had left behind, and 
called the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 a "direct violation of the declared 
fundamental principles of the Constitution" w ithout delineating exactly what 
those principles were or what they were based upon. By the m iddle of the 
nineteenth century, African Americans had grown quite astute in dissecting 
and applying specific parts of the Constitution to negate other sections that 
could be interpreted as proslavery. Nearly sixty years after the 1797 petition, 
John Mercer Langston invoked the "true spirit of the American Declaration 
of Independence [and] the Constitution" in his condemnation of the 1850
282 The Liberator, February 12, 1831; Donald G. Nieman, Promises to Keep: African Americans 
and the Constitutional Order, 1776 to the Present, (N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 
31.
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Fugitive Slave Law before the Convention of Colored Citizens of Ohio. But 
Langston went further and spelled out the specific legal grounds for the 
unconstitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Law, in particular "the 
constitutional guarantee of the writ of Habeas Corpus."283
Interpreting the Constitution as an anti-slavery document put m any  
black leaders at ideological odds with white and black abolitionists like 
Garrison and Martin Delany, who saw the Constitution as an endorsement of 
slavery and was thus a "covenant from hell." In 1844, Massachusetts black  
and white attendees of the N ew  England Anti-Slavery Convention heard 
Charles Lenox Remond criticize the Constitution as an instrument of 
oppression upon "the few whom it entirely overlooks, or sees but to trample 
upon." Remond and other Garrisonian abolitionists who advocated 
disunion view ed the Constitution as a tool for protecting slavery and as the 
glue binding the free states to the slave states. Their view s were shared by 
other African Americans in the North. At an Ohio convention, H. Ford 
Douglass offered a fervent dentmdation of the pro-Constitutional positions 
held by William Howard Day and John Mercer Langston, dedaring that "the 
gentleman may wrap the stars and stripes of his country around him forty  
times, if possible, and with the Dedaration of Independence in one hand, and 
the Constitution of our common country in the other, may seat him self 
under the shadow of the frowning monument of Bunker Hill." Langston 
replied that he hoped black men would do anything "under the Constitution, 
that will aid in effecting our liberties." But Douglass' repudiation 
demonstrates how  deeply other African Americans had drunk of the 
Constitutional well; he castigated the thorough identification of other black
283 Proceedings of the Black State Conventions, vol. 1, 260; A Documentary History of the Negro 
Peoples, 43.
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leaders with American ideals and heritage. That identification fostered a 
support for the Constitution and lead the convention to side with Day and  
Langston. They voted  dow n Douglass' motion to reject the Constitution 
twenty-eight to tw o.284
The anti-constitutional position of Remond and successors of his 
stance like Henry M cNeal Turner has been characterized by Mary Frances 
Berry as a negative v iew  of the Constitution. Berry labels this group as the 
"blacks-do-not-need-whites-to-succeed" school. On the other hand, 
antebellum black abolitionists who supported the Constitution em phasized  
"Americans' ow n stated ideals" and often "attempted to identify with those 
ideals and to insist that the nation should live up  to them." Berry notes that 
the civil rights m ovem ent, beginning in the nineteenth century and 
continuing into the twentieth, "was a distinctly American movement, 
making appeals to traditional American culture and values." And though, as 
Peter Hinks points out, Americans, black or white, did not have a m onopoly  
on many of these values, the context within which black leaders worked and 
the culture and value system  they drew from w as nonetheless an American 
one. When Charles Lenox Remond, speaking before the Massachusetts 
legislature in 1842, called Boston the "Athens of America," he invoked a 
republican vision of independence and equality that Americans, black and 
white, intuitively understood.285
284 Charles Lenox Remond, Black Abolitionist Papers, vol. 3, 442; Proceedings of the Black 
State Conventions, vol. 1, 262-263; Donald G. Nieman, "The Language of Liberation: African 
Americans and Equalitarian Constitutionalism, 1830-1950" in The Constitution, Law, and 
American Life: Critical Aspects of the Nineteenth-Century Experience, ed. Donald G. Niem an, 
(Athens: The University o f Georgia Press, 1992), 67-90, 68.
285 Mary Frances Berry, "Vindicating Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Road to a Color-Blind 
Society" Journal of Negro History 81 (1996), 141; Hinks, To Awaken M y Afflicted Brethren, 110; 
see also William M. W iecek, The Sources of Anti-Slavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760- 
1848 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977); Charles Lenox Remond, Black Abolitionist 
Papers, vol. 3, 368.
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African Americans saw  themselves as part of that republican vision of 
America. They called upon federal and state governments to uphold the 
spirit of the Constitution's preamble to "promote the general welfare, and 
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our prosperity." According to 
their interpretation of the Constitution, the government ought to serve their 
interests since they were a part of the sovereign people. In this African 
Americans differed little from other Americans; Americans had undergone a 
significant change in their v iew  of the law and government in the nineteenth  
century, when the traditional v iew  of rights was largely displaced. The 
traditional view  had "emphasized what government could not do," but 
within that older view, w hich had been essential w hen an absolute 
sovereign had the potential to take away established practices, "rights defined  
as restraint made less sense where the people themselves were sovereign.... if 
the people owned the government, it should serve their interests. So argued 
those energetic Yankees w ho called on law to help them modernize the 
economy, conquer the continent, and exploit its riches." While historian R. 
Kent Newmyer and the Yankees he describes were concerned w ith the 
expansive change in how the law  could help free up capital, free people of 
color argued for a government and law that served their particular interests.
In Boston, Hosea Easton drove this point home. African Americans, he said, 
"being constitutionally Americans," were depending on "American 
government, and American manners...a witholding of the enjoyment of any 
American principle from an American man... is in effect taking aw ay his 
means of subsistence; and consequently, taking away his life." Black 
Bostonians, like other free people of color, sought freedom from racial 
oppression and equal civil rights, upon which the ability to take complete
208
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advantage o f the nation's burgeoning economic opportunities was 
predicated.286
Though Walker and other black leaders unflinchingly concentrated 
attention on the sins and inconsistencies of the United States, they shared the 
moral, economic, and political aspirations of most Americans. Many of those 
aspirations had never been anathema to an African worldview, thus 
facilitating African Americans' support. As early as the 1790s, Venture Smith 
placed frugality, financial stability, and material success as high priorities.
The African-born Smith, who grew up in Connecticut, expressed a value 
system that m any w est African cultures as w ell as N ew  England Yankees 
would have appreciated. Black entrepeneurs in Boston like David Walker 
and John Hilton, who joined in toasts for prudence and economy at the 
testimonial dinner for Prince Abduhl Rahaman, no doubt shared those 
sentim ents.287
The point here is not to enter into the well-worn argument of 
assimilation versus resistance. Certain aspects of African and American 
value system s could and did co-exist; nevertheless, nineteenth-century 
African Americans expressed these ideals and aspirations in an American 
context and in American terms. Walker persisted in defining himself as
286 R. Kent Newmyer, "Harvard Law School, N ew  England Culture, and the Antebellum  
Origins o f American Jurisprudence," Journal of American History 74 (December 1987), 814-835, 
821; also see James Willard Hurst, 77ie Lazo and Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth- 
Century United States (Madison: The University o f Wisconsin Press, 1956); and Morton J. 
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Laxo 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1977); H osea Easton, A Treatise on the Intellectual Character, and Civil and Political 
Condition of the Colored People of the United States (Boston: 1837), 49. Reprinted in Negro 
Protest Pamphlets: A Compendium (New York: A m o Press and the N ew  York Times, 1969).
287 See Robert E. Desrochers, Jr., " 'Not Fade Away': The Narrative of Venture Smith, an 
African American in the Early Republic," Journal of American History 84 Qune 1997), 40-66; and 
A Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Venture A Native of Africa, But Resident above 
Sixty Years in the United States of America (New London, 1798), reprinted in Five Black Lives 
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1971).
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African or of the "African race," and though opposed to emigration, held up 
Haiti for emulation. Like many other African Americans, Walker expressed 
corporate ties reaching beyond the shores of the United States. But these 
transatlantic connections did not subsum e an American identity or Walker's 
commitment to a system of morals and values accepted by many white and 
black Americans. Walker "wanted only the opportunity for his people to 
participate fully without obstacle in the expanding free labor economy and the 
culture of Protestant moral improvement." Celebrating the end of slavery in  
New York on July 4th of 1827, the escaped slave and entrepreneur Austin 
Steward exhorted African Americans to inscribe "in letters of gold upon every 
door-post — 'industry, prudence, economy.'" Samuel Cornish, co-founder of 
the nation's first black newspaper, articulated a Jeffersonian-like vision of 
getting black families to establish a literal stake in this country when he ran 
an ad for the sale of a 2000-acre parcel of land along the Delaware river in 
New York. Cornish's stated aim was to sell it at half its value (by his 
estimate), so as to avoid the appearance o f attempting to make a "good 
bargain". For buyers, he was looking for som e of his "brethren who are 
capitalists", w ho he hoped would in turn sell it for a small profit to black 
families who w ould  build an African American farming community.
Walker, Steward, Cornish, and others connected pursuit of financial stability 
to sound morals, education, hard work, and prudence — qualities inseparable 
from the overall goal of full equality.288 But black leaders knew virtue, 
frugality, and education would be insufficient to elevate ordinary free people
288 Hinks, To Awaken M y Afflicted Brethren, 108-110; Austin Steward, "Termination of 
Slavery," in Lift Every Voice, 108; Cornish's ads in Freedom's Journal, July 13, 1827 and several 
other issues.
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of color to full social, economic, and political equality without procuring all 
the rights that God, nature, and the Constitution imparted.
Most African Americans, far from proposing radical change or 
abandoning the country, were intimately tied to m any of the goals articulated 
by American society. As Kimberle Crenshaw has pointed out for the 
twentieth-century civil rights movement, antebellum black activists called on  
social and political institutions to act in the w ay they were supposed to act 
according to the Constitution so that African Americans, like white 
Americans, could realize those goals. Black N ew  Yorkers gathering in 1840 
for a state convention aimed at gaining black suffrage, professed themselves 
"to be American and republican," and described the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution as em bodying "the primary ideas of 
American republicanism." In their estimation, the framers of those 
documents had intended federal and state governm ents to live up to those 
ideals by granting and protecting the "republican birth-right" every 
individual, black or white.289
When African Americans spoke of a /birth-right/ they infused it w ith  
multiple meanings. Birth-right connoted a stake in America because their 
forefathers fought for freedom, and im plied that an inheritance was due 
them because slaves had worked the land. But it also grounded a rights 
discourse by focusing on constitutionally defined citizenship by right of birth. 
During the plenary address at the 1840 N ew  York convention, published in  
the Colored American and likely read by Boston's black leaders, Austin 
Stewart neatly summarized this by asserting "We do regard the right of our
289 Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law," Harvard Law Reviezv 101 (May, 1988) 1331-1387, 
1367; Proceedings of the Black State Conventions, v. 1, 21.
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birthdom, our service in  behalf of the country, contributing to its importance, 
an developing its resources" as sufficient reason to consider African 
Americans as worthy of suffrage. But Stewart predicated the right to vote on  
"still higher ground" — the "certain peculiar rights" belonging to any being 
"found endowed with the light of reason." Human nature provided the 
foundation and legitim ation for rights, and the Declaration of Independence 
and the Constitution represented the ultimate expression of "natural and 
indestructible principles o f man," designed to secure "the purest liberty God 
ever conferred" upon a people.290
Making rights rhetoric the heart of the argument for full equality and 
opportunity was "a way of saying that a society... ought to live up to its 
deepest commitments." The complicating factor becomes the limits of using  
rights to achieve the desired goals. Crenshaw notes that "demands for change 
that do not reflect the institutional logic — that is, demands that do not engage 
and subsequently reinforce the dominant ideology — will probably be 
ineffective." Because African Americans shared many of the same goals and 
ideals of other Americans, m ost had little desire to effect radical change that 
threatened established institutions (other than slavery) or to challenge an 
ideology that placed the Constitution and the law as a primary agent of 
change.291
290 Proceedings of the Black State Conventions, v. 1, 21-22.
291 Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment," 1365-66; Proceedings of the Black State 
Conventions, vol. 1, 21-22. For arguments similar to Crenshaw's regarding the how the need to 
legitimate law and legal ideology works both to maintain hegem ony while also exposing it to 
challenges, see Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law" in Albion's Fatal 
Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (N ew  York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 3- 
64; E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (N ew  York, Pantheon 
Books, 1975).
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Kimberle Crenshaw's insights on the possibilities and limitations of 
twentieth-century civil rights protesters' use of rights rhetoric are directly 
relevant in discussing antebellum black activists. Like their twentieth- 
century successors, black leaders made claims framed in language of rights 
rhetoric that Americans of all ranks would recognize. Their claims "reflected 
American society's institutional logic: legal rights ideology." By talking about 
legal rights, African Americans in both centuries "exposed a series of 
contradictions," primarily the contradiction between Constitutional promises 
of citizenship and its attendant privileges, and the systematic denial of those 
privileges through the practice of racial subordination. But African 
Americans, beginning in  the antebellum era, advanced arguments "as if 
American citizenship were real, and demanded to exercise the 'rights' that 
citizenship entailed." This represented an attempt "to restructure reality to 
reflect American mythology," a mythology that presumed rights undergirded 
all social and political equality, and would also open the doors to economic 
opportunity. Obtaining full exercise of rights would supposedly make reality 
fit the mythology.292
Crenshaw points out that it is the need of the dominant order "to 
maintain legitimacy that presents powerless groups with the opportunity to 
wrest concessions" from that order, but at the same time, "it is the very 
accomplishment of legitimacy that forecloses greater possibilities. In sum, the 
potential for change is both created and limited by legitimation." Though the 
kind of change Crenshaw speaks of is primarily legal and political in nature, 
her conclusions can be applied to the construction of identity. The 
'institutional logic' of legal rights ideology shaped African American identity.
292 Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment," 1367-1368.
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By using the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution to legitimate 
their citizenship, African Americans m ade that legal rights ideology an 
integral part of their identity.293
Incorporating a legal rights ideology into a free black identity may have 
foreclosed more radical alternatives, such as a 'classical' black nationalism. 
Wilson Jeremiah M oses defines classical black nationalism as "the effort of 
African Americans to create a sovereign nation-state and formulate an 
ideological basis for a concept of a national culture." African Americans who  
supported establishing a black republic through colonization, whether in west 
Africa, Canada, or other parts of the Americas, were classical black 
nationalists. The m ovem ent to create a black republic revived shortly before 
the Civil War, but never received broad support in black communities. 
Undercutting classical black nationalism in the antebellum era w as an 
African American identity that articulated a vigorous claim to American 
citizenship based on  the birth-right and the Constitution. Part of living out 
that identity was fighting for full citizenship rights.294
Writing from Boston in 1855, W illiam C. Nell called African 
Americans the "Patriots of the Second Revolution." His label neatly 
encapsulated African Americans' revolutionary heritage, as w ell as their 
continuing duty to pursue change. Though the committment to seeing the 
fulfillment of the prom ises of the Constitution weakened the potential of a 
classical black nationalism, fighting for individual and group rights did create 
potential for change. In the decades before the Civil War, African Americans 
and their white allies managed to strike dow n racist practices in
293 Ibid.
294 Moses, Classical Black Nationalism, 2.
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Massachusetts that segregated rail cars and schools. Fighting for rights also 
became part of what it m eant to be African American.295
While free blacks' use of a legal rights ideology may have lim ited some 
potential for change, the historical context is crucial: few  alternatives existed  
for African Americans. The law and rights rhetoric offered one of the few  
possibilities for change, as w ell as some ability to exercise control over their 
own lives in an era of steadily deteriorating conditions. For most free people  
of color, emigration or the establishment of a classical black nationalism was 
beyond their means, and, more importantly, beyond their desire. Though the 
choices free people of color had available to them  were limited, the elem ents 
of choice and agency remain important. African Americans were not 
ignorant of other possibilities such as emigration. But they consciously  
conceived of them selves as Americans with a legitim ate claim to citizenship, 
and they asserted that claim during a time w hen proslavery forces and white  
colonization advocates challenged their right to even be considered citizens. 
Protecting that basic right w as crucial in the daily lives of many ordinary 
African Americans. Black Bostonians who exercised their rights to use the 
law  and the courts in a variety of ways would have suffered had they, unlike 
their enslaved southern brethren, not experienced the guarantees of the fifth 
through the eighth am endments or been unable to execute writs of habaes 
corpus. A letter written by a black man to The Liberator pointed to the 
consequence of slaves being unprotected by the Constitution:
295 William C. Nell, The Colored Patriots of the American Revolution, with Sketches of 
several Distinguished Colored Persons: to which is added a Brief Survey of the Condition and 
Prospects of Colored Americans (Boston: 1855), 380. Reprinted by A m o Press and the N ew  York 
Times, 1968; on the efforts to end segregation in Boston, see Levesque, Black Boston, 149-152 and 
165-229; James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, Black Bostonians: Family Life and 
Community Struggle in the Antebellum North (New York: H olm es and Meier, 1979), 67-76; Jim 
Crow in Boston: The Origin o f the Separate but Equal Doctrine, ed. Leonard W. Levy and  
Douglas L. Jones (N ew  York: Da Capo Press, 1974.)
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"they are not permitted to testify against a white criminal, in courts of justice; 
consequently, their persons, property, and lives are at the mercy of every 
white ruffian, thief or murderer. The question, therefore, should be quickly 
settled, whether free colored persons, bom  or naturalized in this country, are 
not American citizens, and justly entitled to all the rights, privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the several states; and whether the Constitution of 
the United States makes or authorises any invidious distinction with regard 
to the color or condition of free inhabitants."
A  few  years ealier, a report in Freedom's Journal pointed out injustice in the 
W est Indies when a slave managed to publicly identify his assailant shortly 
before he died from the injuries. The slave's testimony, however, had no 
legal standing and his murderer was allowed to go free. The living testimony 
of the denial of citizenship and legal recognition to m illions of slaves 
remained continually before free people of color.296
African Americans had m oved from bleakly acute cries of "No 
Country!" to compellingly resolute declarations of "Our Country!" Vincent 
Harding notes that one of the "essential questions" — perhaps the first and 
foremost one for African Americans in the early republic — raised by the 
black freedom movement was focused on the Preamble: "Who were 'we the 
People of the United States'?" Like Maria Stewart, who proclaimed herself a 
"true bom  American," m ost black wom en and men had no doubt in their 
ow n minds that they did indeed belong in that equation. The challenge was
296 The Liberator, January 15, 1831; Freedom's Journal, September 14, 1827. On the antebellum  
environment for African Americans, see Gary Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation of 
Philadelphia's Black Community, 1720-1840 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); 
Leonard P. Curry, Free Blacks in Urban America (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1981); 
Shane White, " 'We Dwell in Safety and Pursue Our Honest Callings': Free Blacks in N ew  
York City, 1783-1810," Journal of American History 75 (September, 1988), 445.
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making American social and legal institutions recognize what African 
Americans already knew.297
But because rights and fighting for rights became an integral part of 
African American identity, many black m en and women could brook no 
lassitude on the part of other free blacks regarding any issue concerning 
rights. Those w ho appeared to shirk from the battle became the target of 
withering criticism, as they were perceived as betraying what it m eant to be 
African American. During the 1840s and 1850s, black Bostonians became 
embroiled in an acrimonious dispute over whether to support the closure of 
Boston's black schools in favor of integration with the white schools. 
Differing interpretations developed over w hat it meant to be black and a 
citizen, and to som e extent, the depth of feeling that surfaced in this debate 
resulted directly from the incorporation of legal rights ideology w ithin free 
black identity.
297 Harding, "Wrestling Toward the Dawn," 721.
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Chapter Five
The Elusive Boundaries of Blackness: Identity Formation in Antebellum Boston
African Americans'’ vigorous defence of free people of color as American 
citizens in the first half of the nineteenth century left little room for calm  
disagreement within the black community w hen issues concerning the exercise 
of rights were at hand. The stakes were high. In the estimation of many black 
leaders, the present welfare and future prosperity of all blacks hinged on their 
ability to protect the rights they had and to gain the rights they did not have. 
Though there was broad agreement among black Bostonians that rights were  
crucial, there was not always consensus on the best strategies for accomplishing 
those goals. Dissent felt like betrayal.
During the 1840s the question of whether or not to push Boston's School 
Committee to allow African American students into the public schools and close 
the tax-supported black schools brought dissension to the forefront. Black leaders 
pushed hard for integration, because they believed their childrens' education  
would improve, and because it w as their responsibility as African Americans to 
fight for equal rights. They ran headlong into a divisive dispute. The conflict 
exposed deep personal sentiments that reflected different perspectives am ong  
black Bostonians concerning the future of the black community, what citizenship  
in the republic meant, and h ow  citizenship ought to be wielded in protecting and 
promoting black interests. The dispute, at times quite acrimonious, 
demonstrated the extent to w hich black identity w as contested ground in the 
urban antebellum north. A n image of black identity emerged with a relatively  
stable core but uncertain boundaries. Stability existed in a consensus that African
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Americans were citizens and had little desire to be defined as anything other 
than American. But the rancorous discussion between the two groups blurred 
the boundaries of identity. The integrationists attempted to include 
commitment to making equal rights a reality as quickly as possible as a part of 
what it meant to be black and American. The separatist-minded blacks argued 
that there were limits to what could be realistically expected, and that part of 
being a citizen was the right to withdraw from interacting with whites on certain 
issues and pursue their ow n course. For them, being African American was 
sim ply that: an African heritage, and an American citizenship. What each black 
wom an or man made of their citizenship did not detract from what it meant to 
be black and American.
Using a tactic at times still em ployed in public disputes today, the 
integrationists, who counted m ost of Boston's prominent African Americans 
among their ranks, attempted to define their black opponents as standing outside 
the black community. M eanwhile, their opponents, w ho composed a substantial 
minority of the black community that wanted to maintain the city's black 
schools, exercised a broader conception of black identity. They appealed to 
common experience and to the prejudice every African American faced. Led by 
Thomas Paul Smith, John H. Roberts, and Alexander Taylor, the minority 
faction prompted the more prom inent integrationists to amplify the importance 
of the school issue by placing it in  the context of a national struggle for rights and 
the future of black Americans. In the m inds of the integrationists, racial barriers 
had to fall before African Americans could truly be full citizens. Reaching that 
goal demanded that black citizens challenge those barriers at every turn; to do 
less constituted a betrayal of present and future generations. The minority 
'separatist' faction, however, conceived of citizenship as the right to be left alone 
by whites and thus avoid an implacable racism w hen possible.
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During the night of September 17th, 1849, Boston's sixth ward witnessed a 
palpable expression of how deep feelings ran. Earlier in the day the Smith 
School, Boston's public school maintained exclusively for blacks, had reopened 
after being briefly closed by the integrationist faction.298 John T. Hilton, William 
C. Nell and other integrationist leaders called a meeting of colored citizens at the 
Belknap Street church, adjacent to the Smith School, in order to "deepen  
impressions already made, and animate [the audience] with increased zeal and 
determination" in their opposition to the opening of the school.299 The 
integrationists had already decided that until the School Committee relented and 
permitted integrated public schools, they w ould close the Smith School and 
establish a fund to pay private school tuition. A substantial number of black 
Bostonians, however, not only wanted the school to remain open for the time 
being, but opposed integrated schools altogether. Many of them attended the 
meeting that night.
The integrationists' leaders took center stage, seeking to harden the 
resolve of their supporters. They characterized Thomas Paul Smith, a leader of 
those opposed to integration, as "unworthy [of] their confidence or respect". 
Smith's supporters refused to stay quiet. The abolitionist newspaper, The 
Liberator, reported that some separatists "stationed themselves near the door, 
and, observing the cue of their leaders, persevered in disturbing the meeting by 
hisses, and various other demonstrations." The integrationists attempted to
298 The Smith School gained its name from a white benefactor, Abel Smith, who established a 
trust as part of his w ill that provided for continued maintenance of the school. The school for 
black children had originally been established in 1808 by the black community because they 
feared not only lack of equal treatment for their children in the white schools, but also outright 
hostility. This w as used during the 1840s and 50s by the white pro-segregation majority of the 
school committee as a rationale for continuing the maintenance of an exclusively black school.
299 The Liberator, Sept. 21, 1849. The Boston Daily Journal of Sept. 18, 1849 also reported that 
the meeting was held by the integrationist faction who wanted the Smith School shut down.
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retain control of the m eeting by instructing the audience to ignore the 
disturbances, but, having already been spurred on by John T. Hilton, William  
Cooper Nell, Henry W eeden, and other leaders of the integration faction, 
emotions were running high. Individual members of the audience "attempted 
to secure order"— likely a euphemism for attempting to shove the opposition out 
of the building— "and on the rioters retreating from the building, were 
immediately assailed by a volley of stones and other missiles, which [were] 
preserved as trophies of the prowess of those w ho resort to such methods".300
The Boston Daily Journal reported that after the meeting had begun, the 
integrationists "were disturbed by the appearance of a number of the friends of 
[the school]. A  large crowd collected, and m issiles of all sorts were used, breaking 
the windows of the church and bruising several persons." The melee came to an 
end only when the police arrived on the scene.301 By this account, which seems 
consistent with the pattern of other meetings both before and after the riot, the 
black integrationist leadership intended the meeting to be for colored citizens 
who shared their viewpoint. A  year earlier, Thomas Paul Smith had protested  
this very tactic. A m eeting supposedly called to discuss pushing Boston's school 
committee for a new  teacher, better physical conditions, and a cessation o f the 
"strange management, the very peculiar system s and policy" of the School's 
white principal turned into a call for the abolition of the school. Smith 
complained that a committee, with B. F. Roberts as chairman, was appointed, 
"was out from three to five minutes, when Mr. Roberts re-entered, and the
300 Ibid.
301 See the Boston Daily Journal, Boston Traveler, and the Boston Evening Transcript o f  
September 18,1849. None o f the papers I surveyed gave prominent notice of the incident, giving  
it on average about ten lines of one column. The Evening Transcript cast it in a derogatory light 
by commenting that the question at the end of the riot became "Who throw'd de last brickbat?"
221
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
audience w as thunderstruck by the announcement of a string of resolutions he 
had som etim e previously written, referring exclusively to the abolition of the 
school. N o debate had been intended. Nevertheless, a "protracted and warm  
discussion" ensued, after which the resolutions passed by a small majority. In 
the published account, Roberts described the support for the resolution as 
unanimous. Both men had an agenda, making it difficult to ascertain the truth; 
but the black integrationists d id  on other occasions publicly claim unaminity on  
the issue among black Bostonians w hen that clearly was not the case.302
The threat of violence had apparently been running throughout the day; 
some black youths sprung an impromptu boycott intended to keep black children 
from entering the school on the m orning it opened for the fall term. Police 
broke up the boycott, but the number of students registering fell from the 
previous spring's 67 to only 23, though the number of students eventually 
increased to somewhere between 40 and 53 later in the fall and to 60 the 
follow ing winter.303 Though no violence followed, the w ounds did not fade
303 Attendance figures contained in the loose papers of the Boston School Committee records, 
folders #1, 6, and 26 of the box covering 1849 (BPL); and from the Postscript o f the Report of a 
Special Committee of the Grammar School Board, Presented August 29, 1849, on the Petition of 
Sundry Colored Persons, Praying for the Abolition of the Smith School: xuith an Appendix 
(Boston: J.H. Eastburn, City Printer, 1849), 70. This report, along with the minority report of 
those that favored granting the petition to desegregate the schools, and the majority and 
minority reports from 1846, are reprinted in fim Crow in Boston: The Origin of the Separate but 
Equal Doctrine, edited by Leonard W. Levy and Douglas L. Jones (N ew  York: Da Capo Press, 
1974). The Committee's report, which added the postscript after the school opened, depicted 
the youths' boycott negatively. A more positive account is given in John Daniels, In Freedom's 
Birthplace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1914), 448. James O. Horton notes that the 
boycotters "were well organized, holding frequent meetings which provided mutual support and 
communication." Though the integrationists do appear to have been organized as far as support 
and communication, their political and legal strategy did not have the same degree of 
organization; the boycott, for instance, apparently was not planned out well ahead of time. 
Horton's source for his conclusion is Carleton Mabee's Black Freedom (N ew  York: The 
MacMillan Company, 1970). Mabee, aside from not consistently documenting his sources, does 
not give a picture of a well-thought out strategy of boycotts combined w ith legal action. I 
suspect the integrationists' strategy, like that o f their twentieth-century successors, was 
frequently borne out of the needs o f the moment. For Horton's description, see James Oliver 
Horton and Lois E. Horton, Black Bostonians: Family Life and Community Struggle in the 
Antebellum North (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979), 74. For an examination of how
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away; a year later black Bostonians opposed to keeping an all-black public school 
open declared that "our motto has been, n ow  is, and ever shall be, 'No  
fellowship with the exclusive school system, its teachers or supporters."304
This riotous confrontation and sim m ering resentment between the 
colored citizens o f Boston sounds a discordant note in the relatively harmonious 
symphony of like-mindedness generally attributed to antebellum African 
Americans. Historians of black America such as Herbert Gutman, Eugene 
Genovese, Gary Nash, and Sterling Stuckey, have described a common 
experience and culture and a similarity in w orldview  for both slave and free 
blacks that indicates the existence of a shared identity, forged in the crucible of 
slavery and hardening racial ideologies. Stuckey has shown, for example, that 
the experience of slavery and racism was central in eradicating cultural, social, 
religious, and political differences among Airican slaves and that it stimulated a 
resilient African American culture. Gary N ash describes how steadily 
intensifying racism further solidified Philadelphia's black community in the 
early republic era. While these seminal works have been invaluable 
contributions in revealing a complex process, there is a danger in assum ing that 
this is the end of the story for African American identity formation and m issing  
the significance o f difference and division am ong African Americans.305
twentieth-century strategies against discrimination evolved, see Stephen L. Wasby, Race 
Relations Litigation in an Age of Complexity, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
1995) and Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925- 
1950, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987).
304 The Liberator, A ugust 15, 1850.
305 Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1972); Herbert Gutman, The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom 1750-1925 (N ew  
York: Vintage Books, 1976); Gary B. Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation of Philadelphia's 
Black Community, 1720-1840 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Sterling Stuckey, 
Slave Culture: Nationalist Theory and the Foundations of Black America (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987).
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Their arguments and others fit into Kenneth Kusmer's delineation of 
three primary forces shaping the black urban experience. Along with the 
"fundamentally nonradal" structural forces such as economic trends, Kusmer 
explains the other two as external forces— the attitude and behavior of whites 
towards blacks— and internal forces, or "how black urban dwellers have 
responded to their circumstances, either through the retention or creation of 
cultural values or institutions.... [and] the attitude of blacks towards whites, and 
the behavior that results from such attitudes."306
Yet attitudes and behaviors of free blacks to each other is a central but 
often overlooked fourth element that shaped black identity as well as black urban 
experience. Other historians have taken note of the Smith School dispute; none, 
however, have examined what it says about the ongoing construction of black 
identity and the attendant tensions.307 While the responses of black urbanites to  
each other did not act independently of the three forces Kusmer describes, this 
neglected fourth element frequently manifested itself more overtly than any 
other in the daily experience of black urbanites. Structural forces were often not 
immediately tangible and the retention of cultural values and institutions could  
at times also be a long-term and abstract process; black urbanites' responses 
towards one another were typically concrete and immediate, especially when 
priorities clashed.
Emancipation presented black Americans with different sets of choices. 
Several important studies have demonstrated that free blacks in the early
306 Kenneth Kusmer, "The Black Urban Experience in American History," in The State of Afro- 
American History: Past, Present, and Future, ed. Darlene Clark Hine (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1986), 105.
307 For a thorough narrative see George A. Levesque, Black Boston: African American Life and 
Culture in Urban America, 1750-1860 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1994), 165-230; for 
another brief commentary see Horton and Horton, Black Bostonians (N ew  York: Holmes and 
Meier, 1979), 70-76.
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republic responded to freedom by establishing communities, creating 
institutions, and maintaining a significant degree of cultural continuity.308 But 
little has been done to explore either h ow  freedom complicated matters of 
identity, or the potential conflicts freedom presented as black m en and wom en  
attempted to gain control of their immediate and future circumstances in 
different ways, formed different priorities, and pursued a variety o f goals. With 
freedom came the incorporation of a legal rights ideology, but not necessarily a 
consensus on strategies to protect and pursue equal rights.
In Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., 
explores, am ong other things, the abiding complexity of w hat it m eans to be black 
in modem America. Pulling no punches, Gates lays bare some markedly 
different and at times oppositional perspectives held by a handful of notable 
black men. W restling with black identity is nothing new for African Americans; 
the men Gates profiles are dealing with issues that have deep historical roots.309 
Nor has the process of defining particular individual African Americans as 
anathema to black identity ceased— Clarence Thomas, for instance, is frequently 
censured in public discourse because of his political and social stances, thereby 
placing him outside the black community. Precious little, however, in the 
historiography of pre-Civil War America has bothered with the long struggle of 
black Americans for self-definition. The dispute over maintaining a separate
308 See Gary Nash, Forging Freedom: The Formation of Philadelphia's Black Community, 
1720-1840, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Robert J. Cottrell, Afro-Yankees: 
Providence's Black Community in the Antebellum Era (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982); 
Horton and Horton, Black Bostonians ; James O. Horton, Free People of Color: Inside the African 
American Community (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1993); Shane White, 
Somewhat More Independent: The End of Slavery in New York City, 1770-1810 (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1991) and " 'It Was a Proud Day': African Americans, Festivals, 
and Parades in the North, 1741 - 1834," Journal of American History 81 (June 1984), 13-50.
309 Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man (New York: Random  
House, 1997).
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school for black children in Boston was not the first manifestation. But because 
it dealt with two issues close to the heart of an oppressed people — the immediate 
well-being of their children and how  to shape a better future — it crystallized 
some aspects of the diversity in thinking am ong black Bostonians concerning 
what it meant to be black in America.
Ironically, the Smith school had been originally established because in 
1787 the state government, and in 1798 tow n of Boston, had turned dow n  
requests from its black citizens for a separate school. On both occasions, the 
explanation given w as a lack of funds. After several years of conducting a school 
based in private residences, a school for black children was held on the bottom  
floor of the town's first black church in 1806. Abiel Smith was one of several 
white philanthropists w ho funded the school, and in 1815 the town began  
contributing $200 towards the annual budget, with the children's parents paying 
the other $300. Two other small primary schools for black children were also 
eventually opened by the city, though these schools did not become a focal point 
during the fight over integration. At the time, the city's financial support was no 
doubt a boon and taken as a hopeful sign by black parents. Ultimately, however, 
it gave the city grounds to exercise its authority in matters such as hiring and 
firing of teachers and headmasters, and, more significantly, enabled the white 
school committee to refuse to close the school and thereby maintain a segregated 
system.310 The loss of control over the Smith school, a school founded at the 
request of Boston's African American community, resulted in the school 
becoming a magnet for community dissension.
310 George Levesque, Black Boston, 165-180; Horton, Black Bostonians, 70-72.
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The first hints of a split among African Americans in Boston over the 
importance of having an exclusively black school surfaced several years before 
the issue became inflammatory. In 1843, The Liberator reported that a m eeting  
of colored citizens in Boston passed a resolution disputing allegations that some 
of the "colored people, as a body, do not approve and support the efforts which  
the friends of equal rights have made" regarding school integration. It w as 
probably true that few  black Bostonians actively opposed integrated schools. But 
it was probably also true that some members of the black community resisted any 
move to shut down the Smith School. Early on in the dispute, some of the black 
community's leaders sought to marginalize members of the rank-and-file who  
held differing viewpoints by denying the existence any differing viewpoints. Six 
years later, it was apparent they had not succeeded; nevertheless, black 
integrationists proved unrelenting in their efforts to both castigate the white 
school committee and weaken their black opponents.311
The integrationists ratcheted up the stakes by tying the issue of integration 
and their opponents' support of the Smith School to 'blackness'-- in other words, 
to questions of identity. Two months previous to the riot, a group of 
integrationists met and unanimously passed a series of resolutions that were 
ostensibly directed at white Bostonians, particularly those in position to 
influence the school committee that would ultimately decide the matter. The 
resolutions laid dow n the gauntlet within the black community. They resolved  
that the Smith School, "being a caste, an exclusive school, [is] a GREAT PUBLIC 
NUISANCE, which should be immediately annihilated....we will not regard with  
confidence, any contrivance to quiet our efforts in  relation to its abolition....it is
311 The Liberator, Feb. 10, 1843.
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our hope, that no individual who is identified with us in complexion, will suffer 
himself to be used as a TOOL, to prolong the existence of that school."312
The emotional and symbolic w eight of the terms used are telling and 
proved to be the beginning of a charged and acrimonious dispute. The rhetoric 
held a certain militancy- 'annihilating7 the school- and calling for its abolition 
carried undertones of the larger struggle for freedom. But more importantly in 
considering what it meant for black identity is the phrase "those who would be 
identified w ith us by complexion." This loaded phrase w ould  be used repeatedly 
in the days and months to come. The subtext was an acknowledgment that 
while all blacks were identified as one group by whites, for black integrationists, 
to be 'identified7 with them by virtue of 'complexion7 w as not enough. The 
implication was that regardless of the means by which whites arrived at a 
definition of who was a member of the black community, being black meant 
som ething more than having a sable hue. The integrationists defined 'blackness7 
with greater sophistication and complexity than their white neighbors.
This stemmed in part from an ongoing attempt by black Bostonians to 
redefine, or at least to complicate, how  Americans conceptualized race. 'Race7 
was by no means a fixed and concrete concept; historian David Roediger's 
evidence revealing the construction of whiteness indicates just how  diverse and 
fluid racial ideologies remained in mid-nineteenth century America. While for 
some whites racial ideologies were already well established, others expressed 
uncertainty and ambivalence. Roediger notes that som e whites grew less 
tolerant and more openly hostile to African Americans7 public gatherings in  
northern cities during the 1830s; yet in September of 1850 a company of black 
soldiers received a warm response from N ew  York City crowds during a
312 The Liberator, August 10, 1849. In this chapter all emphases in quotes from primary sources, 
such as capitalization and use of italics, are original and not added unless otherwise noted.
228
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
precision march in full dress. The effort m ounted by the Boston School 
Committee to maintain segregated schools also evinces ambivalence towards 
race. In 1846 the committee's report im plied that the African 'race' had some 
innate inferiority, w hile the 1849 committee, after hearing Thomas Paul Smith's 
eloquent defense of the Smith School, stated that if Smith "be taken as fair type 
of the African intellect, the question of organic differences in the capacities of the 
two races could no longer be seriously entertained." The point here is not to 
dispute the weight of historical scholarship that argues for a hardening of racial 
oppression in the urban north. But the response of the N ew  York City crowd 
and the ambivalence of Boston's school committee suggests that racial 
oppression and racist ideologies were not absolute, uniform, or universal, 
especially in a society and culture that w as still groping for a firm understanding 
of exactly what race was and where the boundaries lay.313
Black Bostonians attempted to exploit that uncertainty. They repeatedly 
argued that the issue was not race, but complexion. Successful several years 
earlier in eradicating Jim Crow laws from public transportation in Massachusetts, 
pushing for the acceptance of black m en into Massachusetts militias, and fighting 
to end segregated units in the national military, black integrationists consistently 
referred to the difference between black Americans and white Americans as one 
of complexion, not race. In a petition on  the militia issue, they introduced 
them selves as the "acknowledged citizens of this Commonwealth, 
(notwithstanding their complexional differences)". By the m iddle of the 
nineteenth century, 'complexion' and 'colored' were common self-designations 
w hile 'black', 'African', or 'race' became less frequent. William C. Nell even
313 David Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working 
Class (N ew  York: Verso, 1991), 115-132; The Liberator, October 4, 1850; Report of a Special 
Committee o f the Grammar School Board,48.
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referred to prejudice and racism as 'colorphobia'.314 This was a marked change 
from earlier in  the nineteenth century.
The choice o f terms, combined with their efforts and rhetoric, indicates 
that African Americans did not accept the social construct of race as immutable 
or fixed in antebellum  northern society. The School Committee's majority 
report in 1846, w hich rejected the black integrationists' petition to open up all of 
Boston's public schools to black children, recognized that the integrationists' 
language and argum ent represented a threat to the existing racial hierarchy. The 
stakes were higher than allowing black children in previously white schools; 
underlying the challenge to segregation was a discourse about how  a society  
delineated and m aintained boundaries. Occasionally, this subtext rose to the 
surface. Noting that the integrationists had "so often and so confidently asserted, 
that the principle, on  w hich the separate schools for colored children are 
maintained, is that o f complexion, merely", the committee took issue w ith  the 
public being told "over and over, that a darker or lighter colored skin, is made 
the ground of separating children." Reacting to the persistent "taunt that it 
might be difficult to decide on the requisite degree of ebony which a child's 
pigment m ust possess, in  order to entitle him to the distinction of a colored  
child", the School Com m ittee emphatically stated that color or complexion was 
"not the ground of distinction" for determining whether a child was to go  to a 
black or white school. The boundary was established and maintained on  the 
grounds of "races, not of colors." And race w as not a categorization subject to the 
caprice of men; it w as established by God, and "founded deep in the physical,
314 William C. Nell, The Colored Patriots of the American Revolution, with sketches of 
several Distinguished Colored Persons: to which is added a brief survey of the Condition and 
Prospects of Colored Americans (Boston: Robert F. Wallcut, 1855; reprint, Am o Press and the 
N ew  York Times, 1968), 107-114. Nell and other black leaders also used the term 'colorphobia' 
in various issues of The Liberator.
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mental, and moral natures of the two races" and "no legislation, no social 
customs, can efface this distinction."315 Exhibiting strains of a romantic racialism 
that view ed every race as innately endowed with distinct talents, the majority 
report argued that "amalgamation is degradation" for both races since it 
threatened the "genuine virtues" peculiar to each race.316 The report concluded 
by emphasizing the white committee's racial conception, describing the students 
as "colored children, or the descendants of the African race" whose unique 
educational needs due to their race — needs the committee outlined as an 
inferior ability to use "faculties of invention, comparison, and reasoning" — 
mandated separate schools.317 The school committee's argument may have also 
been an example of Kenneth Kusmer's external forces on the black urban 
experience. Most whites defined blackness as being determined by one variable, 
race. That attitude of whites towards blacks likely contributed to many free blacks 
formulating a similar construction of their own identity as being primarily 
determined by what passed for an antebellum understanding of race. But for 
African Americans, that w as not the only determining factor in defining what 
made one part of the black community. Other variables entered into the 
equation, in part because race itself was not a fixed concept in American society.
315 Report to the Primary School Committee, June 15, 1846 on the Petition of Sundry Colored 
Persons, for the Abolition of the Schools for Colored Children, With the C ity Solicitor's 
Opinion, Documents of the City of Boston for the year 1846 (Boston 1846), 7. Also Reprinted in 
Levy, Jim Crow in Boston.
316 Ibid., 13. On the increased acceptance of a romantic racialism, see George M. Fredrickson, 
The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 
1817-1914, (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), "Uncle Tom and the Anglo-Saxons: Romantic 
Racialism in the North," 97-129.
317 Report to the Primary School Committee, June 15, 1846, 27-29. The report allowed that 
black students were equal in som e areas: "colored children will often keep pace with the white 
children" in "those parts of study and instruction in which progress depends on memory, or on 
the imitative faculties."
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Even the school committee dodged the more elusive question, how  race was 
determined, though they im plied that complexion w as the primary means.
Shortly after the School Committee rejected the petition for integration, 
The Liberator printed a rejoinder. Though the writer may have been white, the 
thinking was consistent with the arguments of the black integrationists. If 
segregation was truly based on race and not color, asked the writer, "why not 
have separate schools for the genuine Celtic Irish, who are as distinct a race from 
the Anglo-Saxon as the native Africans?" These Irish had "physical peculiarities 
almost as marked" along with a distinct language and therefore, according to the 
logic of the school committee, represented a greater risk to erode the /peculiar 
virtues' of the white race. Since the school authorities condoned Irish children 
in any public school except the black schools, the determining factor was 
obviously complexion, not race. The resolutions the black integrationists passed 
during a meeting in July of 1849 made a similar argument, noting that 
"foreigners of all kinds... who are white, are not rejected."318
N ot only were white foreigners admitted into the public schools, they 
were aggressively assimilated. In 1851, German immigrants — som e of whom  
lived on the same streets as Boston's black citizens — petitioned the school 
committee for a separate school in which their children could receive 
instruction in German. The committee refused their request on the grounds 
that "it is the English language that the Germans must know and ... they 
should begin as early as possible to learn the national characteristic and the 
peculiar development in human nature of those, with whom  they are to be 
associated in life." Being educated in schools "German in their character" 
w ould only serve to place their children at a disadvantage. Ironically, the 
committee revealed its large racial blindspot by noting that "there are many
318 The Liberator, August 21,1846; A ugust 10, 1849.
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classes in our comm unity who desire separate schools, for various reasons 
which they think sufficient" and warned against setting a precedent, 
apparently for other ethnic groups. African Americans were clearly in a 
completely different category, so maintaining a separate school for black 
children did not set a precedent, since the reasons for separation were based 
on innate racial differences. The committee's greatest concern w as that a 
separate German school, or other ethnic schools, would tend to "continue the 
German elem ent & dispense with the American." This expression of 
nativism, typical for the era, pushed immigrants to forsake or at least 
minimize their cultural heritage and m ove towards becoming American in 
character as w ell as in legal standing.319
Schools, said the committee, were "designed by our lawgivers, to make 
American citizens - to furnish the best education for this purpose & for no 
other." Education benefited society as a w hole and served "as a powerful 
instrument in support of the political institutions of our government."320 This 
explains another facet for the school committee's unwavering opposition to 
permitting black children into the all-white public schools: African Americans 
were not desirable citizens, thus negating a key purpose of education. Black 
Bostonians, both the integrationists and the separatists, resisted this definition by 
defining them selves as Americans and as citizens. The integrationists attacked
319 From the loose papers of the Boston School committee, box covering 1850 (BPL), contains a 
list of children by ward and street. The German immigrants' petition and the committee's 
response is in the box covering 1851-1852. On antebellum nativism, see Eric Foner, Free Soil, 
Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War (N ew  York: 
Oxford University Press, 1970), 226-260; on nativism during and after the Civil War, see John 
Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (N ew  Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1955).
320 From the response o f the school committee, in the loose papers of the Boston School 
committee, box covering 1851-1852 (BPL).
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the committee's thinking from another vantage point by attempting to exploit 
the uncertain boundaries of antebellum racial conceptions.
This tactic had some moderate success. Sixteen members of the school 
committee, com posing the minority who supported the integrationists, adopted 
the integrationists' argument. The public schools, they argued, rested upon a 
constitutional principle that "all men are bom  free and equal." This principle 
had been established with the Puritans and made law  by the Constitution. 
Therefore, any exclusive schools must be m ade "upon some distinction, 
recognized by the law s of God and man, stronger than the distinctions of birth 
and origin, of religious or political faith, of wealth or poverty, of social condition 
and standing. It m ust be upon a distinction founded in the constitution and the 
laws." But the majority of the committee had m ade "color, and color alone" the 
only distinction. W hile the white minority did  go so far as to argue that races did 
not exist — a position black integrationists did not subscribe to either — their 
language echoed that of the black leaders.321
Other whites sympathetic to African American integrationists also 
adopted the tactic of questioning the legitimacy of race as a determining factor, 
underlining the potential threat to established racial boundaries. Responding to 
the school committee's 1849 decision upholding segregation, a committee from 
the First W esleyan Church of Boston wrote that since
the children o f all foreigners— many of whom  are rude in manners, 
and corrupting to good order, are freely and without question 
admitted to all the schools, we must feel the exclusion of the children 
of native Americans, whose industry and love of order contribute to 
the wealth and peace of the city— w hose forefathers bled for the 
country's freedom; and who are equally taxed for the support of 
schools; ... is a m ost unjustifiable and every w ay dangerous 
distinction.322
321 From the minority report contained in Levy, Jim Crcnv in Boston, 5-7.
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This protest also reflected the growing sentim ent against immigrants and 
Catholics that would help catapult the Know-Nothings to power in 
Massachusetts. In Boston, with a growing influx of Irish Catholics, Republicans 
and Know-Nothings voiced fears that the absolutism they saw represented in 
Catholic traditions w ould  undermine liberty. The opposition of many Irish to 
anti-slavery merely fueled  Republican and K now-Nothing rhetoric, which  
stressed Americanization.323 Black integrationists exploited this tension by 
arguing that African Americans had long inculcated American concepts of 
liberty; indeed, argued the integrationists, some of their ancestors had fought in 
the Revolution. Furthermore, the push for the right to be able to have black 
children go to the schools in their own neighborhoods had everything to do w ith  
seeking liberty; if anything, it was the school committee who represented a threat 
to liberty. By melding claims to an American identity with a critique of the 
school committtee's rationale that made 'complexional distinctions' the basis for 
segregation, the integrationists questioned the validity of northern society's racial 
conceptions.
Black and white arguments for integration that challenged the uncertain 
yet dominant racial conceptions failed to make any headw ay with the majority of 
the school committee. This did not deter Boston's black activists from 
continuing their attempt to m ove the focal point of the argument to the more 
subjective and slippery ground of skin color. The resolutions passed in the July, 
1849 meeting stated again that some of Boston's children "are refused common 
school privileges, solely on account on complexion." A n 1851 broadside
322 Letter from the First W esleyan Church to the Boston School Committee, December, 1849. 
Contained in the loose papers o f the Boston School Committee records, folder #26 of the box 
covering 1849 (BPL).
323 Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, 228-231.
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addressed to the state legislature repeated the charge that "citizens of Boston, 
have for a number of years been deprived from the enjoyment of our rights...on 
account of complexion."324
Dominick LaCapra, describing the difficulty of writing about race, notes 
that "it is decidedly difficult to overcome the tendency to privilege whiteness as 
the master-text— the valorized and often unmarked center of reference— and to 
identify the nonwhite as 'other7 or 7different/ " In a sense, by trying to make Irish 
immigrants an 'other7, and by persistently talking about complexion— which, 
because of miscegenation, varied greatly— the integrationists were attempting to 
rewrite the 'master-text7 by m uddling the already uncertain concept of race. 
George Fredrickson has noted  that in the mid-nineteenth century, Americans 
were no longer "being characterized primarily by their adherence to a set of 
political and social ideals allegedly representing the universal aspirations of all 
humanity, but democracy itself was beginning to be defined as racial in origin 
and thus realizable perhaps only by people with certain hereditary traits." 
Thrusting a contending narrative into this rewriting of American identity, black 
integrationists reasserted the broader outline of American identity by stressing 
those "political and social ideals allegedly representing the universal aspirations 
of all humanity." Making ideals the 7master-text7 was more inclusive. Anyone 
could adopt the ideals, but African Americans could not adopt white skin.325
This attempt to confound the bounds and definitions of race by stressing 
complexion and pointing to distinguishing variables of other white ethnic 
groups had no discernible im pact on the School Committee's thinking. Though
324 The Liberator, August 10, 1849; "EQUAL SCHOOLS FOR ALL WITHOUT REGARD TO 
COLOR OR RACE", Boston, May 21,1851.
325 The Bounds of Race: Perspectives on Hegemony and Resistance, ed. Dom inick LaCapra 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 2; Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind,
101.
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this raises interesting questions regarding the ongoing formation of racial 
ideologies in the antebellum North, the focus here is on w hat this language and 
debate meant to African Americans and the ongoing formation of black identity 
as free people of color found themselves pitted against one another.
Little of the available evidence hints that the parents opposed to closing 
the city's black schools were black nationalists. Some of the m en who led the 
movement to keep the all-black Smith School open supported other measures 
aimed at integration, such as opening up Massachusetts' militias to black men.
At most, they were 'separatists' in a different sense than the term's m odem  
connotations. They arrived at a separatist stance reluctantly, out of necessity, and 
not because of a well-defined black nationalism, though the seeds of a moderate 
form of nationalism may have been present. Thomas Paul Smith, the most 
visible of the 'separatists', supported a resolution passed at a Boston anti­
colonization m eeting declaring that black citizens had decided "under all 
circumstances, to cling to the land sanctified by the blood of our fathers; and in 
this land, upon this soil, beneath the flag of stars and stripes" to fight for slaves' 
freedom so that "when they are free, w e  w ill stay to enjoy w ith them the land 
their labor and blood have enriched." The symbolic language of the resolution 
underscores how  keenly American these m en and wom en conceived of 
themselves-- they em ployed a potent nineteenth century American imagery, 
rooted in an independence gained by land and the Revolution. On the same 
page of this issue of The Liberator, an account of an anti-colonization "Colored 
People's Meeting" in N ew  York City stressed both the transatlantic black heritage 
and the American strain of antebellum African American identity. The N ew  
Yorkers argued that "we do not trace our ancestors to Africa alone. We trace it to 
Englishmen, Irishmen, Scotchmen; to Frenchmen; to the German; to the Asiatic,
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as well as to Africa. 'The best blood of Virginia courses through our ve in s/ "326 
These black N ew  Yorkers swung a two-edged sword. Cutting through racist 
attempts to deny rights by linking their claim for full citizenship to 
miscegenation, they affirmed their Americanness while pointedly reminding 
whites of their ow n racial infidelity. White infidelity fortified the African 
American rhetorical arsenal by giving them a w eapon for challenging racial 
conceptions and weakening colonizationists' arguments that im plied black 
Americans were som ehow  less American than white ethnic groups.
In addition to identifying themselves as Americans and seeing the racism 
behind many of the colonization schemes, m ost free blacks opposed colonization 
based on three points: a firm belief in their right to the heritage of the 
Revolution and the promises of the Constitution, a hope for a brighter future in 
America, and a negative conception of Africa. While black Americans did not 
deny or minimize their African heritage, and frequently glorified it, they did not 
see Liberia or any other part of Africa as desirable. The Boston resolutions 
described it as "the land of the crocodile, the burning sun, the fever, and of 
death," and the N ew  Yorkers referred to it an "inhospitable region" of "deep 
superstition and idolatry." Even those African Americans supporting 
colonization saw  it as a land in need of redemption, a land that could be civilized 
and evangelized— in other words, made into a relocated America, but black and 
free from racial oppression.327
326T/ze Liberator, April 4, 1851.
327 For instance, see Daniel Peterson, The Looking Glass: Being a True Report and Narrative of 
the Life, Travels, and Labors of the Rev. Daniel H. Peterson, A Colored Clergyman; Embracing 
a period of time from the year 1812 to 1854, And Including His Visit to Western Africa, (N ew  
York: Wright, 1854); Paul Cuffe, A Brief Account of the Settlement and Present Situation of the 
Colony of Sierra Leone, in Africa (New York: 1812).
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This is but one example of the complex nature of northern black id en tity -  
many free people of color affirmed their African heritage while conceiving of 
that continent in broad and frequently denigrating terms. Free black people were 
able to incorporate a glorified African past into their self-conception w hile  
berating that continent's present condition. Paralleling that, most free people of 
color affirmed them selves as truly and com pletely American, proclaiming the 
unique heritage o f this country while unhesitatingly condemning the 
unrelenting oppression of black Americans, slave and free. Within this context 
of fervent hope and identification with the promise of America, the 
integrationist faction attacked Smith and his supporters for their opposition to 
closing Boston's black school.
The quandary for the integrationists in  their two-front battle against the 
separatists and the School Committee was that their rhetoric condemning the 
latter strengthened the case of the former. The integrationists, quite sensibly, 
called attention to the poor logic in the School Committee's rationale (which was 
not hard to do), and argued that it boiled dow n to prejudice— or 'colorphobia'. 
Pointing to the true motives behind the committee's rationale sim ply reinforced 
what the separatists had been saying all along— that because of rampant 
prejudice, forcing black pupils into white schools "would interrupt or retard 
their elevation."328
There are a few  shreds of evidence that hint at the motives and thinking 
of Thomas Paul Smith. He was one of a handful w ho supported the formation 
of a black political association in 1847 "for the purpose of acting with or against 
any of the anti-slavery bodies or societies now  in  existence." Key leaders of the 
black integrationists disagreed. A group led by John T. Hilton, Robert Morris,
328 The Liberator, February 15, 1850.
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E.B. Lawton, Henry Weeden, passed a resolution stating that "it is not necessary 
to form an association among us, for the purpose of acting politically in regard to 
slavery." W eeden and William Wells Brown (who, when presiding over a N ew  
England black convention over a decade later, said that he was "unfavorable to 
any gathering that shall seem  like taking separate action from our white fellow- 
dtizens") spoke in support of this motion. Am ong the four men who spoke 
against it- who wanted to form an exclusively black anti-slavery association w ith  
political ends- were Smith and Henry Bibb. With a clear majority against them, 
Bibb offered a compromise w ith an am endm ent that stated "the people are under 
the highest obligation to remove Slavery by moral and political action." The 
next resolution reaffirmed the majority stance against "the formation of any 
society... calculated to induce the people to join any existing religious sects or 
political parties, with the hope or expectation that they will aid the cause of the 
slave's emancipation." Hilton and his supporters saw  no need to rock the boat 
and were satisfied with the current integrated anti-slavery organizations; Smith, 
expressing a moderate form of black nationalism, clearly felt otherwise.329
The severity of the rhetoric integrationists aimed at Smith was likely due 
in part to his heritage: he was the nephew of Thomas Paul, the first pastor of 
Boston's first black church. Some of the black integrationists no doubt 
remembered growing up under Paul's spiritual tutelage. The scene of m any of 
the meetings regarding the school issue and other seminal events in the life of 
Boston's black community took place in the very church that Smith's uncle had 
helped found. When John T. Hilton and other black integrationists called Smith 
a traitor, they may have spoken with a sense of personal as well as political
329 The Liberator, January 28, 1848. William Wells Brown quote taken from Proceedings o f the 
Black State Conventions, 1840-1865, Philip S. Foner and George E. Walker, eds.,
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980.) 207. The N ew  England Colored Citizens' 
Convention was held in Boston in 1859.
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betrayal. It is difficult to know how  much of the rhetoric was bom  out of 
personal hurt, however. Smith's stance should not have been a complete 
surprise; his uncle had expressed separatist sentiments during the 1820s.
Thomas Paul was sympathetic to emigration to Haiti, and while not an 
outspoken supporter of colonization, he was not entirely opposed to it. Smith's 
stance in the school issue w as not out of the family character.330
Despite some of the asperions cast upon him, Smith did support black 
agitation to secure civil rights. Two weeks prior to the September 17 riot, one of 
Smith's compatriots, John H. Roberts, argued that the separatists favored 
"removing all legal disabilities from our oppressed people," including forced 
segregation. But they did not favor "the abolition of exclusive institutions 
among ourselves, literary, religious or scientific, until such times as we can enjoy 
more liberty and equality am ong the whites."331 This reluctant separatism, bom  
out of a feeling of the necessity to protect their children from the scorn of white 
teachers and students, likely typified the sentiments of m any black parents who  
wanted the Smith School to remain open. Lobbying for a black headmaster and 
black teachers a year earlier, three unnamed black citizens argued that "the 
colored citizens of Boston, feeling the greatest anxiety that their children should 
be well educated... believe that their instructor should be one who is identified 
with themselves, who is well educated, who would naturally feel for and 
sympathize w ith them...they desire it may be taught by one possessing the 
affection of the children, and the confidence of their parents and guardians."
The writers assumed that a w hite teacher would not generate the same degree of
330 See Horton and Horton, Black Bostonians, 41.
331 The Liberator, September 7, 1849.
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confidence and affection as a black teacher. Petitions supporting Smith indicate 
that this kind of moderate 'nationalism' w as echoed by other black parents.332
These parents wanted to ensure that their voice would continue to  
influence decisions affecting their children's education. By dispersing their 
children throughout Boston's public schools, integration threatened to scatter 
their voices. Ironically, William C. Nell, perhaps the most ardent of the 
integrationists, inadvertently confirmed their fears. When the state legislature 
eventually intervened in 1855 and mandated integration, he complim ented the 
"mothers w ho accompanied me to the various school houses" to ensure their 
children's admittance.333 Nell likely did not think of the implications of black 
children and parents going to "various" schools instead of one.
The separatist parents no doubt also feared the loss of an institution that 
served as an arena of common interest. Integrated schools posed the danger of 
splintering Boston's black community; in many ways the Smith School served as 
a focal point for black families. In many northern cities black students 
periodically demonstrated their musical, mathematical, or other acquired skills. 
Black and abolitionist newspapers frequently carried notices of "exercises in 
declamation and singing [for] a large audience of family and friends," indicating 
the importance of the local black school as a source of pride.334 Black schools, like
332 Contained in the loose papers of the Boston School Committee records, folder #33 o f the box 
covering 1847-48, BPL. Other letters and petitions w ith signatures contained in folders #33, 35- 
37. There is some question regarding the Iegitmacy of all the signatures; Smith was accused of 
forging some of them. Smith responded in another letter, writing that he signed the nam es of 
those who agreed with him but could not write their names. There are a few names that 
appear to be in Smith's handwriting with an 'x' next to the signature. The V  was likely made 
by the individuals w hose name Smith wrote.
333 "Triumph of Equal School Rights in Boston," December 17,1855. This was a celebration 
with speeches by Garrison, Charles Lenox Remond, and other notables. Nell was the primary 
honoree.
334 The Liberator, April 19, 1850. This particular exhibition was to raise money to "advance 
the cause of Equal School Rights."
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black churches, performed important functions for black urbanites beyond  
educating their children by providing reasons to meet, to reaffirm com m on  
goals, and as a public display of African American identity to black and w hite city 
dwellers. An integrated school system may have delivered a better education for 
black children, as Boston's integrationists believed; but it also meant sacrificing 
an institution that helped maintain comm unity, especially for those parents who  
had little or no involvem ent in the city's black churches.
The price o f integration was simply too great for many black Bostonians.
In their eyes, black teachers being responsible for the education of black students 
outweighed any potential benefits of achieving a dubious victory for 'rights' or 
gaining access to the superior facilities of w h ite schools. Reluctance to lose an 
institution that m aintained black identity, the loss of control over their 
children's education, and the potentially dam aging effects of whites' racism on  
their children all added up to make the uncertain benefits of integration an 
untenable goal.
Herein lies one key difference in the tw o  factions. The integrationists, 
whose language depicted the issue in terms of an eternal battle for truth and 
justice within a distinctive American setting, called for sacrifice in order to gain 
what was rightfully theirs. Citizenship dem anded the aggressive pursuit of the 
equality and opportunity for which their fathers had died. Deprived of the right 
to send their children to public schools attended by white children, the oppressed  
black American had a duty to "use every effort to obtain an unqualified and an 
uncompromising possession" of their rights. These m en and wom en v iew ed  
free and unrestricted access to the public schools— schools supported and open to 
every other American— as part of an ongoing effort to make it clear that the 
Constitution's "we the people" included African Americans. Others in Boston's
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black community, identifying themselves no less as Americans, had different 
priorities and a different conception of what citizenship meant.335
The stance of the separatists defined a space between themselves and 
white society. Being a citizen meant having the right to protect that space and  
pursue their own interests. While they were not inactive or apathetic regarding  
their legal, political, and economic disadvantages, m eeting the daily dem ands of 
life was often taxing enough without the added burdens of waging lofty battles 
about 'rights' with little prospect of measurable improvements in white 
attitudes. For many free people of color, working long days and keeping families 
intact was being active in  improving their lot, and life left room for little more. 
Citizenship simply m eant the ability to continue doing so without interference 
from whites.
These parents recognized that changing the written law might mean  
nothing in day-to-day life. In nearby Salem there w as no law prohibiting black  
students from any public school, but there were few  if any black students. W hen 
the Salem Gazette printed an editorial defending the labeling of that town's Latin 
Grammar School as the first 'free' school, open to any student, black or white, the 
editor argued that lack of ability was the only reason there happened to be no  
black students. A 'colored citizen' wrote to The Liberator, arguing that w hile  
there was no 'law', public opinion like that voiced by the Gazette's editor w as in 
effect a more potent law. White prejudice kept black students away.336 Separatist 
parents may have agreed in principle with the larger goals of the integrationist
335 The Liberator, August 10, 1849; regarding this perspective am ong nineteenth century African 
Americans, see Vincent Gordon Harding, "Wrestling toward the Dawn: The Afro-American 
Freedom Movement and the Changing Constitution," Journal of American History 74 
(December, 1987): 718-739.
336 The Liberator, September 23, 1842.
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faction, but in practice the reality of experience with white society had taught 
them that ideals did not change white behavior. Unwilling to trade their 
children's welfare for w hat seem ed to be intangible and uncertain future benefits 
of education in supposedly superior white schools, these parents opted for a safer 
immediate course of keeping their children under black supervision.
Attitudes like this explain black leaders' complaints throughout the 
antebellum era about the lack of participation and enthusiasm among free blacks 
in the abolition movement; the school struggle generated similar criticisms. One 
of the stronger rebukes to the African American community came at the end of 
the fight, when integration had been achieved, and a celebration was held  
honoring William C. N ell for his central role. Charles Lenox Remond, one of 
several notable speakers, excoriated the defeated opposition, saying that he 
"longed to see the day w hen it would no longer be possible for any man or 
wom an to point to pro-slavery colored churches, and to the spirit of colored 
wom en who send their children to pro-slavery schools, as evidences of 
inconsistency on their part."337 The 'pro-slavery' churches were African 
American congregations not active in the abolition movement, and the 'pro­
slavery school' was the Smith School. In Remond's mind any church that 
directed insufficient energies towards abolition might as well have been an 
apologist for slavery. The church-goers at whom he hurled this charge m ay or 
may not have been apathetic, but they probably felt trying to maintain control 
over their daily lives consum ed enough strength without shouldering 
additional responsibilites that offered questionable returns relative to the energy  
expended. Their opposition to closing black schools earned them Remond's 
wrath. His tactic of increasing pressure on the separatists by connecting the
337  "Triumph of Equal School Rights," December, 1855.
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school debate to the national issue of slavery typified the dispute's sharp 
language.
With the lines of demarcation clearly drawn around the Smith School, the 
rhetoric of the integrationists intensified. The separatists, who had petitions 
representing about 13% of Boston's adult black population, were castigated as 
traitors. Thomas Paul Smith was labeled as "a young, ambitious bigot." Two 
days before the School Committee's ruling in late August, Smith and John H. 
Roberts attended a meeting that apparently was open to both factions. Smith and 
Roberts acknowledged that they represented a minority in the black community. 
Hearing this, "John T. Hilton replied, that [Smith] was mistaken in representing 
himself in the minority, for John C. Calhoun, Henry Clay, the American 
Colonization Society, and the entire pro-slavery community, were with him." 
Among the resolutions passed at this meeting was one reminding the black 
minority that "our zeal [shall not] be in any degree abated by the insidious efforts 
of those identified with us in complexion... who... are reverting, by their animus, 
the hand upon the dial-plate of our liberties." At another meeting two months 
later, Henry Bibb compared this internal struggle to other "instances where 
colored men have been betrayed in the most auspicious m oment of a freedom  
struggle by traitors," likening the separatists to free black men who, for a price, 
aided slave catchers in northern cities.338
The integrationists' rhetoric continued to place the school issue within a 
larger context. They compared the leadership group to Christ's apostles, and 
called the struggle a "crisis as important... as any this side of eternity, it being 
none other than the cause o f  truth and right against prejudice and
338 Smith was called a bigot in a letter dated August 6,1848, in the loose papers of the Boston 
School Committee records, folder #34 of the box covering 1848 (BPL);77ze Liberator, September 7 
and November 9,1849.
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expediency."339 Though lofty language like this was not unusual in antebellum  
America, its ubiquity does not mitigate the integrationists' sincerity. Fighting to 
secure opportunity for their children to be educated on the same terms as white 
children so they w ould have a chance to overcome oppression w as indeed a 
"great and important undertaking." Because the future appeared to rest on this 
matter, black integrationists related it to other great historic struggles for spiritual 
and earthly freedoms, from the Israelites' battles against pagan peoples to the 
American Revolution. But this came w ith  a price. Pushing the school dispute 
into such portentous territory, and cloaking it w ith faith, citizenship, and the 
future of free people of color, forced the integrationists to intensify the virulence 
of the language aimed at free people of color opposed to integrated schools.
Doing so led the integrationists to attempt to establish the boundary of blackness.
For the integrationists, boycotting the Smith School became, at least 
briefly, a means by which blackness could be defined. Arguing to both the white 
and black com m unity that there was no difference other than com plexion posed 
an unforeseen problem— what, then, did make a man or wom an 'black'? As in 
other northern cities, skin color could vary greatly among free people of color in 
Boston. W hile m ost black Bostonians w ere not hard to identify as having  
African blood in  their veins— and thus w ere black as far as white society was 
concerned— the implication of the integrationists' argument w as that 
complexion w as a subjective categorization. Color alone did not provide a 
sufficient basis for classifying groups of people. And yet the integrationists 
clearly perceived themselves as a distinct group within American society. For a 
time, they attempted to make one's stance on the school issue, w hich was tied 
into a host of larger issues, a marker identifying who belonged.
339 The Liberator, September 7, 1849.
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The integrationists sought to make the price of opposing integrated 
schools high because they recognized the difficulty of achieving integration. 
When they spoke of rights and doggedly grounded their claims in the 
Constitution, their w hite opponents did likewise. Legal historian Hendrick 
Hartog has described how  the efforts of one group to claim rights means negating 
supposedly constitutionally established rights of other groups. In this case, white 
segregationists argued that they possessed the right to keep schools segregated, 
and that white parents had a right to not have their children go to school with 
black children. This ostensibly served the public good by preserving harmony 
and providing education aimed at white children's alleged innate talents, and 
targeting black children's alleged innate deficiencies. Success by the black 
integrationists spelled the elimination of that interpretation of rights and the 
validation of their ow n interpretation of rights.340
Hartog has noted that "when presented as claims to negate rights, rights 
readily become a focus for group organization and identity." Though Hartog 
applied this primarily to twentieth-century civil rights movem ents, many of the 
dynamics are similar.341 Many black Bostonians did indeed focus on their 
individual and corporate rights to have access to all public schools. And on 
some level, black integrationists must have known that their struggle to open up 
Boston's public schools to their children challenged the rights claims of white 
segregationists. As black integrationists' identity consolidated through focusing 
on their own rights claims and in response to the difficulty of realizing those 
claims, it made the lack of support and undermining actions of the black 
separatists all the more galling.
340 Hendrick Hartog, "The Constitution of Aspiration and 'The Rights That Belong to Us AH'" 
Journal of American History, 74 (December, 1987), 1023.
341 Ibid.
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Without question, the integrationists recognized that a fractured 
community weakened their fight for expanded civil rights. To some extent, their 
language of separation — that any African American who did not link arms with  
them in this battle ought to be ostracized from the black community — 
represented an attempt to make the cost of disagreement so high that few, if any, 
black men and wom en w ould fail to support the integrationists' position.
Black identity, then, was not only or even primarily a matter of degree of 
complexion, but a combination of physical, cultural, and political variables.
Even culture could vary significantly, as some black Bostonians were raised in 
southern slave societies, some in northern urban areas with a significant black 
population, and still others in the rural north. Though most shared certain 
cultural aspects, differences existed. Making one's political stance a defining 
characteristic had the advantage of being inclusive regardless of cultural 
background or skin tone. This is why a man like Henry Bibb, described as 
"almost a clear white," was identified and accepted as a black man.342 Bibb's past 
as a slave and his present activism translated into unquestioned acceptance in 
the black community. Had Bibb chosen to pass as a white man, his acceptance in 
the black community likely would have been challenged.
The integrationists did remonstrate against accepting the separatist blacks 
and blamed the separatists for having a part in the failure of integration in 1849. 
One week after the School Committee rejected the 1849 petition for integrated
342 Regarding how black culture in the North resembled and differed from slave culture, see 
William D. Pierson, Black Yankees: The Development of an Afro-American Subculture in 
eighteenth Century New England, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988); and 
Shane White, Somewhat More Independent: The End of Slavery in New York City, 1770-1810.
On description of Bibb, see correspondence from the Connecticut State Convention of Colored 
Men in 1849, reprinted in Proceedings of the Black State Conventions, 1840-1865, ed. Philip S.
Foner and George E. Walker (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), vol 2, 25. Bibb 
said his father was a white slaveowner and described his mother as having "slaveholding 
blood flowing in her veins." See Henry Bibb, Narrative of the Life and Adventures of Henry 
Bibb, An American Slave (N ew  York, 1850; reprint, Mnemosyne Publishing Co., 1969.)
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schools, a m eeting of colored citizens denounced the Committee's decision and 
targeted the dissenters in their m idst. Since "Law, justice and God are on our 
side," the black integrationists declared that the dissenters' "deeds and their 
inevitable results imperatively call for our strongest censure," and cast their 
"evil machinations" in biblical terms of betrayal.343 The integrationists believed  
that much of white Boston had begun to support opening up the white schools, 
and thus the black separatists had thrown their weight behind the black schools 
at the worst possible moment. They were, therefore, "false brethren." Any 
"colored persons who are not for us in  this trying hour, m ust be counted in the 
ranks of those w ho would deprive us of our heaven-decreed rights."344 The 
knife in the back was only thrust deeper when Thomas Paul Jr., son of the long­
time pastor o f the city's first black church (in which m ost of the meetings 
mentioned here were held), agreed to become the new headmaster of the Smith 
School. Paul, a Dartmouth graduate, raised the stature of the school. His 
placement w as a boon for the separatists, since they had requested him as the 
school master over a year earlier. Paul no doubt strengthened their position 
within the black community.
Part of the separatists' appeal to some within the black community lay in 
their moderate strains of nationalist sentiment. Thomas Paul Smith had m oved  
to establish a black political party early in 1848, but was voted dow n by a cadre of 
black men w ho had a long track record of favoring integrated parties.345 In 1848, 
the address at the National Convention of Colored Freemen in Cleveland
343 The Liberator, September 7, 1849.
344 Ibid., September 21 and October 5,1849.
345 Ibid., January 28,1848. William W ells Brown, one of Smith's opponents on this issue, 
would state over a decade later that he w as "unfavorable to any gathering that shall seem  
like taking separate action from our w hite fellow-citizens." Quote taken from Proceedings of 
the Black State Conventions, 1840-1865, vol. 2, 207.
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dedared that only ten years previous, "many of us uttered complaints against the 
faithful abolitionists, for the broad assertion of our rights; thought they went too 
far, and were only making our condition worse." Though the address insisted 
that this thinking had nearly disappeared by 1848, it apparently still characterized 
a portion of the black community. The separatists in Boston were saying 
essentially the same thing about the w hite and black integrationists: because of 
pervasive prejudice, the 'broad assertion' of the rights of free people of color was 
not always w elcom e. The speaker at the convention went on to encourage 
assotiation w ith  whites; some black dtizens remained less than enthused. 
Through their determined opposition, the separatists tried to control the extent 
of assodation for themselves and their children. Black Bostonians, even in the 
dty wards w ith  the heaviest black concentration, lived with and among white 
folks— all the more reason why som e black urbanites wanted to maintain control 
of the few  arenas in which they had minimal assodation w ith white 
Bostonians.346 The separatists loathed sacrificing the Smith School, a concrete 
manifestation of black identity.
The separatists conceived of black identity broadly by appealing to the 
common experience of prejudice. Thomas Paul Smith, responding to the barrage 
of rhetoric that challenged the place of the separatists in the black community,
346 Report o f the Proceedings o f the Colored National Convention (Rochester, 1848), 18. 
Reprinted in Minutes of the Proceedings of the National Negro Conventions, 1830-1864 , edited 
by Howard Holman Bell (N ew  York: Am o Press, 1969). On population distribution for Boston 
see Leonard Curry, Free Blacks in Urban America, (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press,
1981). Henry Taylor's artide on Cintinnati is instructive on how antebellum black urban 
populations, even when concentrated in particular sections of a dty, were still typically 
interspersed am ong white tenants and homes. See Henry L. Taylor, "On Slavery's Fringe: City- 
Building and Black Community Development in Cindnnati, 1800-1850," in Ohio History 95 
(1986), 5-33. Also, Kenneth Kusmer has noted that even by 1910 there were only 5 northern 
industrial d ties w ith a high enough index of dissimilarity to indicate the beginnings of 
distinct 'black belt' of segregation in the North. See Kusmer, "The Black Urban Experience in 
American History," in The State of Afro-American History: Past, Present, and Future, ed. 
Darlene Clark Hine (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 91-122.
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dedared that "we are colored men, exposed alike to oppression and prejudice; 
our interests are all identical—we rise or fall together." He was echoing the call to 
common cause and identity expressed at Cleveland's Colored Freeman 
convention. The same address that called for cooperation with white 
institutions and assodations— which Smith had probably read w hen it was 
published in The Liberator — also reminded free people of color that "we are one 
people—one in general complexion, one in a common degradation, one in 
popular estimation. As one rises, all m ust rise, and as one falls all m ust fall." 
Smith adopted this language, used it to emphasize a common identity, and 
argued for black control of the black future.347
Ultimately, m ost of the separatists were motivated less by a nationalist 
philosophy than by the exigendes of the moment. Intentionally or not, their 
separatism held the potential of stimulating a black nationalism that might have 
offered a more radical alternative to white hegemony than the integrationists — 
if, that is, an antebellum black nationalism had been a viable political entity. The 
separatists tried to use a rights discourse to protect a space for themselves, a space 
over which they could maintain control. Had they succeeded, there w ould have 
likely been a greater potential for fostering a black identity infused w ith a well- 
defined black nationalism. But success m ay have also meant diminished  
opportunity to engage white Americans on matters of legal prindple. A  dassical 
black nationalism, which would have been difficult to realize both because of the 
threat it would have posed to white hegem ony and the limited means of 
ordinary black people, may have also preduded maintaining a dialogue about 
rights.348
347 The Liberator, February 15, 1850; Report of the Proceedings of the Colored National 
Convention , 18.
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The integrationists, through their more active engagment w ith  white legal 
institutions, attempted to exploit the ambiguities in white racial thinking while 
wielding claims o f  constitutional rights. When challenging legally defined racial 
barriers, the integrationists used twin strategies of employing a rights discourse 
laced with historical claims of an American identity, and a racial discourse that 
questioned ill-defined racial boundaries. The argument for integration, perhaps 
not as radical as a black nationalism on the surface, not only represented a 
challenge to white hegemony by threatening to reduce legal barriers to education 
and opportunity, but also attempted to make political activism a condition of 
African American identity. This held potential to challenge w hite hegem ony by 
ensuring that black protest and activism became an indelible part o f w hat it 
meant to free, black, and American.
But the black integrationists' challenge to white hegemony, contrary to a 
classical black nationalism, used the "institutional logic" that Kimberle 
Crenshaw describes. Black integrationists called Americans to live up to the 
promises of their revolutionary heritage and the principles of the Constitution. 
They spoke the lingua franca. By focusing on the right to participate in society on 
all levels, they legitm ated the principles of a professed egalitarian society. They 
also legitimated the legal system by ultimately succeeding in getting legislation 
passed that forced the School Committee to open up the public schools. Success 
in turn reaffirmed that fighting for legal rights was part of what it m eant to be 
African American.349
348 For a useful definition of classical black nationalism, see Wilson Jeremiah M oses, Classical 
Black Nationalism: From the American Revolutioti to Marcus Garvey (New York: N ew  York 
University Press, 1996) 2.
349 Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, "Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and 
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law," Havard Lam Review 101 (May, 1988) 1331-1387.
253
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In the end, it is doubtful that either faction succeeded in defining black  
identity solely on its ow n  terms. The two groups had much in common: both  
groups drew on the sam e repository of American imagery and heritage as a part 
of their identity, and both employed a discourse of rights. They used their claims 
to the rights of citizenship for different ends, but the language stemmed from a 
common ideology shaped by the Constitution. In addition, black Bostonians 
shared a common lifestyle, culture, and most were in the same economic class. 
And Smith knew he w as appealing to the m ost common denominator w h en  he 
spoke to mutual experiences of facing oppression and prejudice. Countering that 
appeal, the integrationists used a tactic that African Americans often still em ploy  
in publicly defining how  'black' one is: supporters of political stances that 
seemed opposed to black America's local and national interests were 
characterized as being outside the black community. This tactic was possible  
because these were free people of color with a voice through petitions, 
newspapers, and pamphlets. Furthermore, in the courts and legislature, and 
with suffrage, there w ere institutional channels of protest available. The same, 
however, was open to the separatists, and their response exacerbated tensions 
within the black com m unity and within black identity.
Black identity continued to be shaped by a variety of forces. As free people 
of color fought on an individual and institutional level for equality, ongoing  
mediation within the black community was central to identity formation. W hen 
the Know-Nothing legislature passed a bill opening the public schools to black 
children, and the School Committee closed Smith School in the fall of 1855, 
these tensions were not necessarily resolved— just submerged, waiting for the 
chance to emerge once again in different forms over different issues.
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C onclusion
In the spring of 1851, in the w ake of the Fugitive Slave Law, the Boston 
Vigilance Com mittee nailed up posters around the d ty  warning African 
Americans to "Keep a Sharp Look O ut for KIDNAPPERS, and have TOP EYE 
open." More ominously, the posters cautioned them to "avoid conversing 
with the Watchmen and Police Officers of Boston," since the mayor and 
alderman had empowered law enforcement offidals to detain any black man 
or woman they suspected of being a fugitive slave. Not only were black 
Bostonians to merely avoid talking w ith  the police; they were instructed to 
"Shim them in  every possible manner, as so many HOUNDS on the track of 
your most unfortunate race."350
Over a hundred years earlier, a black man named John W oodby had 
been imprisoned by one of the tow n watchm en and only freed after paying 
thirteen shillings. Woodby — w ho w ou ld  later himself serve as a temporary 
watchman during smallpox outbreaks — went to the next m eeting of the 
selectmen and lodged a complaint, saying he had been held "without legal 
process, which he humbly Apprehends is against Law and Justice."351 
W oodby m ust not have been overly concerned with seeing the watchman 
punished; he did not appear at the next selectmen's meeting w hen they 
hauled the watchm an before them and, since Woodby did not appear, 
dismissed him  "with a Caution to act prudently in all such matters for the
350 A copy of the poster is reprinted in The Black Abolitionist Papers, ed. C. Peter Ripley 
(Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1991), vol. 3, 52.
351 A Report of the Record Commissioners of the C ity of Boston, containing the Boston Records 
from 1729 to 1742 (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1885), June 18, 1740.
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future." For Woodby, it apparently was enough to make it dear he knew the 
law and that he would not stand for unlawful treatment.
African Americans had probably never entrusted the law  or legal 
authorities with total confidence. To varying degrees, they had probably 
always kept a "top eye open." But there had been substantial reliance on t^ ie 
law as a tool to mediate differences with other blacks as well as with whites, 
and to provide a foundation for African Americans to define them selves as 
dtizens. During the 1850s, however, African Americans could no longer go 
to the law with any assurance. Gone were the days when black Bostonians 
could approach the neighborhood constable as they had approached George 
Reed in the 1810s. Gone were the days of the police working with black men 
like Richard Crafus in what was probably a guarded but mutually beneficial 
relationship.
This dissertation has described black engagement with the law in 
Boston that fostered a legal consciousness over a stretch of two hundred years. 
That particular legal consciousness may have begun to change toward the end 
of the antebellum era. Even then, however, the legal arena was a scene of 
victories and defeats. Locally, ordinary African Americans no doubt 
continued to use legal beliefs, both inside and outside the formal legal system, 
in a variety of ways, with varying effectiveness. Nationally, African 
Americans experienced setbacks with the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 
1850 and the Dred Scott decision in 1857. Black Bostonians experienced the 
ability of the law to protect w hen three courts exonerated three leaders of the 
black community for assisting in the successful rescue of Shadrach Minkins, 
an fugitive slave w ho had been captured for an imminent return to slavery 
in 1851. The black leaders, James Scott, Lewis Hayden, and Robert Morris, had 
almost surely participated in the rescue, but their defense attorneys managed
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to convince enough members of the white juries to prevent convictions of 
Scott and Hayden, and a unanimous vote for Morris' acquittal. For these 
men, the law worked to overcome an unjust law. But just a few months 
later, black Bostonians w ou ld  witness the triumph of injustice w hen Thomas 
Sims,0 only seventeen years old, was apprehended and all efforts to free him  
failed. City policemen had told Sims he was accused of theft, a charge that 
Sims, knowing he was innocent, had been confident of beating in court. Only  
after he was in custody w as he told that he had been captured as a fugitive 
slave. This incident likely prompted the Vigilance Committee posters that 
appeared a few weeks later. Three years later, black Bostonians would watch  
another fugitive slave, Anthony Bums, marched through the streets of 
Boston by federal troops and returned to slavery. As African Americans had  
always known, the law could be a powerful tool for both freedom and 
oppression. On the eve o f the Civil War, the oppressive power of the law  
seem ed to be on the verge of becoming overwhelm ing.352
It is through the lens of the oppressive power of the law that African 
Americans' interaction w ith  the law is frequently seen. The legal 
consciousness of m ost African Americans in the late nineteenth century and  
into the twentieth century is probably best typified by a joke that circulated in 
the Depression-era South. Two black men walking dow n a country road are 
hit by a white man speeding along in a big white convertible. The first m an is 
propelled 150 feet dow n the road. The second is launched straight up in the 
air and lands in the convertible. When the police arrive on the scene, the 
first black man is charged with leaving the scene of an accident, and the
352 On Shadrach Minkins, see Gary Collison, Shadrach Minkins: From Fugitive Slave to 
Citizen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997); on Thomas Sims, see James Oliver 
Horton and Lois E. Horton, Black Bostonians: Family Life and Community Struggle in the 
Antebellum North (Holmes and Meier, 1979), 105-107.
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second black man is charged with illegal entry.353 Expecting justice in a racist 
white w orld was futile. The legal consciousness of many African Americans, 
especially in  the south during the m iddle of the twentieth century, reinforced 
avoidance of the law. But it was not always so. The story in these pages is of 
the more complicated story of the relationship between African Americans 
and the law  in Massachusetts over the two hundred years before the Civil 
War.
Part of that story is how that relationship shaped black identity. In 
contrast to the joke's two black victims, African Americans in colonial 
America and during the early republic era were not simply acted upon by the 
law. They responded actively to their changing circumstances by using the 
law. Historians Susan Juster and Lisa MacFarlane note that "our identities 
also derive from our active responses to our changing needs and desires, 
responses which in turn serve to reconstruct the categories into which we are 
placed."354 W hen Adam Saffin achieved freedom through the courts in 1703, 
he m anaged to reconstruct himself as a free man. When black integrationists 
sought to close the Smith School, they attempted to define what it meant to 
be black and American as citizens who actively pursued full citizenship 
rights. African American identity, never static, was in many ways a contested 
identity as black w om en and men wrestled w ith whites and one another in 
many arenas. The law was one of few  arenas in which African Americans 
could hold som e expectation that the playing field might be level.
353 Lawrence W. Levine, Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought 
from Slavery to Freedom (N ew  York: Oxford University Press, 1977), 318-319.
354 A M ighty Baptism: Race, Gender, and the Creation of American Protestantism, ed. Susan 
Juster and Lisa MacFarlane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 3.
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The real but elusive opportunities for change after the end of the Civil 
War likely further encouraged the kind o f legal consciousness described here. 
The thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth Amendments "were fundamental 
expressions of the black community's struggle, vision, and hope." In the early 
years of Reconstruction, black m en m ade inroads into political institutions, 
giving African Americans hope that legal equality might eventually translate 
into political and economic equality. Eric Foner describes the developm ent of 
a rights consciousness among southern blacks that was connected to the 
Declaration of Independence, and African Americans' interpretation of the 
postwar amendments as defining a "new national citizenship."355
But for many African Americans hope waned in the latter years of 
Reconstruction before being crushed in the era white restoration.356 Though 
there may have been a retreat from the law  and the development of a different 
kind of legal consciousness among ordinary black folk — one that taught them to 
avoid the formal legal system law when possible, and to be exceedingly wary 
w hen engaged with it -- African Americans probably continued to use legal 
beliefs privately in a variety of ways. Black leaders certainly continued to employ 
legal beliefs about the Constitution and the 'rights that belong to us all.' The 
ongoing employment of legal beliefs w ou ld  also continue to generate tensions 
within the black community; in the twentieth century friction at times stemmed
355 Vincent Harding, "Wrestling toward the Dawn: The Afro-American Freedom M ovement and 
the Changing Constitution/' Journal of American History 74 (December,1987), 724; Eric Foner, 
"Rights and the Constitution in Black Life during the Civil War and Reconstruction," Journal of 
American History 74 (December,1987), 880.
356 See Joel Williamson, A Rage for Order: Black/White Relations in the South Since 
Emancipation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Eric Foner, A Short History of 
Reconstruction, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper and Row, 1990); Edward L. Ayers, The Promise of 
the New South: Life After Reconstruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); C. Vann 
W oodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crcrw, 3d rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press,
1974).
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from the recalcitrance of ordinary black folk, many of them older, to buck an 
entrenched system of segregation. Those tensions were nothing new. African 
Americans in the twentieth century, as they had in earlier times, continued to 
work out what it meant to black and American.
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